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1 Introduction
Whereas the focus of modernity is on "what should be done," I suggest a
reorientation toward "what is actually done." In this way we obtain a better
grasp-less idealistic, more grounded--of what modernity and modern
democracy are and what kind of strategies and tactics may help change them
for the better (Flyvbjerg, 1998, pp. 2-3).
Transportation finance systems worldwide are in a precarious state. In the United
States, policy makers are faced with aging transportation infrastructure and little money to
bring infrastructure to a state of good repair. In Malaysia, the government has been forced
to buy back transportation infrastructure and operating concessions after private sector
providers declared bankruptcy. In Italy, the government is preparing for the collapse of the
state-owned national airline, which has posted significant operating losses for several years.
This precariousness is the result of a range of issues related to the lumpiness of
transportation investments, competition in the transportation sector, externalities associated
with transportation activity, properly pricing transportation services, dedicating government
revenues for transportation expenditures, and effectively leveraging the private sector for
transportation services. It raises several questions with respect to the relationship between
government and transportation. Is transportation a public good? Why does government
become involved in the transportation sector? What are the components of a sound
government policy for transportation finance?
This thesis attempts to answer these questions through an analysis of the Portuguese
public finance and transportation finance systems. The Portuguese case is interesting for
several reasons. The government is a relatively young democracy, having emerged from
authoritarian control in the mid 1970s, and as the nation continues to build and modify its
governance system, vestiges of the authoritarian regime still guide cultural values and beliefs
toward governance and its role in society. The case also provides an interesting look at the
influence of the European Union (EU) on transportation activity. Portugal was admitted to
the EU in 1986 and, as a result, transportation investments in the country have been both
enabled and shaped by EU policies.
A final, additional characteristic makes the Portuguese case interesting. Similar to other
systems worldwide, the Portuguese transportation finance system is in a precarious state.
Transportation infrastructure and services place a significant financial burden on the public
finance system, yet the significant burden does not always equate with significant public
benefits. Transportation related debt is high in Portugal and many Portuguese citizens are
beginning to ask why that is so.
Three primary research questions will address the relationship between government and
transportation in both a general sense and as applied to the Portuguese case:
* What criteria should be used for evaluating transportation finance systems?
* How does the Portuguese transportation finance system measure up with
respect to these criteria?
* What lessons can be drawn from the Portuguese approach to transportation
finance?
Because transportation finance exists as an element within the larger public finance
system, several secondary research questions must be addressed before the primary research
questions can be answered. Specifically:
* What is public finance?
* What is transportation finance and how does it function as an element within a
general public finance system?
* How does the Portuguese general public finance system affect transportation
finance in Portugal?
Flyvbjerg asserts that focusing on "what is actually done" will change modernity and
modem democracy for the better. This thesis attempts to apply Flyvbjerg's focus to
transportation finance in Portugal in the hopes that it, too, will be changed for the better.
1.1 Research Questions in Context
Policy-oriented research in the field of transportation is rare in Portugal. Few resources
describe either the inner workings of transportation policy and planning in Portugal or the
consequences such activity brings to bear on, ultimately, the daily lives of Portuguese
citizens. Three factors contribute to this situation: (a) political ideology in Portugal has for
many years now been oriented to modernization, economic growth, and developing a middle
class; societal concerns are secondary, (b) transportation ideology in Portugal, evidenced by
both professional activity and academic research, values a technical, engineering-based focus;
the social science approach is undervalued; and (c) government documents and public sector
reports are only now being made available to the public.
Certainly many of the public administrators and transportation professionals active in
transportation policy and planning in Portugal are familiar with how the current public
finance and transportation finance systems work. Yet there is no academic record that
offers researchers the background they need to propose realistic solutions for Portugal. It is
hoped that this thesis will fill that gap. On a more practical level, the research in this thesis
will provide a basis for the future projects and proposals developed under the
Transportation Systems focus area of the MIT Portugal Program.
1.2 Methodology
An embedded case methodology is used to analyze the Portuguese transportation
finance system. Case studies are analyzed as sub-units of the Portuguese transportation
policy and finance system, which, itself, is a case analyzed as a sub-unit of the general public
finance system. The approach is largely a descriptive exercise using data collected in the
field, media accounts, and government documentation.
A large body of research for this thesis was conducted during two field visits to
Portugal in July 2007 and January-February 2008. The field visits yielded seventeen
interviews with over twenty individuals including academics, public administrators and
transportation professionals (see Appendix, Table A for a complete list of interviewees). In
addition to conducting interviews, time in Portugal was spent collecting documentation
(reports, studies, etc.) pertinent to transportation policy and planning in Portugal. Additional
research on the Portuguese public finance and transportation finance systems continued via
a variety of media and government Internet resources.
Case-based research as employed in this thesis faces a number of limitations regarding
proof, generalization, and subjectivity. First, the case study methodology is a contextualized,
descriptive exercise that cannot "prove" anything definitively. Second, generalization is
difficult to do with case-based research. Analysis of the Portuguese case, for example, does
not create predictive theories of transportation policy and finance that can be generalized to
other contexts.
A final limitation concerns the inherent subjectivity of the case study methodology.
Individual bias influences the formulation, execution, and evaluation of case-based research.
An attempt has been made to be as transparent and cognizant of bias as possible in this
thesis. For example, the preconceived notion that transportation planning should be easier
in a smaller country was dismissed upon understanding the political ideology, politics, and
policies in the data relevant to the Portuguese case.
Despite these limitations, the descriptive power of analyzing the Portuguese case still
lends insight to the general study of transportation policy and finance. The supposition is
that the state of, influences over, and challenges to transportation policy and finance in
Portugal are similar in other national and sub-national contexts. That supposition, however,
will be left to future research.
1.3 Structure
The thesis begins with theoretical overviews of both general public finance in Chapter 2
and transportation policy and finance in Chapter 3. These overviews provide the reader with
a basis for analyzing the Portuguese public finance and transportation finance systems. The
embedded case methodology begins with the largest unit of analysis, the Portuguese public
finance system, in Chapter 4. It continues through the sub-unit cases, providing a
description of the Portuguese transportation policy and finance system in Chapter 5 and
concludes with three sets of cases studies within the transportation policy and finance
system. The last chapter, Chapter 7, draws some basic conclusions and directions for
additional research.

2 A Public Finance Primer
It is necessary to introduce the basic concepts of the theory behind public finance
before beginning an analysis of the Portuguese public finance and transportation finance
systems. This chapter offers an overview of public finance as a component of public policy
and fiscal policy. It introduces the concept of the public good, describes several revenue-
generating mechanisms for financing government activity, and provides a common language
for describing concepts that define intergovernmental fiscal and administrative relationships.
2.1 A Driver Pulls Onto a Stretch of Highway...
In the year a driver pulls onto a stretch of highway in . The year
could be 1960, 1984 or 2008. The highway could be in the mountains outside Mexico City,
the concrete jungle of Tokyo or the dense forests of rural India. The time and place are
irrelevant. What is important, however, is that while continuing down the highway, this
driver thinks back on that moment in time when the road did not exist in its current state.
When there was only a dirt road or, maybe, no road at all. When to get from Point A to
Point B drivers had to travel many miles out of their way, or suffer severe congestion, or risk
unsafe traveling conditions, or take a train or, perhaps, when people had no reason at all,
really, to travel between Points A and B.
Just beneath the surface of the driver's musings lie some very important questions
about the highway: Why was it built? Who decided to build it? Where did they get the
money? Certainly the road was not built without some sort of justification.' The road may
be a vital component of regional economic development, enabling trade and tourism, or a
means of introducing greater accessibility to a remote region lacking access to healthcare,
education or other opportunities. The road may be a key component of a much larger
network of roads and therefore intended to provide a logical link between major pieces of
infrastructure, or it could be nothing more than a political tool to reward or win the favor of
residents and businesses in the region. Or it may be a combination of some or all of these
elements.
The local municipality, the provincial government, or the national government may
have decided to build the road. It might have even been a proposal of a private company.
The decision maker may have opted to tax citizens in the region in order to fund the road, or
it may have levied a tax on citizens in other regions. It might have received a grant or loan
from a national or supranational entity or bank. The decision maker may ultimately use tolls
to fund or offset construction costs. Alternatively, the decision maker may have opted to
take money dedicated for other activities and use it to fund construction.
The possibilities are many. One could even imagine a situation where a government
does not pay for a road, but simply uses force to coerce its construction. Regardless of the
specific answers, the hypothetical driver's questions can be expanded to form the very basic
questions of public finance, a discipline that explores governance systems and how such
systems fund and administer government activity. Whether providing for healthcare,
education, public safety, or mobility (as in the case of the highway driver), governments
1 Publicly stated or otherwise.
choose to provide certain services to their citizens. The fundamental questions therefore
become:
* What are public services and why do governments provide them?
* Who funds and delivers public services?
* How is money raised to provide public services?
The following chapter attempts to answer these questions by providing a primer on
public finance, introducing the reader to basic elements of public finance theory. It also
provides a brief description of new directions the discipline has taken over the past two
decades.
2.2 What Are Public Services and Why Do Governments Provide Them?
Government obviously has a number of economic and political considerations to take
into account when designing an approach to public service provision. Before addressing
those considerations, however, it is important to briefly revisit public economics, the
concept of the public good, and the logic framing the argument of why the public sector, as
opposed to private markets, should provide public goods and services. The following
section will also delve behind public goods to briefly explore the inherent sociological and
cultural influences-values, beliefs and norms--that come to bear on the production of
public goods.
Public Goods
In a market-based economy, goods are separated into two categories: public and private.
A good is considered "public" when its is both non-rivaled-meaning one's consumption of
the good does not decrease another's ability to consume the same good-and non-
excludable--meaning consumers cannot be excluded from consuming the good (Samuelson,
1954; Stiglitz, 2000). Classic examples include national defense, broadcast television or a
lighthouse. A ship that benefits from a lighthouse onshore does not take away from another
ship's ability to "consume" the same good. A second ship on the horizon can avail itself of
the lighthouse while the first ship is doing the same. This is the definition of a non-rivaled
good. Additionally, when the lighthouse is operating, any and every ship on the horizon can
see it. A specific ship cannot be selectively excluded from consuming the light from the
lighthouse, a fact that satisfies the criteria of a non-excludable good.
Private goods are the opposite of public goods because they are both rivaled and
excludable. An individual who drinks a cup of coffee certainly decreases another's ability to
consume that same cup of coffee. Additionally, the coffee must be purchased. Any
individual lacking the money to buy the good can be prevented from consuming it.
Most public goods are not considered pure public goods because they are, to some
degree, rivaled, excludable, or both. A public road, for example, might be unrivaled when
few drivers are using it. It could become rivaled, however, during times of congestion. Each
additional driver that enters the congested road adversely impacts all of the other drivers on
the road, adding to their cumulative delay and, of course, decreasing their ability to consume
the good. Roads, too, can be made excludable through the use of tolls. Even if a road was
constructed with government funds and subsequently made available to the public, some
governments may make use of the road contingent on payment of a toll.
Despite the fact that most public goods are not pure public goods, it is clear that
markets are not the best means for their delivery.2 Markets use consumption quantities as a
proxy for demand, which, in turn, influences supply. However, it is difficult to determine
exactly how much of a public good has been consumed. For example, farmers know how
many coffee plants to grow based on the amount of coffee consumed in the particular
markets they serve, whereas it is much more difficult to know how much of a lighthouse's
service a ship consumed. The ship may have relied exclusively on the lighthouse throughout
its night passage. On the other hand, it may have possessed advanced navigation equipment
that rendered the lighthouse superfluous. The lighthouse keeper will never know. Without
an indication of a consumer's preference for a service, public economists theorize that, were
markets to provide public goods, there would always be an underproduction.
Apart from their difficulty in ascertaining how much of a public good to supply, market
producers would also need to be able to sell the goods in order to recover costs and make a
living. This is the basic function of a transaction-based market. For example, suppose an
individual opts to construct a lighthouse and sell its services to ships in the region. Some
ship captains may see the lighthouse as a valuable service and opt to pay for its provision.
Others, however, will conceal their preference for the service and resolve not to pay,
knowing that once the lighthouse is operational they will be able to take advantage of it even
though they did not fund its construction. Samuelson (1954) first identified this
phenomenon as "giving false signals," but it is since been coined thefi·e rider phenomenon.
Because the good is non-excludable, non-payers cannot be prevented from consuming the
good, thus there will always be the incentive to free ride. Therefore, a basic tenet of the
market system cannot be met.
Because private markets are unsuitable for producing public goods, their provision is
left to the public sector. Although the public sector is not immune to the issues surrounding
the underproduction of public goods and the free rider phenomenon, it is clear that the
public sector is the most appropriate entity for determining the amount of public goods to
be produced, either by the public sector itself or in a close regulatory relationship with the
private sector.
Culture and Public Goods
Examples of public goods and services provided by government include national
defense, public security, fire protection, healthcare, education, transportation infrastructure,
public transportation services and law. This, however, raises a fundamental question: how
did government "decide" that these public goods were necessary to provide? The above list
is by no means a standard one. A close survey of public goods provision across world
governance systems reveals many differences. As Douglas (1992) notes, "In England, post-
war governments tried to treat health care as essentially a non-excludable public
good...while in America it is largely treated as a private good. In many societies food and
water are treated as non-excludable" (p. 130). Here Douglas provides a critical link between
public goods and society. Governments provide a specific set of public goods that acts as
(a) a reflection of societal characteristics, namely the hegemonic political ideology within
society, and (b) an active tool for socialization itself. Put more precisely, the fundamental
question is therefore: which political ideologies drive the decision-making processes that
2 That is not to say that private markets cannot provide certain public goods with proper incentives and
oversight from the public sector.
ultimately dedicate government activity to the provision of a specific set of public goods as
opposed to another?
The field of economics has traditionally been unwilling to acknowledge the influence of
culture on governance systems and economic activity.3 Yet the influence is undeniably
significant. Instead, sociology has been left to link culture, governance and economics
through the study of behavioral economics, economic sociology and political science. While
a complete survey of these disciplines' work is beyond the scope of this thesis, it will be
useful to briefly acknowledge the cultural underpinnings of governance and economics,
evidenced by two recent studies by social psychologists and economists.
The work of Licht, et al. (2007) links culture to the establishment of norms of
governance, specifically the rule of law, attitudes toward corruption and democratic
accountability. Cultural orientations therefore explain the degree to which these norms, as
legitimate modes of wielding power, are adopted and practiced within governance systems.
In the study, cultures are defined and distinguished through a framework of cultural value
dimensions developed by Schwartz and applied in several previous studies. The framework,
outlined in Table 1, utilizes three polar orientations-embeddedness/autonomy,
hierarchy/egalitarianism, mastery/harmorny-which define "three basic issues that confront
all societies" (p. 662).
Table 1. The Schwartz Framework of Cultural Value Dimensions
Embeddedness/Autonomy Embeddedness refers to a cultural emphasis on the
individual as embedded in the group and committed to
maintaining the status quo, propriety, and restraint of
actions or inclinations that might disrupt group solidarity or
the traditional order. Autonomy describes cultures in
which the individual is viewed as an autonomous,
bounded entity that finds meaning in his or her own
uniqueness.
Hierarchy/Egalitarianism Hierarchy refers to a cultural emphasis on obeying role
obligations within a legitimately unequal distribution of
power, roles and resources. Egalitarianism refers to an
emphasis on transcendence of selfish interests in favor of
voluntary commitment to promoting the welfare of others
whom one sees as moral equals.
Mastery/Harmony Mastery refers to a cultural emphasis on getting ahead
through active self-assertion in order to master, change,
and exploit the natural and social environment. Harmony
refers to an emphasis on accepting the social and physical
world as it is, trying to comprehend and fit in rather than to
change or exploit it.
Source: Licht et al. (2007, p. 662).
The authors administered a cultural values survey to over 15 thousand urban
schoolteachers on all seven continents over a period of ten years. Through the survey they
were able to establish cultural value profiles for over fifty nations. Cross-referencing their
3 This became especially true when the American institutionalist school of economic thought died out in the
early 20t Century. American institutionalists were replaced by the discipline's new focus on utility
maximization brought about by the Paretian and Keynesian revolutions in the 1930s (Bernard Schwartz Center
for Economic Policy Analysis, 2008).
value profiles with the World Bank's Governance Indicators dataset, the authors determined
that the embeddedness/autonomy dimension, which assesses the relationship between the
individual and society, to be the most significant predictor of government norms. Cultures
that value individual autonomy and embrace citizens as unique, free-thinking agents
necessitate transparent legal systems, stigmatize and punish corrupt activity, and promote
democratic accountability. Alternatively, cultures that embed the individual in society as an
agent of obedience, traditional ways and the status quo promote "community-based
enforcement [in place of a rule-of-law norm,]... are more likely to socialize citizens to accept
bribery as a way of life... [and] call for circumscribing individual freedoms in the name of
protecting social order, security, and interests of the wider group" (pp. 664-665).
In an effort to further strengthen their results and disprove reverse causality, that is, that
government norms precede and create cultural values, the authors took a unique look at the
relationship between culture and language. Under a body of work known as the Sapir-
Whorf hypothesis, "culture and language are intertwined and mutually constitute one
another" (p. 672). Because language enables cognition, decision-making and the
transmission of shared values so, too, must culture. Culture and language therefore precede
any ability for social organization, including governance.4
It is not difficult to make the leap from culture's impact on norms of governance to its
impact on what Guiso, et al. call "political preference," essentially the individual or collective
preference of "what governments should do" (2006, p. 40). The authors used data from the
United States General Social Survey, a national survey used to measure the attitudes of U.S.
citizens, to establish a correlation between religious affiliation and preference for income
redistribution.' They also used the same data to establish a correlation between ethnic origin
and preference for income redistribution, concluding that "overall, the underlying cultural
determinants of preferences for redistribution do seem to have an impact on the amount of
redistribution that occurs" (p. 44).
The authors' notion of political preference approximates the definition of political
ideology: the set of beliefs, norms, principles and doctrines, which persists over time and
prescribes a specific way to organize society. Max Weber (1921/1946), the seminal
sociologist, strikes at the heart of the concept of political ideology with the following:
... the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by
means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence. If the state is
to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by the powers that
be. When and why do men obey? Upon what inner justifications and upon
what external means does this domination rest? (p. 78).
4 To establish a link between culture and language, the authors investigated a component of language known as
"pronoun drop." This refers to a language's use of pronouns, specifically whether they are required or whether
they can be left out or dropped. They found that this feature correlated significantly with a culture's
measurement along the embeddedness/autonomy value dimension. Individuals who use languages which
feature pronoun drop have an "entrenched view of individuals as embedded in social contexts" as opposed to
autonomous and unique agents (p. 673).
s Income redistribution refers to government activity designed to capture income from the "haves" and
redistribute it to the "have nots."
Political ideology is inherent in all cultures6 and, subsequently, cultures throughout the
world have acknowledged the "existence" of the state. The inner justifications Weber refers
to hinge, in part, upon several criteria: how the state functions, provides for and protects its
citizens. The production of public goods lies within these criteria and is undeniably
influenced by a culture's political ideology or ideologies. This makes most sense when
government is viewed not as an abstract political construct, but as an affiliation of
individuals. Even those who claim authority in Weber's state are not immune to the
ideological socialization that began long before their entrance to civil service. Whether a
governance system provides free education or leaves citizens to purchase a private education,
whether it offers public transportation or allows the market to provide public transportation
services, the specific set of public goods the system produces is a reflection of cultural values
and beliefs.
The Production Path of Public Goods
Culture is not a static construct nor is it limited to political boundaries. It changes over
time, often regardless of any direct government intervention. As cultures change,
governments will feel the pressure to parallel that change, whether that pressure is domestic,
international, or both. While this pressure may induce changes of revolutionary proportions,
it also impacts the much less revolutionary production of public goods. Acknowledging this
dynamism, scholars have sought to describe the actors and actions that influence public
goods provision, known as the "production path of public goods."
Kaul and Conceigio (2006) offer an illustrative diagram which describes the production
path of national public goods. They envision the production of a public good as a function
of incentives, political pressure, coercion, domestic preferences, opportunity, consumption,
external preferences and externality. The key elements missing in the Kaul/Conceigqo
production path, however, are the cultural underpinnings. Language, political ideology, and
so forth allow the aforementioned interactive elements to occur in a space of shared
meaning and understanding. Figure 1 reproduces and adapts the authors' production path to
include these crucial elements, presenting a succinct overview of the complexities behind
producing and providing public goods.
6 Some sociologists go so far as to suggest that "politics is inseparable from ideology" (Seliger, 1976 as quoted
in Gerring, 1997, p. 968).
Figure 1. Production Path of National Public Goods
Source: Adapted from Kaul & ConceiýAo (2006, p. 12)
Thus, public goods are non-rivaled and non-excludable goods whose production is
most appropriately governed by the public sector. They are a function of political ideology,
a cultural element that influences not only what public goods and services governments
provide, but also the form and even existence of government itself. A survey of the public
goods and services produced by government will reveal cultural values and beliefs. Still, the
production of public goods is not an abstract process. Although complex, the production
path of public goods can be characterized as a series of actions and reactions by domestic
and international agents.
2.3 Who Funds and Delivers Public Services?
The second basic question of public finance addresses the key actors within the public
finance system, the relationships between those actors, and their responsibilities and
limitations in funding and providing public services. Here the distinction between funding
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services and providing services is important. Specific administrative divisions may deliver
services with funds that are provided by other levels of government. The hypothetical
highway driver at the beginning of the chapter, for example, may be driving upon a piece of
infrastructure owned by the municipality, but constructed with monies from regional
sources, national sources, or both. Furthermore, tolls may be levied on the driver herself
and utilized as a funding source.
In addition to carving up administrative divisions, government systems employ a
framework of laws and policies that define the degree of autonomy, authority and
responsibility for specific levels of government. The link to public finance occurs here,
where governments must decide (explicitly or implicitly) the public services to be provided
by specific levels of government with specific monies. This is the purview of a set of
principles known as fiscal federalism (Oates, 1999). Before delving into the concepts of
fiscal federalism, the following sections introduce the concept of territorial governance as
well as several specific forms of governance.
Government and Territory
As the previous section on public goods, culture and political ideology suggests, the
evolution of modem-day governance is a long and storied history. Rather than recount that
history, however, this thesis will begin with governance as a function of territory. In an
effort to facilitate government activity, governments organize themselves into multiple
levels-spatial jurisdictions that possess varying degrees of autonomy (Hooghe & Marks,
2003).7 A national or central government can undertake government activity as one large
administrative body or it may subdivide itself into nationally controlled regions or field
offices. Additionally, sub-national governments can exist within government systems. Some
may operate under the direct control of central government while others may be completely
autonomous, operating under the control of locally elected leadership. Multi-level
governments often possess "cascading jurisdictional scale" as the size of territory they
govern decreases with each level. Thus, states and provinces constitute forms of "regional"
government with purview over larger territories in comparison to counties and districts,
which may still be regional jurisdictions yet at a much smaller scale. Regional governments
can also be divided into smaller autonomous jurisdictions such as municipalities, which can
be sub-divided even further into administrative councils.
For the purposes of this thesis, three levels of government are distinguished:
supranational, national and sub-national, with the final level divisible into regional and
municipal (or local) governments. Supranational governments have some degree of
authority over one or more national governments, as is the case with the European Union
and its member states.
Government and the Vertical Structure of the Public Sector
Governance, in the context of the modem nation-state, can take on a variety of forms.
The form is a function of (a) the existence and degree of democracy, (b) the existence of
sub-national jurisdictions of government and (c) the level of government decentralization.
The fiscal and administrative relationships between multiple levels of government constitute
7 Admittedly, Hooghe and Marks (2003) argue that "multi-level governance" can be organized around many
things other than territory (e.g. policy problems, specific competencies), but for sake of simplicity I will use the
more traditional spatial organization of territories as a foundation for understanding basic government. The
authors call this "Type I Governance".
the "vertical structure" of the public sector. Although it is possible to imagine a government
that centralizes all administration at the national level, most contemporary governments,
dictatorships or otherwise, have a vertical structure. In an effort to identify the factors that
influence fiscal federalism, the following sections highlight different forms of governance as
well as degrees of government decentralization.
Forms of Governance
Forms of modern governance directly impact the vertical structure of the public sector.
In an interesting study of federalism and economic performance, Inman (2007) classifies
over seventy nations into five forms of governance- federal democracy, administrative
federal democracy, unitary democracy, federal dictatorship and unitary dictatorship-using
three criteria, "[a] the number of provincial [sub-national] governments, [b] policy
assignment for the provision of important government services between central and
provincial governments and [c] constitutionally protected [and locally elected] provincial
[sub-national] representation to the central government legislature" (p. 530). Under Inman's
classification, governments can be either federal or unitary and either democratic or
authoritarian.
Federal governments possess two or more provinces that have policy autonomy and
representation in the national legislature. Unitary governments, however, "either lack
politically independent provincial governments or, if there are provincial or lower-tier
governments, those governments either lack independent policy authority or central
government representation [meaning locally-elected representatives do not serve on a central
government legislative body]" (p. 530). The author calls out "administrative federal
governments" as systems that are unitary by nature, but rely heavily upon sub-national
governments for central-level policy implementation. The category acts as a middle ground
between the federal/unitary designations.
Although the author does not offer an explicit distinction between democratic and
authoritarian governments, it can be assumed that the former pursues competitive elections
under the tenet of equal rights for all citizens whereas the latter does not. A sample of
Inman's country classifications by forms of governance can be found in Table 2.
Table 2. Countries Classified by Form of Governance
Sample Period: 1965-2000
Federal Administrative Unitary Federal Unitary
Democracy Federal Democracy Dictatorship Dictatorship
Democracy
Argentina France Chile Ethiopia Chinaa
Germany Japan Jamaica Malaysia Nicaragua
India Sweden New Zealand Russia Thailand
United States Uruguay Portugal Yugoslavia Zimbabwe
Source: Adapted from Inman (2007, pp. 532-535).
a Inman admits that China could be classified as a federal dictatorship, but claims the results of his
analysis were unaffected by this change.
Governance Forms and Decentralization
As Inman's "administrative federal democracy" category suggests, decentralization can
take on a variety of forms and is, in fact, a much more complex concept than its counterpart,
centralization. Rondinelli provides an illustrative delineation of three degrees of
decentralization-deconcentration, delegation and devolution-that illustrates where
governments fall on the spectrum from deconcentration, the weakest form of
decentralization, and devolution, the strongest (1990).
Administrative deconcentration occurs when a central government decentralizes activity to
other levels within central government or to field offices under its direct control. This form
is often considered a more efficient means of service delivery and may even grant field office
directors some decision-making autonomy. The democratic potential of this form of
decentralization is severely limited, however. Those same field offices are ultimately
beholden to central government, not the citizens in their charge.
By contrast, under delegation, a decentralizing government opts to authorize the decision-
making processfor and the provision ofpublic services to a sub-national government. In
most cases, however, the sub-national government to which authority has been delegated
lacks fiscal autonomy. This is not a trivial distinction. Because it cannot raise its own
revenue, it must rely on national government for all funding support. Although sub-national
governments have some degree of autonomy under the delegation process, central
government still wields significant control and is thus able to act in its own self-interest
(Bahl, 2007; Weingast, 2006). A central government could, for example, vary the level of
support offered to specific jurisdictions as a means of meting out reward or punishment (see
Democracy under Section 2.5).
The process of devolution takes delegation a step further, providing sub-national
governments both the autonomy to make decisions about the provision of public services as
well as the authority to raise revenue to fund government activity. Local governments are
thus fully accountable for the services they provide. Devolution is generally considered the
preferred vertical structure for the public sector (Bird, 1999; Nechyba, 2007; Oates, 1999,
2006; Smoke, 2007; Tiebout, 1956), although it is not without its pitfalls and critics (Bird &
Wong, 2005; Prud homme, 1995).
Elements of Fiscal Federalism
The vertical structure of a public finance system describes the two basic elements of
fiscal federalism: a government's authority to (a) deliver public services and (b) raise the
revenue necessary to fund those services. The principles of fiscal federalism are not
exclusive to federalist governance systems. Even unitary governments must coordinate
activity through a series of decisions regarding jurisdictional authority and resource
allocation.
Whether by decree, deliberation or default, national and sub-national governments
receive (or take) the authority and consequent responsibility to provide public services to the
citizens they govern. This speaks to the wide variety of approaches to fiscal federalism. In
some cases, laws and policies strictly outline a government's vertical structure, defining the
authority and responsibility for public services as they relate to that structure. Most national
governments and their accompanying legal and policy frameworks are not so thorough,
however. There is a definite tradeoff between a clear and comprehensive approach versus
one that is piece-meal. The comprehensive approach may thoroughly define responsibility,
but it may also be inflexible, slow to change, and politically difficult to implement. A piece-
meal approach may create an extremely flexible and responsive environment, but it may be
too ambiguous and leave gaps in policy. Basic service provision must be sufficiently
mandated in order to avoid administrative gaps that may prove harmful to the governed;8 yet
sub-national governments need the authority to provide new public services as conditions
change. A well-designed system will harmonize service provision at specific levels of
government, account for spillovers between jurisdictions, minimize jurisdictional conflict
and accommodate flexibility in new approaches to service provision.
Good design also necessitates delegating the authority to raise revenue for service
provision to various levels of government. This, the second basic element of fiscal
federalism, concerns fiscal decentralization. While the specific financial mechanisms used to
generate revenue will be discussed in detail in the following section on fiscal policy, what is
of concern here is a jurisdiction's abikty to raise its own revenue, known simply as "own
source revenue."
Fiscal Equivalence
The two basic elements of fiscal federalism-authority and revenue-are linked by the
economic concept offiscal equivalence. Olson (1969) describes fiscal equivalence as matching
"those who receive the benefits of a collective [public] good and those who pay for it" (p.
483). Under this definition, governments (with obvious physical boundaries) produce public
goods, the benefits of which impact a designated population or area, considered the goods'
"benefit boundary". As an argument of economic efficiency (Pareto optimal conditions), the
boundary of benefits from public goods should therefore match the boundary of revenue
generation for those goods. Since some public goods are more local in scale (public schools
or parks, for example), local governments should provide those services and raise the
revenue for their provision. On the other hand, large-scale public goods, such as national
defense, should remain the responsibility of national or regional governments.
The fiscal equivalence condition argues that sub-national jurisdictions should provide
the lion's share of public good production. As previously stated, different political
ideologies influence preferences for specific public goods. So, too, do differences in climate,
terrain and economic conditions. A key fact is that these differences often manifest
themselves at a local or regional level. If "local" public goods are produced by national
government, there will certainly be a sub-optimal provision of public goods, as the national
government will not be able to account for those differences as effectively as sub-national
government. In such a situation, the national government would provide a set of public
services that would likely create an overprovision in some areas and an under provision in
others.
The fiscal equivalence condition also influences government decision-making processes
regarding service provision and the pursuit of democracy. When specific benefits are tied to
specific revenue-generating mechanisms, citizens are more aware of the link between the
two. Governments must therefore make public policy decisions that reflect the political
ideologies of the governed or risk being voted out of office.
Fiscal federalism in any multi-level governance system is an organic piece of policy and
law that fits within a culture's political ideologies as well as a nation's specific form of
governance. It will change as politics, power and values (and even forms of governance)
change, a fact that holds true for both established and emerging economies (Stiglitz, 2002).
It is also an extremely powerful policy tool. While a public finance system can be a uniting
8 For example, by not clearly defining the role of both national and sub-national governments in providing
public safety services--police, fire, and so forth-public sector response to any disaster would be at best
disorganized and at worst catastrophic.
force that harmonizes revenue generation, equalizes public goods provision and improves
service delivery, it can also be a source of great contention between levels within a specific
system.
2.4 How Is Money Raised To Provide Public Services?
While the principles of fiscal federalism address the authority and responsibility of
multi-level government to provide public services, fiscal policy concerns the actual
mechanisms used to raise revenue as well as the rules and laws that address government
deficits and expenditures.' Those rules and laws vary widely from government to
government. Rather than discuss the myriad possibilities of their formulation, this section
will focus on the various mechanisms governments use to raise revenue. This is not
intended to de-emphasize the importance of a policy framework in defining national and
sub-national fiscal policy, however. Each of the aforementioned elements has a strong
influence over economic activity in a specific economy.'0
Government revenue-generating mechanisms fall into four broad categories: user fees,
taxes, intergovernmental transfers and a final category consisting of donations, loans and
other mechanisms. Specific mechanisms are more appropriate for funding specific types of
public services; however, all government revenue generation in the modern global economy
can be characterized by these categories.
User Fees
The user fee is perhaps the most basic and straightforward revenue-generating
mechanism because it is based on a public service unit price charged upon consumption of
that service. This charge may be levied before or after consumption, a question of timing.
Thus governments decide the timing and amount of the user fee for any given public service.
The power of the user fee is that it can be adjusted to affect consumption, assuming price
elasticities for specific public services are understood.
One simple example of a user fee is a toll charged to access a highway or bridge. A
government or authorized governing body will decide the amount of the toll (based, in
theory, on short- or long-run marginal costs," social benefit, etc.) and will also determine
when the toll is to be paid. Consequently, an individual wishing to drive on the highway or
cross the bridge will be required to pay the toll. Specific measures will be put in place to
prohibit toll evasion (physical barriers to prevent bypassing toll booths and laws to prosecute
violators, for example) and the government will collect the toll revenue as drivers use the
facilities. The revenue raised may be used to finance capital or maintenance costs associated
with the facility, expenditures for future expansion or other investments in the
transportation network. Other public services that are appropriately linked to the user fee
financing approach include water services as well as access to public transportation and
recreational facilities.
From a public goods perspective, it would appear that the user fee finance mechanisms
unfairly charges for something that should be available to all: the ability to travel freely, in
9 Fiscal policy also includes the supply of money, which I do not address here, but which has obvious
economic implications.
to And, of course, over the economic activity that takes place between economies.
" Bahl and Linn (1992) describe the complications and impractical nature of utilizing the "pure marginal cost
rule" to price public services.
the case of road tolls, or access to clean water, in the case of water fees. A government that
provides these public good, however, must ensure that the good is not wasted. Here the
rationing potential of service provision through the user fee becomes important. If a
government sees a need to curb water consumption, it can raise the unit price for each liter
of water households take from the municipal water system. Likewise, pricing can be used to
match demand with supply in the absence of additional capacity. Tolls for a congested piece
of highway infrastructure may be increased to decrease demand on the facility, for example.' 2
In either case, the user fee is utilized to ration the good such that it is not completely
exhausted.
Taxes
While services associated with consumption levels are more appropriately paired with
the user fee, there are obvious public services that are not. These would include the
provision of police and fire protection, education, pensions, and, in some cases, healthcare.
The notion that a municipal fire brigade cannot respond to a house fire until the household
pays a "fire protection user fee" is rejected under most political ideologies. 13 In such cases,
taxes are better suited to raising revenue for service provision.
Taxes are fixed amounts levied upon transactions that take place in a specific economy.
The amounts are based upon a percentage of the total transaction, known as the tax rate. A
variety of taxes exist in governance systems, the most common being the income tax,
property tax and consumption tax (sales, value added or excise tax'4 ). Taxes are either direct
or indirect. Direct taxes are those paid directly to the government by those being charged
the tax, such as an income tax, whereas indirect taxes are those collected by an intermediary
and then paid to the government, such as a sales tax that is charged to the consumer,
collected by retailers and paid to the government.
Tax Assignment
The primary issue concerning taxation is tax assignment, essentially which levels of
government can charge specific taxes, who can be charged (the tax base) and which
transactions can be charged. Tax assignment is a very complicated and nuanced task; there
are many interactive effects between the various taxes jurisdictions utilize. Government
systems that are not mindful of these effects can inadvertently lock themselves into
unsustainable tax assignment models with negative economic consequences.
Although tax assignment might be considered more of an art than a science, most
public finance scholars have come to agreement on the appropriate tax assignment model
for a decentralized government. Dahlby (2001) has coined this the "consensus view" and
provides an illustrative overview of the model in his work. The consensus view
recommends that local and regional governments levy taxes on less mobile sources, leaving
central government to tax highly mobile sources. Mobility, in this sense, concerns a source's
ability to move from one tax jurisdiction to another in search of, presumably, a more
favorable tax environment.
12 Road tolls can also be used to capture the negative externalities of transportation activity (pollution,
congestion, accidents, etc.). This will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.
13 Which is not to say that a homeowner may not share some of the costs for fighting the fire.
14 An excise tax is defined as a tax on specific commodities such as alcohol or tobacco products (known as
sumptuary or "sin" taxes) as well as automobiles or fuel.
Business, for example, is considered highly mobile. Operations, holdings and profits
can be easily shifted across borders in order to avoid taxation. The consensus view argues
that this mobility is much higher across sub-national boundaries, therefore business taxation
should not occur at the sub-national level. Land, on the other hand, is highly immobile.
Thus taxes on land (real property) are most appropriate at the local level.
Most taxes-consumption taxes (retail sales tax, value added tax, excise tax), individual
and corporate income tax, payroll tax, wealth, inheritance and estate taxes, tariffs and natural
resource revenues--are reserved for central and, in some cases, regional governments under
the consensus view. Central government therefore has the most robust revenue-raising
capability, which often leaves local jurisdictions with access to relatively less lucrative taxes-
namely the property tax-and user fees. Intergovernmental transfers (which will be
discussed in greater detail in the following section) are intended to address this gap, but
some scholars criticize the level of complexity required to design transfers that maximize
benefit and minimize distortion (Bird, 1999; Dahlby, 2001; Weingast, 2006).
Scholars raise other issues with the consensus view. Bird (1999, pp. 6-7), for example,
highlights four problems with the approach: it (a) "assumes the economy would function
perfectly in the absence of taxes" and that tax distortion should therefore be minimized; (b)
assumes that government policy objectives are arranged hierarchically with central
government objectives trumping those of sub-national governments, something the author
claims to be impossible in a true federation; (c) discounts the political nature of government
by assuming that governments are benevolent agents pursuing only the highest good for
their constituents; and (d) is "purely normative.. .providing at best a very poor explanation
of tax assignments found in the real world." More grounded approaches to tax assignment
would take into account the more "messy" yet realistic nature of modern governance. This
is the view of the "second generation fiscal federalism" movement that will be discussed in
Section 2.5.
Intergovernmental Transfers
In addition to user fees and taxes, governments can also avail themselves of
intergovernmental transfers as a means of revenue generation." In its simplest form this
involves transferring the control of a designated amount of money from one authority to
another. In many governance systems, transfers are commonly made from central to sub-
national governments, but it is also possible to employ transfers between sub-national
governments or from a supranational government to a national government, as in the case of
the European Union and its member states.
Intergovernmental transfers are generally used to resolve vertical or horizontal fiscal
imbalances between levels of government within a specific economy. According to Ahmad
and Craig (1997), a vertical imbalance "occurs when the own revenues and expenditures of
various levels of government within a federation are unequal" and a horizontal imbalance
"occurs when the own fiscal capacities of various sub-national governments at the same level
differ" (p. 73). Resolving these imbalances can lead to greater macroeconomic stability,
equity and efficiency for a decentralized government.
Transfers take the form of revenue-sharing arrangements or grants. Under revenue
sharing, a portion of central government revenue from taxes (or even user fees) is shared
15 Technically, intergovernmental transfers themselves do not generate revenue. In an accounting sense,
however, the recipient can count the transfer as revenue.
with sub-national governments. The share distributed to a sub-national government can be
linked to the amount of revenue raised in that jurisdiction, known as derivation, or it can be
based upon a redistributive formula that promotes horizontal balance, known as equalization,
or both may be used in a combined approach (Ter-Minassian, 1997). The driving force
behind horizontal balance should not be equalizing the actual outlay of funds to sub-national
governments, but, rather, providing sufficient funds such that each government has the same
capacity to provide a minimum public service standard, based on a "jurisdiction's potential
revenue-raising capacity and not on actual revenues" (Bird & Smart, 2002, p. 901). Thus
more wealthy governments would receive a smaller sum of money than their less wealthy
counterparts.
Grants, in contrast, are not directly linked to central government revenue. These can be
general-purpose lump sums transferred to sub-national governments for unrestricted
spending or they can be conditional grants designed to fund a very specific purpose (e.g.
education, infrastructure) or based upon a matching criterion. Grants can also be disbursed
on a recurring basis-during each budget cycle, for example---or on an as-needed or one-
time basis.
Just as in tax assignment, the design of an intergovernmental transfer system must be
carefully considered. Derivation-based revenue-sharing arrangements may unfairly punish
jurisdictions with smaller tax bases while conditional grants limit sub-national fiscal
autonomy.16 Matching criteria may also introduce problems where wealthy jurisdictions are
able to raise the required match with greater ease than their poorer counterparts, therefore
more easily becoming eligible for the transfer. Regardless of their form, governments must
clearly define the goals for their intergovernmental transfer systems and work to eliminate
inefficiencies or adverse behavior within those systems.
Donations, Loans and Other Mechanisms
Beyond the traditional triumvirate of user fees, taxes and intergovernmental transfers,
governments have utilized a number of additional sources for revenue generation. These
include donations, loans, public land leasing and public-private partnerships.
Non-governmental or quasi-governmental organizations regularly disburse donations to
governments in support of a variety of dedicated activity such as disaster relief or
community development.'7 The Oxfam and the Red Cross grant programs are two prime
examples. Grants may even be used to create government. The United Nation's Local
Development Fund, for example, is designed to assist undeveloped local governments in the
provision of public infrastructure and services and may even be utilized to establish
institutional governance structures in the absence of a workable government (UNCDF,
2008).1
Loans and bonds mark yet another revenue source available to governments. This is
often done within a specific legal framework that dictates not only national and sub-national
governments' ability to borrow, but also loan sources, maximum loan terms, and borrowing
limits. Sub-national governments, for example, may be prohibited from borrowing from
foreign sources or only allowed to borrow up to a fixed percentage of their annual budget
16 Which may be necessary if sub-national jurisdictions produce sub-optimal outputs of specific public services.
17 I acknowledge that non-governmental agencies regularly bypass government as a recipient of donations, but
in the event that government does receive the money it is certainly a source of revenue.
18 Cambodia availed itself of the UN Local Development Fund in the early 1990s to reestablish a working
governance system after years of civil war (Smoke, 2007).
outlay. While providing governments with a powerful tool to leverage additional monies for
public service provision, debt can obviously become unmanageable and unsustainable at
both the national and sub-national levels.' 9
Public land leasing, as opposed to selling, is another potential revenue source for
governments, particularly those transitioning from a socialist regime where private land
ownership was previously forbidden. Under this arrangement, the public sector can auction
off the lease rights to land that it owns for specific periods of time. This can be a once-off
charge to lessees or an annual rent that incorporates increases in land value. Public land
leasing is a challenging mechanism to apply. A government that releases too much land into
the leasing market essentially throws away money, yet a decision to rationalize land supply to
maximize rent revenue can lead to inflated housing costs as lessees pass high leasing costs on
to consumers. Hong Kong, for example, has had a long history of public land leasing, but it
has not been without its challenges (Hong, 2003).
Finally, pub'ic-privatepartnerships may be utilized to generate additional revenue for
government activity. Just as governments can lease land, they can also lease infrastructure to
the private sector though a long-term concession agreement. This is especially prevalent in
the transportation sector, but is also seen in water delivery services. 20 Government therefore
concessions the ownership, operation and maintenance of a specific piece of infrastructure
to the private sector which is, in turn, allowed to charge users to access the facility. The two
parties negotiate the terms of the concession including the duration of the lease, the pricing
of user fees, the conditions for revoking the concession as well as the cost of the concession.
This cost reflects what the private sector must pay to the public sector for the right to
control the infrastructure and represents the revenue government receives. The number of
such partnerships is growing. Recent long-term concession agreements in the United States
yielded large monetary awards for Chicago and Indiana totaling 1.83 billion and 3.8 billion
dollars, respectively (Buxbaum & Ortiz, 2007).
In addition to infrastructure concessions, government can solely concession the
operation of services-public transportation, waste management or healthcare, for
example-to the private sector. The use of operating concessions as a revenue-generating
mechanism, as opposed to a cost-saving mechanism, is rare. Appropriate business and
administrative environments must exist. Sufficient demand is necessary for the creation of
profit, for example. That profit will not be shared with government, however, unless the
concession outlines how profit is to be administered, generally only after the private sector
recovers its costs and earns a reasonable profit itself.
More often, one or both of these elements are not in place. In the absence of demand,
government will forego any potential profit before the private sector concessionaire does. In
the presence of a profit-sharing administrative environment, a government often cannot
resist the temptation to alter the concession to either include profit sharing or increase its
profit share when the private sector is making significant revenue.
The challenge in any public finance system is to design revenue-generating mechanisms
that are effective yet create minimal market distortions. Effective mechanisms are those that
are easily understood and easily administered. This has as much to do with the fiscal
19 See Brazil and Columbia in Ter-Minassian (1997, chaps. 18 & 19).
20 The 1992 Buenos Aires water concession stands out as an example. See Alcizar, Abdala, & Shirley (2000).
equivalence condition-where taxpayers perceive a direct link between the taxes they pay
and the benefits they receive-as it does government capacity. Complicated taxes or user
fees can just as easily confound both the taxpayer and the public sector administrator,
rendering the effectiveness of such mechanisms questionable.
Even straightforward mechanisms may be difficult to implement if the public sector
lacks either the appropriate information to use the mechanism, sufficient staff trained to
administer the mechanism or administrative safeguards to protect revenues. A municipality
will find it difficult to tax land, for example, if there is no public record of land ownership
(or, more fundamentally, no legal system which identifies land as real property), no staff to
collect taxes and process the revenue, or no policy to protect tax revenue from in-house
budgetary raiding. Often, the promise of great revenues lures a government system to
underestimate its capacity to administer specific mechanisms.
2.5 Toward a Grounded Theory of Public Finance
Answering the three basic questions related to public policy, fiscal federalism and fiscal
policy reveals several characteristics of public finance. First, the elements of a public finance
system are clearly interconnected. A government cannot consider specific revenue-
generating mechanisms until it determines which levels of government will be responsible
for which services. Nor can it assign responsibility without understanding the services that
are to be provided. Because each element has the ability to vastly affect the other, any
notion that the development of a public finance system is a linear process is quickly
dispelled.
Second, public finance is inherently political. The production of a specific set of public
goods and services represents the prevailing political ideology. Ideologies change, however.
They are challenged, altered or replaced as individuals and groups seek greater cultural and
societal control and government, itself, works to legitimize its authority and remain in power.
This fact directly relates with the third characteristic of public finance: it is highly contextual.
What spells success in a specific national, regional or local context may not be replicable in
other jurisdictions. Forms of government, government institutions and political ideologies
vary widely across and within national boundaries.
Significant criticism has been levied against the traditional public finance theory, from
which the previous sections have been heavily drawn. While the theory is especially valuable
for pedagogical purposes, it presents a highly normative model that is not grounded in the
real world. Its espousal of devolution, fiscal equivalence, the "consensus view" of tax
assignment and the need for administrative tax capacity as the purview of sovereign nation
states does not adequately acknowledge the challenges facing modern public finance.
The field of "second generation fiscal federalism" has emerged as a response to the
traditional or "first generation" model, criticizing it as overly simplistic and unable to
account for failures in governance systems that have pursued its approach "by the book." A
second group of scholars and public administrators, under the banner of the "new public
finance model," claim that the traditional model erroneously ascribes to the Westphalian
state21 ideal, a construct that no longer exists in the modern global economy. Public finance,
21 The concept of a Westphalian state describes a sovereign nation-state that is (a) organized around territory
and (b) considers international influence on its affairs an intrusion. The term comes from the Peace of
Westphalia, which brought an end to the Thirty Years War in Europe in 1648. Here major European powers
agreed to the principle of "territorial integrity": No nation-state would promote alterations of territory (through
annexation or secession movements) in other nation-states.
they argue, while still the responsibility of sovereign governments, is an increasingly
supranational endeavor, which has created a global public finance that also influences
national-level fiscal federalism.
Second Generation Fiscal Federalism
Second generation fiscal federalism addresses discrepancies in governance and public
policy formation that are not explicitly encompassed by the traditional fiscal federalist model,
which is known as "first generation" fiscal federalism. While academics in the second
generation vein do not completely refute the tenets of the first generation model, they
highlight the fact that it makes many assumptions that do not hold in practice. The pursuit
of fiscal decentralization does not often result in the well-balanced, market-preserving (or -
enhancing) public finance system espoused under the first generation model.
Oates, the father of fiscal federalism, acknowledges this new generation of federalism
and in doing so highlights several assumptions made by the traditional model (Oates, 2005).
Three of these assumptions stand out as particularly relevant:
* First generation fiscal federalism assumed a benevolent national government that
sought to maximize the welfare of the governed.
* It assumed that central government, while unable to ascertain the preference for
local public goods, can adequately judge preference for national public goods.
* The traditional model took "an existing, stable, and self-perpetuating underlying
federal structure" as a given (p. 366).
Second generation fiscal federalism provides a more rich, interdisciplinary approach to
intergovernmental financial and administrative relations, drawing from three main fields of
study, which Oates identifies as public choice, political economy and "problems of
information" 22 (p. 356). Public choice theory applies the motivations of self-interested,
utility-maximizing actors to the study of behavior in economic systems. This is an important
direction for the study of public finance because it acknowledges the complexities guiding
human interaction and provides a more robust framework for analyzing government
interests as evidenced by government action. The benevolent government is no longer a
given.
The field of political economy encompasses public choice theory. It moves beyond the
deterministic regard of economic structures and systems as brute fact to consider them as
functions of sociological and political elements: meanings, values and norms. It "regards
economic ideas and behaviors not as a framework for analysis, but as beliefs and actions that
must themselves be explained" (Maier, 1987, p. 6). This, too, is an important direction for
public finance theory because it acknowledges public finance systems as social constructs.
Under this new direction, second generation fiscal federalism builds upon the first
generation model and provides a more practical foundation for the process of fiscal
decentralization. Weingast (2006), a second generation fiscal federalist, offers an illustrative
synthesis of the movement, revealing unspoken complexities within the first generation
model through a focus on the role of intergovernmental transfer systems and democracy in
22 Here OGates associates "problems of information" with a lack of perfect information, which, he intimates, is
endogenous to institutional interaction. I would move the concept to the field of sociology and the realm of
power and rationalization, expanding it to include organizational power seeking through the purposeful
manipulation, obfuscation or withholding of information.
fiscal federalism. Both, he argues, are elements difficult to design, implement and maintain
within a working (as opposed to theoretical) governance system. The following section
draws heavily from his work.
Intergovernmental Transfers
Despite the need for intergovernmental transfers to correct vertical and horizontal
imbalances within a governance system, their implementation often leads to market-
destroying practices. Weingast (2006) highlights that newly decentralized governments tend
to rely too heavily upon the intergovernmental transfer system and not sub-national tax
independence as a means of fiscal decentralization. This over-reliance may provide some
sub-national fiscal autonomy, but it comes with a significant drawback: it does not promote
sub-national economic growth. There is no incentive for sub-national governments to
promote growth in their jurisdictions when the majority of the benefit will be captured by
central government through a biased tax system.
In addition to failing to promote growth, Weingast (2006) explains that an over-reliance
on the intergovernmental transfer system can create a cycle of sub-national dependence on
central level support. This imbalance of power can often be tempting for central
governments to exploit, which can lead to undemocratic actions (see the section on "tragic
brilliance" below). On the other hand, the same system has the potential to engender a
culture of demand in which sub-national governments champion their "rights to revenue
[emphasis added], not markets and incentives" (p. 16). A sub-national government or
coalition of governments might effectively employ the revenue rights argument to pressure
central government for funds in excess of "optimal" levels, especially in the presence of a
soft budget constraint.23
Finally, large intergovernmental transfers remove the fiscal equivalence condition,
incentivizing an overprovision of services or overspending.24 This also sets the stage for
corruption. Weingast (2006) points out that due to the disinclination to finance sub-national
economic growth, local governments will be more inclined to undertake rent-seeking
behavior and corruption to gain both revenue and political support. Thus, governments will
create inflated charges or fees to raise funds while targeting benefits to a limited and
influential constituency for political support. Such an arrangement also gives local
government officials incentives to "blame policy failures on the central government whether
it is responsible or not" (p. 23). Thus sub-national governments can pursue whatever policy
course they choose regardless of the repercussions. When constituents become dissatisfied
with that course, sub-national governments can simply raise their arms in resignation and
claim that central government "controls everything."
23 The term "soft budget constraint" characterizes intergovernmental fiscal relations in which sub-national
governments, in times of fiscal difficulty, expect and receive a "bail out" from central government. A soft
budget constraint, as opposed to a hard budget constraint, encourages sub-national governments to spend
beyond their means and "blunts the incentives for... local officials to make sensible provisions for hard times"
(Oates, 2005, p. 365).
24 Historically, sub-national governments spend more when intergovernmental transfers are their main source
of revenue. They are much more careful, however, with own-source revenue. Public economists have coined
this phenomenon the "flypaper effect". For more on the flypaper effect see Hines, Jr. and Thaler (1995).
Dexnocrary
In addition to the complexities of intergovernmental transfer design, Weingast also
highlights the difficulty in establishing democratic governance systems, which, he explains, is
"more than just creating elections" (p. 40). He highlights three dangers that nascent
democracies face when establishing a decentralized economy in the fiscal federalist tradition:
(a) the tendency to violate the "limit condition," (b) "tragic brilliance," and (c) denying
access to organizations. All three involve manipulative action coordinated by central
government to exact specific behavior from sub-national governments and their
constituents.
In the democracy envisioned under first generation fiscal federalism, government grants
its citizens a series of rights and public services by virtue of their citizenship. These rights
are assumed to be inalienable, meaning government would limit its power to take them away,
which Weingast (2006) coins the "limit condition." The temptation, and subsequent reality,
however, is for government to violate the limit condition and make those rights and public
services contingent upon a citizen's political relationship with those in power. This can have
a destabilizing effect on democracy. When such basic rights are at stake, citizens are more
likely to pursue "extra-constitutional" action such as coups or riots.
The scope of this concept can be widened to include sub-national governments in the
context of intergovernmental transfer design. Central government may use discretionary
transfers to punish sub-national governments that support opposition party candidates or,
conceivably, conduct any action contrary to central government. Weingast (2006) calls this
"tragic brilliance": tragic because it forces citizens to play an active role in maintaining an
authoritarian regime that they would rather replace; but also brilliant, in that authoritarians
use their policy discretion to create political dependence and subservience while providing
the outward veneer of elections, choice, and democracy" (pp. 37-38). Those governing
emerging democracies may even purposefully create vertical economic imbalances in order
to establish the environment for the tragic brilliance strategy.
Finally, Weingast (2006) addresses the tendency of emerging democracies to limit
citizen access to organizing in the economic, social, political and legal realms. Limitations
may come in the form of outright denial, such as outlawing specific types of organizations,
or rent-seeking activity, such as controlling the formation of corporations through inflated
and arbitrary incorporation fees. From an economic perspective, such action destroys the
competition necessary for efficient economic development. From a democratic perspective,
it not only represents a violation of fundamental citizen rights, but also severely hinders the
ability to keep government in check, which is often the purview of alternative political
parties or government watchdog groups.
Federal Differentiation
One of the most important elements of Weingast's work is a set of five conditions used
to differentiate fiscally decentralized governance systems. Because decentralization can take
on a variety of forms, these conditions are helpful in identifying how or why certain nation-
specific policies or practices have led to a less-than-ideal reality. Although Weingast (2006)
calls these "conditions for differentiating federal systems" it is important to reiterate that the
principles of fiscal federalism are not strictly limited to federal governments. The five
conditions are highlighted in Table 3 below.
Table 3. Conditions for Differentiating Federal Systems
Condition Question
Hierarchy Is there a hierarchy of governments with a
delineated scope of authority?
Sub-national Autonomy Do the sub-national governments have primary
authority over public goods and service provision for
the local economy?
Common Market Does the national government provide for and
police a common market that allows factor and
product mobility?
Hard Budget Constraints Do all governments, especially sub-national ones,
face hard budget constraints?
Institutionalized Authority Is the allocation of political authority
institutionalized?
Source: Weingast (2006, p. 6, emphasis in original).
In the end, second generation fiscal federalism offers a much more grounded
foundation for fiscal decentralization theory, specifically, and public finance theory, in
general. By acknowledging the importance of political economy and public choice, scholars
move the field into a new realm, which provides greater insight into and explanatory power
over intergovernmental fiscal relations. What emerges is a postmodern model of fiscal
federalism that accepts economies and governments not as static and independent from
society, but as dynamic social constructs.
The New Public Finance
Second generation fiscal federalism is not the only force advancing public finance
theory. A group of scholars and public administrators are reorienting public finance theory
to accommodate the global economy in what have coined the "new public finance." They
contend that the notion of the Westphalian state, which has for so long guided public
finance theory and education, is dead. Globalization has long since replaced the isolationist
nation-state with the open, integrated state. This openness has (a) forced nations to
recognize the need to finance public policy challenges beyond their borders and (b) brought
new international pressure to bear on national public policy and public goods provision.
Global Public Finance
In articulating their view of a global public finance, Kaul and Concei~go (2006)
segment the discipline into three distinct categories of evolution: traditional public finance,
public finance 1 and public finance 2. Traditional public finance embodies most of what has
already been described in this chapter and is the purview of the Westphalian state. Public
finance 1 describes the public sector's realization that the private sector can be mobilized for
the provision of public services. Such public-private partnerships aim to address the market
failures inherent in the private provision of public services with the intent of capturing the
increased economic efficiency of the private sector. The authors describe these partnerships
as "channeling resources to public policy goals, with the government using fiscal, regulatory,
and monitoring tools to encourage and complement private activities and private spending
on these goals" (p. 7).
In addition to using the private sector as a tool for more efficient public service
provision, many nations are now looking beyond their borders to address policy challenges
in the global arena. The authors deem this concept public finance 2, which has emerged as a
result of the "deliberate and unintended processes" that bring about globalization (p. 11).
On the deliberate side of globalization processes exist policies that work to break down trade
barriers and create more open economic systems. This, however, leads to unintended
processes that carry both positive and negative effects. More open borders and increased
trade between countries, for example, have led to the unintended transport of communicable
diseases and predatory organisms 25 and even human trafficking. On the other hand, positive
unintended effects include the increased and often immediate exposure of "human rights
violations, poverty, and disaster to the entire world" via global communication systems (p.
17).
The economic and political stability of individual nations is not only a function of
specific national laws and policies. It is also a function of stability in other nations. The
interconnected global economic system ensures that the impacts of poverty, war, disease,
human'rights violations or civil unrest reverberate far beyond the borders of any one nation.
Thus, many nations are working individually and collectively to direct both public and
private finance to address these global issues, viewing democracy and stability as global
public goods. While international aid is nothing new, the authors argue that it marks a new
era of public finance theory. Beyond the humanitarian reasons for eradicating poverty or
disease, nations are coming to realize that global instability may manifest itself internally as
national-level economic, social and political costs. It may also manifest itself externally as
opportunity costs. A government intending to invest in another nation may be forced to its
second option if instability threatens its investments.26
Responsive Sovereignty
The other side of public finance 2 addresses the impact that the global economy has on
goods provision within the borders of specific, mainly developing, countries. Kaul (2006)
expands upon his characterization of national public goods production to acknowledge the
significance of international pressure (see External Preferences, Part 7 of Figure 1) on
national-level goods provision. National governments are faced with satisfying not only the
domestic demands of their constituents, but also the international demands for openness,
competitiveness, development and security. It has become increasingly impossible for the
state to exert "exclusive national policymaking sovereignty" in the Westphalian tradition.
Today's globalizing state must exercise what Kaul calls "responsive sovereignty-[the]
intermediation between domestic and external policy concerns" (p. 95).
External pressure may come from one or many governments, supranational entities or
non-governmental organizations. The author identifies four forces which drive policy
harmonization among nation-state actors: (a) the waning political support for non-
interference (of national government in international affairs), (b) the increasing
interdependence of states, (c) the growing political strength of transnational actors and (d)
the intensifying competitiveness between states. The effects of these four forces on the role
of national or central governance systems, synthesized below in Table 4, are significant.
25 The Asian longhorned beetle, a species that inhabits, feeds on and subsequently kills many species of
hardwood trees, is a prime example. An infestation of the beetle in the U.S. has been attributed to untreated
wooden crates carrying products imported from China (Hank, 2000).
26 Kaul and Concei(io (2006) are careful to point out that support for global public goods provision must
encompass more than simple monetary transfers to recipient nations.
However, Ruggie, as quoted in Kaul (2006), assures that "the effect...is not to replace states,
but to embed systems of governance in broader global frameworks" (p. 75).
Table 4. Changing Roles for a Globalizing National Government
FROM... ... TO
Aggregating primarily national Blending national and external
preferences policy demands
Correcting market failure Also standing corrected by
global business and civil society
Exerting coercive powers Being compelled to compete
Source: Adapted from Kaul (2006, p. 94).
The new public finance brings the obvious-the interconnected nature of modern
national economies-to the forefront of public finance theory, highlighting, perhaps, an
emerging role for supranational entities, but certainly a role for national coalitions and non-
state actors (namely non-governmental organizations), in providing global public goods. Just
as second generation fiscal federalism, the approach grounds the theory in a more accurate
contextualization, acknowledging the limits the global economy exacts on national
sovereignty, a fact many governments are often loath to admit.
This chapter has provided a brief overview of public finance. Political ideology-
cultural values and beliefs toward governance-defines the set of public goods and services
that government provides. Government uses specific mechanisms, such as user fees, taxes,
and intergovernmental transfers, to raise the revenue for the provision of these goods and
services. A government's authority to deliver public services and raise the necessary revenue
to fund their provision is dependent upon the vertical structure of the governance system,
the degree of decentralization the system allows, and the fiscal equivalence condition, which
matches benefits and expenditures.
Several normative elements of public finance emerge from this overview. Efficient and
effective systems establish fiscal equivalence, extend fiscal autonomy where necessary,
promote transparency, maintain hard budget constraints, provide adequate tax
administration, and encourage appropriate tax assignment. An additional element implicit
throughout the overview is the concept of stability. A public finance system benefits from a
stable policy and finance environment that keeps procedures clear and consistent, maintains
institutional structures, and preserves power structures. There is no doubt that government
will transform as political, social, and economic conditions change. Abrupt and arbitrary
change,27 however, adversely impacts the efficient and effective delivery of public goods and
services.
Despite the normative elements described above, no public finance system is perfect.
As the discussion on second generation fiscal federalism reveals, the concept of the
benevolent government is overly simplistic. Governments, just as individuals, should always
27 In some political systems, newly elected administrations, regardless of any real need, are expected to create,
dissolve, and rearrange institutions; change laws and regulations; and purge not only key public administrators,
but also entire staffs.
be viewed as the public choice theory perspective prescribes: as acting in its own self
interest.
An important element of the larger public finance system, the provision of
transportation infrastructure and services impacts economic conditions and social well-
being. Continuing in the vein of public finance, the thesis will now turn to transportation
policy and finance. The following chapter will delve into the concepts that define
transportation policy and finance, offering an understanding of why governments become
involved with regulating and enabling transportation activity.
3 Transportation Policy and Finance
Transportation activity, defined as both the construction of transportation infrastructure as
well as the use of various forms of transportation, influences and is influenced by society,
politics, the economy, and the environment. While the private sector can play a significant
and important role in providing transportation infrastructure and services, the public sector
has traditionally become involved in the construction, operation, regulation, coordination,
and finance of transportation activity. A government's ability to create a transportation
policy and finance system depends greatly upon the characteristics present in the general
public finance system, which were discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter will
discuss public sector transportation policy and finance as an element within the larger public
finance system. It will answer why government becomes involved in transportation, how it
assigns responsibility for transportation expenditures, how it becomes involved, and, finally
present a framework for analyzing the government's role in system finance.
3.1 Why Does Government Become Involved In Transportation?
The previous chapter couched the provision of public goods in terms of dominant
political ideologies. Government makes decisions regarding the set of public goods it
provides, but only within the constraint of society and its values and beliefs. This general
concept can, of course, be applied to specific goods such as transportation.
Human existence requires confronting the spatial distribution of opportunities, whether
they are as basic as water, food, and shelter, or as complex as employment, education, or
entertainment. Humans may choose to travel to those opportunities, wherever they may be,
or they may choose to bring the opportunities to them. Either way, transportation activity
emerges as a fundamental component of human existence. It remains so in contemporary
life, not merely in terms of survival, but also in terms of economic and social opportunity as
well as physical and mental well-being.
Examples of transportation activity demonstrate that, from a goods perspective,
transportation can be both rivaled and excludable. A driver entering a congested road
affects other drivers' ability to utilize the road (rivalry) and that road can be tolled
(excludability). These concepts can be translated to additional real-world transportation
contexts such as public transportation systems as well as theoretical extremes such as
pedestrian or aviation systems (sidewalks and airspace that are rivaled and could theoretically
be made excludable). These qualities create the environment for private sector provision of
transportation services; however, the sector's ability to do so is not without limitation.
Political ideology may require public sector involvement in transportation services in order
to ensure society's ability to "confront the spatial distribution of opportunities." If society
perceives that this right is not being provided or is somehow abrogated by the private sector,
will the public sector be called upon to provide or protect it? What happens when the public
sector is abrogating this right? Political ideology may require that government become
involved in the sector simply because cultural values and beliefs warrant it. The public
sector, therefore, has traditionally been regarded as a force to regulate and encourage
transportation activity with respect to both the private sector and itself. Generally speaking,
the public sector becomes involved because (a) certain characteristics inherent to
transportation activity warrant involvement and (b) transportation is used to fulfill specific
government goals. Involvement may be part of a coordinated, defined policy on
transportation, but it is more likely a piece meal set of government actions from which a de
facto policy emerges.
Transportation's Inherent Characteristics
Over time, economic systems and technological innovation have profoundly impacted
transportation activity. A set of inherent characteristics associated with transportation has
emerged as a result of this impact. Specifically, transportation activity exhibits externalities,
inequity, and monopolistic behavior, which combine to create suboptimal economic and
social conditions. The public sector may regulate transportation activity in order to correct
for these characteristics and improve economic and social conditions.
Transportation Externalities
The market does not adequately internalize the true costs and benefits of transportation
improvements, 28 which are complex economic phenomena. Markets will create suboptimal
economic and social conditions if they do not account for these additional costs and
benefits, known as spillover effects or externalities. Governments may create laws,
regulations and finance mechanisms that work to recapture some or all of these externalities
in order to correct some of the distortions in the market.
The OECD defines an externality as a "situation when the effect of production or
consumption of goods and services imposes costs or benefits on others which are not
reflected in the prices charged for the goods and services being provided" (Khemani &
Shapiro, 1993, p. 44). Positive externalities of transportation improvements include
increased access, which improves land values and creates economies of agglomeration, scale,
and scope as well as positive network effects. Congestion, pollution, noise, and safety
impacts are examples of negative externalities that can manifest themselves as increased
health and social welfare costs, and even decreases in land value (Nash & Matthews, 2005).
While this section will not delve into the extensive research that links transportation
improvements with externalities, the research shows that the link is significant.29 For
example, land within a quarter mile of public transportation improvements such as a new
subway or commuter rail stations will see its value increase by as much as 25 percent (Batt,
2001). This occurs regardless of whether the landowner uses the transportation
improvement. Alternatively, residents who find themselves near new road infrastructure
may suffer the negative impacts of increased pollution and noise. In either case the
aforementioned costs or benefits were borne at least partially by a third-party and were not
captured by the improvements themselves.
While it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to "internalize" all externalities,
governments may employ a variety of laws, regulations, and finance mechanisms to begin to
internalize some of them. This all depends upon the degree to which government
recognizes the existence of externalities and acknowledges the need to correct them.
Specific laws, regulations and finance mechanisms will be discussed in detail in the following
section that addresses how government becomes involved in transportation.
28 Transportation improvements include both infrastructure (bridges, stations, lanes, sidewalks, etc.) and service
improvements (new bus routes, more frequent service, etc.).
29 See Rayle (2008) for an extensive literature review of research that addresses the interaction between
transportation and land use.
Transportation Inequities
As established in the previous chapter, selling goods and services in return for revenue
that recovers costs and (ideally) turns a profit is a basic function of a transaction-based
market. With the exception of walking, most transportation activity in contemporary
economies is transaction based; access to transportation is gained through purchases. Access
to collective transportation-buses, subways, passenger trains, and commercial airlines-is
limited to those individuals who can afford to pay the required fare.30 Access to and use of
personal transportation-motor vehicles and bicycles, for example-necessitates the
purchase of the vehicle itself and, possibly, the payment of fees for access to infrastructure.
The need for profit applies to services provided by the private sector. Even if the
public sector offers transportation services, however, there is likely (but not always) the
desire to recover some costs through user fees. And, in theory in any case, the return
(including valuation of public benefits and costs) on government activities in the sector
should at minimum be equal to the alternative best use of government resources. Regardless
of the specific mix of private and public sector transportation providers, the transaction-
based nature of transportation activity has varying impacts on different sectors of society.
The existence of profits implies prices as they relate to supply and demand. It also implies
potential users who cannot afford to pay for goods and services, a group the private sector
and even the public sector, in some situations, does not accommodate.
The money required to access transportation systems may represent a very large part of
an individual's overall budget or it may be very small. The fact that some people are
burdened more than others, however, leads to a fundamental issue of social equity in
transportation. Political and cultural ideologies define equity standards for society, which
differ across and within specific societies. Yet, opportunities are spatially distributed and, at
the very least, some (if not all) individuals will require access to those opportunities for
economic, social, and personal well-being.3 t Leaving aside a subjective critique of whom
societies allow to use transportation, equity issues with respect to access will still exist among
those who are allowed to access the transportation system.
In addition to the equality issue related to monetary budgets, there are also those related
to time and service quality. Individuals who are unable to afford access to transportation
systems are left with walking as an alternative. This is often impractical, however, in terms
of time and, in many cases, service quality. Therefore, the individual is unable to reach many
opportunities within reasonable walking distance nor are the pedestrian amenities available
to ensure a pleasant or, at the very least, safe journey. Still, individuals who are only able to
access the most inexpensive transportation services-usually collective transportation-
suffer an inequality with respect to travel time and service quality. Their fare does not buy
them access to convenient, fast, comfortable, and safe collective transportation services as
compared to other sectors of society, for example, which can afford to purchase a personal
automobile.
Governments may therefore choose to protect those who cannot afford to access the
transportation system. They may also work to improve transport conditions in an effort to
provide citizens with more equal access to opportunities in terms of time and service quality.
The degree to which transportation policy and finance systems take these equity issues into
30 Fare evasion is obviously an option, but the providers or regulators themselves usually discourage this.31 The use of the word "some" is intended to account for societies that do not believe certain segments of the
population require or deserve such access. Historically, this has included women, children, the elderly, the
poor, etc.
account depends upon the degree to which transportation services are oriented as a public
good, a function of political ideology. Rather than providing mobility-efficient
transportation service from the provider perspective-the system strives to provide
accessibility-equal access to opportunities from the user perspective. A brief discussion on
mobility and accessibility follows below.
Mobility andAccessibility
Mobility is described as "the ability to move, a function of physical and economic
resources" (Vasconcellos, 2001, p. 53). This is contrasted with accessibility, which addresses
opportunities in space and time as they relate to land use and the transportation system.
Thus, it is not simply a question of whether people can move through the transportation
system efficiently. It is a question of the opportunities-jobs, healthcare facilities, education,
retail establishments-people can access based upon their distance to the opportunities
(space) and the time they have to reach those opportunities (time) as they relate to
characteristics of the transportation system, which include cost, travel time, and service
quality.
Accessibility is a question of social equity. An auto-oriented transportation system, for
example, favors accessibility for that segment of society that has access to motor vehicles.
Those who do not have access to a vehicle have markedly fewer opportunities within their
reach.32 Similarly, a public transportation system can be extremely efficient in moving people
from place to place. That means very little, however, if the system does not provide
adequate access to opportunities. Does the bus system go where people need or want it to
go? An area can be rich in mobility, but poor in accessibility.
Monopolistic Behavior
Investments in transportation activity are extremely capital intensive, which acts as a
significant barrier to entry for specific transportation markets. This means that few players
eventually enter the market, creating natural oligopolies and the potential for monopolistic
behavior among the players where prices are inflated and production restricted.
To be in the railroad business in the U.S., for example, a company needs to lay railroad
track to transport and store trains; install signaling systems to coordinate railroad activity;
build stations, maintenance, fueling, and dispatch facilities; and purchase equipment such as
locomotives to pull trains and rail cars to carry goods and passengers. All of this requires a
significant amount of money up front, before the first revenue-generating train pulls out of
the station. The same is true for almost all sectors of transportation. While they may not
need to build the infrastructure on which they operate as railroads do, airline companies still
must purchase aircraft and public transit companies must purchase buses.
This barrier to market entry creates the condition for monopolistic control over specific
transportation markets. Only a handful of interests will possess the capital (or financing
power) necessary to secure the infrastructure required for profitable operation. Thus,
competition will be limited to a few players, creating what the field of economics refers to as
an oligopoly. In such a situation, the players may engage in collusion. Unable to resist the
potential for excess profit, they may work together with their competitors to set prices and
production levels to control the market as a monopoly.
32 Of course these individuals could use non-motorized or public transportation, but auto-oriented land use-
transportation systems often organize opportunities on a spatial scale that is either beyond the range of some, if
not all, transportation modes.
Accomplishing Specific Goals
Government may become involved in the transportation sector to not only regulate
transportation activity, but also to leverage the sector to accomplish specific government
goals. These goals are shaped, however, by a wide range of diverse and sometimes
conflicting elements, which include economic conditions, prevailing social attitudes toward
transportation, and political pressures among others. While the concept of the ideal
benevolent government serves well for pedagogical purposes, public choice theory suggests
that governments are self-interested actors. The power of transportation activity as a tool
for political control is often difficult to resist.
The transportation sector can be used to increase economic development, mobility,
accessibility, competition, interconnectivity, and political control. In turn, government may
seek to limit the negative externalities of transportation activity in order to accomplish goals
for environmental projection, public safety, and energy. These goals combine to shape a
policy on transportation which explicitly or implicitly outlines the public sector's
involvement in regulating, enabling, and, in some cases, providing transportation activity.
While transportation policy can be used to satisfy specific social, political and economic
goals, its creation is also afunction of social, political and economic elements that influence
government and its attitude toward transportation.
In his seminal work on the relationship between sociology and transportation,
Vasconcellos (2001) defines a macro-level view of transportation policy formation that
weighs the true influences and impacts of transportation on both users and non-users. The
author identifies several elements that influence government's involvement in the sector,
arguing that a deeper understanding of these elements will lead to a more deliberative
process in creating transportation policy. As Table 5 outlines, transportation policy is more
than the simple manifestation of public sector desires. It is the product of multiple
conditions and interactions over which government may have control (e.g. political
motivations), or may not (e.g. migration trends, social attitudes).
Table 5. Elements of Influence on Transportation Policy
Element Description
Structural Migration trends and settlement patterns as influenced by the spatial
distribution of economic activity, wealth, poverty, and housing
Political The motivations of a "limited elite," the middle class, the transportation
industry (construction and manufacturing), or foreign pressure
Ideological Values and beliefs toward specific transportation modes and planning
practices (e.g. the automobile as a natural manifestation of public desire
for mobility)
Economic Prioritization of "democratic" transportation improvements as related to
economic conditions (real or perceived)
Institutional Ability to coordinate activity
Technical Degree to which adequate and appropriate technical measures are
applied to transportation analysis
Technological Existence of technological development with regards to specific
transportation modes
Operational Ability to monitor the performance of specific transportation modes
Source: Adapted from Vasconcellos (2001, pp. 210-216).
An auto-oriented transportation policy, for example, could be the result (or cause) of
extreme urbanization patterns that negatively impact public transportation systems in
metropolitan areas, creating negative attitudes toward public transportation; the technical
inability to monitor public transportation performance, leading to an undervaluation of the
mode's importance to the overall transportation system; political influences that encourage
government to pursue a policy that favors specific actors such as the auto industry; and
ideological conditions which value technical merit over social impacts.
Vasconcellos' elements add a new level to the Kaul & ConceiCgo (2006) production
path of public goods: that of existing conditions. Public goods production is therefore a
product of interaction between governments, civil society, interest groups, households and
firms that is also affected by existing structural, political, ideological, economic, institutional,
technical, technological, and operational conditions at the supranational, national, and sub-
national scales.
Political ideology; the existence of externalities, inequities, and monopolistic behavior
associated with transportation improvements; and the desire to use transportation to
accomplish specific government goals set the stage for public sector involvement in
transportation. Governments must define that involvement, however, and, in doing so,
position themselves along the spectrum between market competition and policy
intervention. This is influenced by the public sector's: (a) recognition of the externalities
associated with transportation and (b) use of transportation policy as a vehicle for
accomplishing specific goals (Nakagawa & Matsunaka, 2006).
In one extreme, market competition may be favored through little to no government
oversight of the private sector. In another, policy intervention may be pursued to such a
degree that the public sector abolishes private sector involvement in transportation and
provides all transportation services itself, namely through public sector systems. A more
balanced approach would enable the private sector to provide transportation services, but in
a manner aligned with the goals of the public sector. Aligning those goals may involve
regulation of the private sector as well as the implementation of mechanisms that capture the
externalities of transportation improvements, fund transportation-related expenditures, or
both.
It is clear why government may become involved in the transportation sector. Key issues
discussed in this section demonstrate the private sector's limitation in providing
transportation improvements as well as government's desire to use transportation for
accomplishing specific goals. Before discussing how government becomes involved in the
transportation sector, it is important to revisit the concept of fiscal equivalence in order to
understand who should be responsible for transportation investments when government
does become involved.
3.2 Who Is Responsible for Financing Transportation?
When the private sector is involved in funding transportation infrastructure and
providing transportation services, it is clear that the companies themselves are responsible
for their own expenditures. The review of public finance in the previous chapter explained
that government expenditures, however, might be the responsibility of national or sub-
national jurisdictions in a multi-level governance system. Expenditure assignment as well as
the ability to generate revenue to fund those expenditures depends upon the incidence of
benefits.
As stated in the previous chapter, fiscal equivalence seeks to match the benefits
boundary of public goods with the boundary of the finance mechanisms used to generate
revenue for funding the provision of those public goods. Thus, local governments should
fund and provide public goods that bring localized benefits. National governments should
fund and provide those goods that bring national-level benefits.
Transportation improvements also have benefits boundaries that range in size and scale.
In a simple way, urban public transit systems bring localized direct benefits to the citizens in
the cities the systems serve. An interstate highway system, however, may extend benefits to
multiple regions or an entire country. In many cases it is not easy to determine the precise
extent of benefits boundaries. For example, in the urban public transit system case,
beneficiaries may be those individuals who live far outside the service area of the public
transit system and drive to work every day. The decreased motor vehicle congestion, a result
of individuals who would otherwise drive using the public transit system, is a direct benefit
that drivers receive.
Despite the difficulty in determining exact benefits boundaries, it is possible to
generalize that certain transportation benefits accrue locally, while others accrue nationally.
Thus, under fiscal equivalence, local governments should be responsible for those
transportation expenditures with local benefits. This would include public transportation
systems, pedestrian amenities, local road infrastructure, and, to some degree, even national
road infrastructure that is part of a well-developed "local" system (Boarnet & Haughwout,
2000). National governments are therefore responsible for transportation expenditures that
bring benefits to the country as a whole. The economic benefit of ports, airports,
interconnected road and rail networks, for example, often accrues nationally.
3.3 How Does Government Become Involved?
Government involvement may be part of a coordinated, defined policy on
transportation, but it is more likely a piece meal set of government actions from which a de
facto policy emerges. Transportation policy is not alone, however, in impacting
transportation. Nor can it be solely responsible for the type and intensity of transportation
improvements. Land use and economic policies as well as housing and construction policies
each influence transportation activity (Vasconcellos, 2001). The effectiveness of
transportation policy rests upon the coordination between itself and these other public
sector policies.
Government involvement in transportation hinges on two points: government's (a)
recognition of transportation externalities, inequities, and monopolistic behavior, and (b) use
of transportation policy as a vehicle for accomplishing specific goals. The following sections
will outline the laws, regulations, and finance mechanisms governments can use to develop
an overarching policy toward transportation activity.
Recognizing Transportation Externalities, Inequities and Monopolistic Behavior
A government that recognizes and wishes to minimize the "inherent characteristics"
associated with transportation activity will opt to do so through regulations and laws.
Finance mechanisms intended to capture externalities are well known, but most
governments do not use them as a principal means of correcting spillover effects. Finance
mechanisms, while often very powerful tools, are almost always never perfect. None can
accurately capture all of the costs and benefits associated with externalities. Furthermore, it
is often impossible to quantify the exact externalities a mechanism should be capturing.
Laws and Regulations
The laws and regulations associated with transportation externalities fall into five broad
categories: those that (a) define standards for specific transportation markets, (b) manage
infrastructure, (c) govern the use of transportation systems, (d) control competition and (e)
promote social equity.
Defining Standards
The first group of laws and regulations define standards for operating vehicles and
infrastructure with regards to safety, noise, pollution, and energy efficiency. Emission
standards, for example, impact motor vehicles, railroad locomotives, aircraft and ships.
Other standards require crash resistance minimums, accessibility for the disabled, emergency
exits and so forth. These standards are enforced by monitoring transportation vehicle
manufacturers and, once vehicles are in operation, by requiring vehicle owners to undergo
regular vehicle inspections.
On the infrastructure side, regulations outline how infrastructure is to be constructed
and configured. For example, a number of regulations define street geometry standards,
railroad grade crossing configurations, and station design.
Managing Infrastructure
Laws and regulations associated with infrastructure management address the manner in
which infrastructure is allowed to expand and contract. They primarily focus on preventing
wasteful duplication of infrastructure, but also regulate how infrastructure will be dismantled
or abandoned. Government has a legitimate interest in ensuring that new infrastructure is
warranted and that abandoned infrastructure does not cause avoidable negative impacts. For
example, every city in a region may want to construct its own airport, but laws and
regulations will prevent them from doing so, thus avoiding the existence of several
underutilized airports within close proximity of one another. Similar regulations might also
prevent private road operators from building competing road segments side by side one
another.
Abandonment is also heavily regulated, especially among transportation sectors that
have capital plants that impact the environment. Railroads in the U.S., for example, are
unable to simply abandon infrastructure without a long, thorough regulatory process
designed to ensure that environmental cleanup and mitigation occurs before the property is
converted to other uses. Furthermore, regulations may prevent the dismantling of
infrastructure even after abandonment in an effort to keep avenues open for future uses.
Governing Use of the Transportation System
Laws and regulations in this category address who has access to transportation systems,
how transportation activity is coordinated, and how activity is enforced. Access to
transportation systems-road, rail, air, and so forth-is often controlled through legal and
regulatory systems that require licenses or other forms of authorizations (certificates, etc.),
which are awarded based upon a set of certain criteria (age, prior criminal record, etc.) as
well as successful completion of specific tests or training. A simple example is the
requirement that in order to drive, an individual must have a valid drivers' license in their
possession. Violation of the "rules of the road" may result in the revocation of the license.
Similar authorizations are required for all other transportation industries from public
transportation to aviation.
Apart from operating licenses, there may be additional regulatory requirements that
govern access. In the United States, for example, it is illegal for a driver to operate a vehicle
without auto insurance. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, access to transportation
systems is not limited to those who operate transportation equipment. It also includes
passengers. Laws and regulations allow transportation providers to restrict access to those
who not only do not pay the appropriate fare, but also disobey cultural norms and company
rules for passengers.
Additional laws and regulations coordinate transportation activity. Whether it is a simple
stop sign on Main Street or a highly sophisticated air traffic control system, the need for
coordinating activity is important for reasons of safety and efficiency. Laws and regulations
ensure that coordination not only occurs, but that it is applied uniformly from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction (the case with motor vehicle systems) or from company to company (the case
with private railroads).3 3 Therefore, traffic signals and signs have a uniform design and a
code that governs their use, which, in turn, provides a degree of coordination for the motor
vehicle system. Alternatively, large air traffic control network coordinate the flight patterns
of private commercial airlines as well as military and general aviation aircraft.
Enforcement is necessary to ensure that individuals or companies adhere to the laws and
regulations associated with either transportation access or coordination. Relevant
procedures identify the appropriate entity to respond to a specific violation and also outline
response mechanisms and punishment. Thus, if an automobile driver speeds down a
municipal road, local law enforcement may be responsible for detaining the individual and
issuing a citation that may require payment of a fine. Alternatively, laws and regulations may
authorize the use of electronic speed detectors that issue citations via the mail, eliminating
the need for direct contact with law enforcement. An unruly passenger on a commercial
flight might be detained by national authorities who meet the individual once the flight has
safely landed. Punishment may come in the form of an arrest, a ban from flying or payment
of a citation. In addition to individuals, companies themselves may be heavily fined or
completely banned from operation by government authorities if they violate laws and
regulations. National authorities have grounded entire fleets of unsafe aircraft, for example.
Controlling Competition
Another set of rules and regulations addresses competition in specific transportation
markets, primarily to limit monopolistic behavior in industries where barriers to market entry
are considered suboptimal. When barriers to entry are high, government may attempt to
limit monopolistic behavior; when they are low, government may need to limit entry into the
market. Too many actors may create additional negative externalities. Relevant efforts may
therefore limit firms' ability to be price makers or to merge with one another. Railroads and
commercial airlines in the United States and Europe, for example, cannot simply conduct
mergers as they wish. Any proposed merger must be reviewed and subsequently approved
by a supranational or national regulating body.
33 Companies may employ very different coordinating systems; harmonization requires, however, that each
system coordinate transportation activity to the same degree.
A taxi market is a prime example of a market with low barriers to entry. Despite the
easy of entry, too many taxis make for congested streets and competitive behavior that may
endanger the safety of drivers and their passengers. Municipal governments may heavily
regulate the taxi market through the use of operating licenses that authorize individual
drivers to operate a taxi within a specific jurisdiction. Municipal government can closely
regulate the number of licenses in circulation at any given time, preventing an overprovision
of service.
Promoting Social Equity
A final set of laws and regulations concerns social equity. This largely deals with fare
structures, but can also concern service areas. Governments, for example, may see the need
to regulate fares for transportation in an effort to protect those who may not be able to
afford basic services. Furthermore, there may be laws and regulations that govern service to
specific communities. If government considers a specific transportation service vital to a
community, a public or private company may be prohibited from discontinuing or altering
service.
Finauce Mechanisms
As previously stated, finance mechanisms that capture the externalities of transportation
activity are well known, but not often employed. These can be divided into two groups:
those that capture positive externalities and those that capture negative externalities.
Capturing Positive Externalities
New transportation activity often increases the value of surrounding properties. A
finance mechanism known as land value capture seeks to expropriate a portion of that
increase and reinvest it into transportation improvements. Taxes or fees are therefore levied
on landowners who will reap partial benefit from the improvements. These owners are
often identified based upon the predominate mode for accessing the improvements. Thus a
specific walking distance may identify affected landowners around a subway station. A new
freeway exit, on the other hand, would impact land values within a certain driving distance
from the off ramp.
Another type of finance mechanism levies a charge on businesses that are located in
areas with public transportation services. The mechanism-usually a tax-seeks to capture
the benefits that businesses and their employees receive through having access to subway,
bus, and commuter rail systems. French municipalities, for example, employ the Versement de
Transport, a tax on businesses in urban areas, in this manner.
Capturing Negative Externalities
A variety of finance mechanisms can be used to capture the negative externalities-
noise, pollution, congestion, and safety issues--associated with transportation activity.
These mechanisms can be very basic or extremely complex and, as previously mentioned, are
often very difficult to calculate.
The most basic finance mechanism for capturing externalities is a user fee, although,
admittedly, it is not always employed for this purpose. User fees are primarily levied to
capture the marginal costs of travel. A private road operator will, at a minimum, levy tolls
that generate sufficient revenues to cover the costs of maintaining the infrastructure it
manages.34 The cost of travel in this example is the wear and tear of infrastructure and also
damage caused by accidents. Tolls might therefore vary by vehicle type; the larger the
vehicle, the more damage it may cause to the roadway. Another component of the marginal
cost of travel is the congestion effect that vehicles create. A piece of infrastructure has an
efficient operating capacity. A private road operator may use price elasticities with respect to
tolls or user fees to influence demand and, consequently, maintain efficient operating
capacity.
User fees in the example above merely capture the marginal cost of travel. Tolls can be
set, however, at a much higher rate in an effort to decrease demand beyond necessary
operating efficiency levels. In this case the user fee not only captures the marginal cost of
travel (wear and tear, accident costs, congestion effects), it also begins to capture some of
the negative externalities associated with transportation activity such as noise and pollution.
In this case the toll is being used as a congestion charge. London, for example, has established a
congestion charge that discourages a large portion of motor vehicle traffic from entering the
central business district. As a result, traffic in downtown London has been reduced by
roughly 30 percent since the congestion charge was established in 2003 (Transport for
London, 2007).
The pollution tax is a finance mechanism that is directly related to reducing pollution.
Ideally, a pollution tax would be levied on the amount of pollution specific transportation
activities produce. Thus, a tax would be associated with every ton of carbon dioxide or
nitrogen oxide emitted. Levying a pollution tax on transportation activity is difficult,
however. The degree of externality depends on the type of pollutant being emitted and in
some cases, the time of day and weather conditions in which emission occurs.3" It is
extremely difficult to track emissions on a per vehicle basis (e.g. measuring tailpipe emissions
as they occur and associate emissions with the time of day and weather conditions) in order
to properly price a pollution tax.
A much less effective, but more practical approach to targeting emissions with finance
mechanisms is with a vehicle excise tax that takes a vehicle's pollution emitting potential into
consideration. Despite the fact that it does not capture actual emissions, the tax scheme can
make higher polluting vehicles pay more in relation to vehicles that have the potential to
pollute less. Excise taxes are often levied on a regular basis, yearly or every other year, for
example.
Fuel taxes may also be used to capture negative transportation externalities. In this
example, taxes are levied on purchases of fuel for all vehicle types. A fuel tax is directly
related to use; a user pays more of the tax the more fuel they purchase. The link between
fuel consumption and externalities is not always strong. Fuel taxes, just as excise taxes, are
often considered a second best solution. While they are effective proxies for carbon taxes,
they are not as effective for other types of emissions, as well as congestion and safety
externalities (Gwilliam & World Bank, 2002).
Accomplishing Specific Goals
Whereas the last section was concerned with recognizing transportation externalities
(which may be a government goal in and of itself), the following section looks at ways in
34 The private operator will want to realize a profit, however. The toll charged will therefore need to exceed the
marginal cost of travel.
35 For example, in sunlight, nitrogen oxide can combine with other compounds to form harmful ground-level
ozone (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2008).
which government enables transportation activity and improvements to satisfy specific goals.
Governments often employ a series of laws, regulations and finance mechanisms related to
transportation that are intended to promote economic development, mobility or
connectivity, for example. These are most often directed to improvements that may not
happen without government intervention.
Laws and Regulations
Myriad laws and regulations create the regulatory environment for transportation
activity. Some regulations also work to promote technological innovation, promote
interconnectivity between systems, modal integration, and, perhaps most importantly,
promote partnerships between the public and private sectors.
Technological innovation is almost always a response to emission and safety regulations.
For example, tighter emission standards have spurred the development of new low emission
vehicles from automobile, truck, and railroad locomotive manufacturers. Vehicles have also
become more energy efficient. Safety standards have produced vehicles that are more
maneuverable and responsive, which utilize safer and stronger materials as well as more
intuitive user interfaces.
Other laws and regulations promote interconnectivity between systems, encouraging
sub-national and national government to work together to promote interconnected road
networks, for example. They might also allow competing private entities to pursue joint
ventures such as shared facilities or reservation systems. Still other regulations may promote
modal integration, allowing bikes, buses, streetcars, automobiles and pedestrians to share
rights-of-way or by incentivizing the construction of intermodal transfer facilities.
Finally, public private partnerships also require a support system of laws and regulations
that enable their success. Generally speaking, these laws and regulations make partnerships
possible, define the relationship between government and the private sector, outline specific
partnerships through contracts and concessions, and determine appropriate action should
either party fail to uphold their responsibilities. Setting up the proper legal and regulatory
support system is often a very difficult and challenging process.
Finance Mechanisms
Obviously, any revenue generating mechanism can be used to finance transportation
activity along with any other government expenditures. In the case of transportation,
government can opt for dedicated or undedicated revenues arrangements. Under a
dedicated arrangement, a specific portion of revenue is exclusively reserved for
transportation expenditures. These revenues are usually tied directly to a tax or user fee and
cannot be diverted to any other expenditure outside that to which they have been dedicated.
In the case of undedicated revenue arrangements, transportation expenditures are funded
from general government revenue.
In terms of dedicated revenues, any of the finance mechanisms used to correct
transportation externalities--land value capture, employer taxes, tolls, congestion charges,
pollution taxes, excise taxes, fuel taxes-could fund transportation activity. Other common
mechanisms include other user fees, such as transit fares and license fees; recurrent taxes,
such as vehicle registration fees; and even sales taxes. Some mechanisms aim to create a
direct link between transportation activity and expenditures, whereas others, namely the sales
tax, do not.
Dedicated revenue sources lend a degree of stability and continuity to financing
government expenditures from year to year.3 6 This is especially important for transportation
infrastructure finance, which often involves large investments that take place over a number
of years. Operating expenses, too, benefit from dedicated resources. Agencies are able to
conduct long-term strategic planning more effectively when it is known that financing will be
there in the future.
3.4 A Framework for Analysis
This chapter has explained why governments become involved in transportation, how
involvement is assigned to specific levels of government, and how the government becomes
involved in the sector. In answering these questions, several overarching elements have
emerged, which form a framework for analyzing transportation policy and finance systems.
These elements include fiscal equivalence, externalities, and equity. A transportation policy
and finance system that accounts for these elements is, in the long run, more sustainable and
more beneficial to both the government and the individuals who utilize its services.
Fiscal Equivalence
A good transportation policy and finance system will acknowledge the fiscal equivalence
condition, assigning transportation expenditures and the correspondent fiscal autonomy to
the appropriate sub-national jurisdictions. This creates a more efficient system that can
accommodate localized preferences, which are a function of political ideology, climate,
terrain, and economic conditions among other things. Additionally, fiscal equivalence allows
taxpayers to create a link between the taxes and user fees they pay, and the benefits and
services they receive. This is important at the level of democracy and accountability.
Externalities
This chapter has also reviewed the externalities associated with transportation activity.
These can be positive-increased land values, agglomeration effects, network effects-and
negative-noise, pollution, congestion, and accidentality. Third parties, therefore, reap the
benefits or pay the costs of transportation activity even thought they are not directly
involved in the original transaction.
Completely accounting for the costs and benefits that make up transportation
externalities is extremely difficult, if not impossible. A transportation policy and finance
system can be assessed, however, by its efforts to recapture some of those externalities.
This, of course, must occur in the proper institutional and technological context.37 The end
result is a more economically and socially optimal system in which individuals, firms and
governments understand and internalize the true benefits and costs of transportation
activity.
36 This is not to imply that mechanisms themselves are inherently stable. All revenue-generating mechanisms
fluctuate as macro and microeconomic conditions change. Dedicated revenue streams lend stability to the
politicalprocess of funding transportation expenditures because there is a prior understanding about the revenue's
use.
37 Several of the aforementioned mechanisms for capturing transportation externalities are likely beyond the
administrative capacity of some governance systems.
Equity
The transaction-based nature of transportation activity means that access to
transportation systems is controlled through purchases. An individual must pay a fare to
ride the public transit system or purchase a vehicle in order to use the road system. Because
individuals have different monetary budgets, this has varying impacts on different sectors of
society. Some sectors of society may be disproportionately burdened by the costs required
to access transportation systems. Furthermore, even once access to the systems is gained,
inequity may manifest itself in terms of the time it takes to access opportunities and the
quality of service they experience.
Whether subsidies offer discounted fares to the poor or investments create faster and
more convenient public transportation services, a transportation policy and finance system
can be assessed by the degree to which it acknowledges the inherent inequity in
transportation activity.
Transportation policy and finance systems must therefore attempt to adhere to the
fiscal equivalence condition, attempt to correct the externalities of transportation activity,
and address equity issues with respect to transportation infrastructure and operations. This
framework will be used to analyze the Portuguese surface transportation policy and finance
system. Because the system is embedded in the larger public finance system, however, this
analysis will begin with a description of the Portuguese public finance system in general.
Chapter 4 will introduce the reader to Portugal and its public finance system, concluding
with a brief analysis of the system through a review of the elements introduced in Chapter 2.
Analysis of the transportation policy and finance system will begin in Chapter 5.
4 The Portuguese Public Finance System
This chapter will provide an overview of the Portuguese public finance system,
providing information regarding the nation's structure of government, revenue assignment
and expenditures. As a case study, the Portuguese public finance system can be
characterized as a fairly stable system that has been devolving authority and fiscal autonomy
to municipal government over the past several years. While hard budget constraints hold
municipal governments in check, high public sector debt at the central government level as
well as issues surrounding fiscal equivalence and the transparency of tax administration
represent significant challenges for the system.
4.1 Background
Located in the southwest corner of the Iberian Peninsula, Portugal is a nation of
approximately 10.6 million inhabitants. The country is roughly the size of the State of Maine
with an area of just over 92,000 square kilometers (approximately 35,500 square miles),
which includes the autonomous regions of Madeira and the Agores, Portuguese archipelagos
in the Atlantic Ocean.
Portugal was ruled by an authoritarian dictatorship until 1974 when a peaceful revolt,
known as the Carnation Revolution (Revolufdo dos Cravos), took place. The country ratified a
constitution in 1976 and, since then, has been governed as a parliamentary republic with
national and municipal elections open to all citizens over the age of eighteen. In 1986, the
nation gained membership to the European Union (EU).
Population
Despite its small population, population growth in Portugal has fluctuated greatly over
the last five years. The overall growth rate has ranged from a high of 0.75 percent in 2002 to
a low of 0.28 percent in 2006. Much of this can be attributed to immigration; natural
population growth has only ranged between 0.02 percent and 0.08 percent in the past five
years (INE, 2007). Future population projections by the U.S. Census Bureau International
Data Base anticipate an overall loss in population for Portugal by 2025 due to a declining
birth rate (2007).
Over the past two decades, the population of Portugal has concentrated itself along the
country's coast in and between the metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto (INE, 2006).
The Lisbon metropolitan area is approximately 2,900 square kilometers (1,100 square miles)
and is composed of eighteen separate municipalities. In 2001, the last year for national
census data, the Lisbon metropolitan area had a population of 2.7 million (INE, 2001).
Population growth has been limited to the periphery of the metropolitan area; the actual
municipality of Lisbon (where most economic activity has been traditionally concentrated)
has been losing population. Although the population of the metropolitan area grew
approximately six percent from 1991 to 2001, the municipality lost fifteen percent of its
population during that same period (Cimara Municipal de Lisboa, 2005b). This trend
continues.
The Porto metropolitan area is approximately 1,900 square kilometers (730 square
miles) and consists of fourteen municipalities. The 2001 population was estimated to be 1.6
million (Area Metropolitana do Porto, n.d.). Outside of the metropolitan areas, other
important Portuguese cities include Braga (2005 population of 170,900), Coimbra (2005
population of 142,400) and Funchal (on Madeira; 2005 population of 100,000) (Direcqao-
Geral das Autarquias Locais, 2005). Figure 2 shows the location of the major Portuguese
cities.
Figure 2. Portugal and Major Cities
Economy
Portugal's gross domestic product (GDP) was approximately 176.8 billion euros in
200638 and GDP per capita was estimated to be 16,679 euros, 0.75 of the average for the 27
EU Member States in the same year (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007; Eurostat, 2008).
After being admitted to the EU in 1986, the country saw significant growth in terms of
38 Purchasing power parity.
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GDP. Between 1996 and 2000, for example, the annual average rate of GDP growth was a
staggering four percent (INE, 2006). Growth rates began to shrink after 2000 and, in 2003,
the country saw its GDP decrease by 1.1 percent. Since then, GDP has grown modestly: 0.5
percent in 2005 and 1.3 percent in 2006. The IMF projects GDP growth in Portugal to be
1.8 percent for both 2007 and 2008 (IMF, 2007).
The Portuguese deficit has fluctuated greatly in the past few years. Table 6 highlights
the evolution of the deficit both in real terms and as a percentage of GDP. The IMF
predicts that Portugal will slide into even higher debt, forecasting that the deficit will reach
9.2 as a percentage of GDP in 2008 (IMF, 2007). Twice, in 2002 and 2005, Portugal has
been required to enter the "excessive deficit procedure" with the European Commission
after violating the Maastricht Treaty, which requires all EU Members to maintain national
deficits below three percent of GDP (OECD, 2006).
Table 6. Evolution of the Portuguese National Deficit, 2000-2005
(in millions of euros)
Deficit 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Central Government -3,214 -4,764 -4,290 -5,221 -7,969 -8,938
Regional & Local Gov't -473 -497 -592 -343 55 -437
Social Security 142 -255 1,018 1,551 3,369 480
Total -3,545 -5,516 -3,864 -4,013 -4,545 -8,895
As % of GDP -2.9% -4.3% -2.9% -2.9% -3.2% -6.0%
Source: INE (2006)
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Annual average income per inhabitant in Portugal was 712 euros per month in 2006, a
1.8 percent increase from the previous year (INE, 2007). The estimated Gini coefficient for
Portugal, which represents income distribution equality,39 was estimated at .410 in 2005. In
comparison, during the same period the EU25 area (the twenty-five member states of the
European Union) and the Euro area (the twelve countries which utilized the Euro at that
time) had Gini coefficients of .300 and .310, respectively (Eurostat, 2007).
The unemployment rate in Portugal was 7.6 percent and 7.7 percent in 2005 and 2006,
respectively. This is expected to decrease to 7.1 percent in 2008. As a comparison, the
unemployment rate in the Euro area for the same periods was 8.6 percent and 7.8 percent.
However, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects the Euro area unemployment
rate to decrease to 6.8 percent in 2008 (IMF, 2007).
4.2 Structure of Government
The Portuguese Constitution of 1976 laid out the framework for three tiers of sub-
national government: regional, municipal, and the parish council, a subdivision of municipal
government known as thefreguesia (C. N. Silva & Syrett, 2006). Since then, the municipal
and freguesia jurisdictions have remained embedded as elements of the current government
39 The Gini coefficient values range from 0 to 1. The lower the value, the more income equality in the
economy being surveyed.
structure. A form of regional government, however, has never been adopted.40 In fact, as
recently as 1998, a national referendum to create elected regional administrations was
rejected (Syrett & Silva, 2001). The Portuguese municipality has therefore emerged as the
principal form of sub-national governance in the country.
Central Government
Portugal is a parliamentary republic, governed by a president, prime minister and a 230-
member parliament, the unicameral Assembleia da Repziblica. Primary authority rests in the
hands of the prime minister, the prime minister's council of ministers, and the parliament;
the president of Portugal does not hold broad executive powers. Central government
activity is divided among fourteen separate government ministries,4' the leaders of which
serve on the council of ministers.
Inman (2007) categorized Portugal as a unitary democracy (see Table 2). Although
members of parliament are elected based upon sub-national electoral districts within
Portugal, those districts have no autonomous governance structure. Municipalities, the most
substantial form of sub-national governance in Portugal, have no formal representation in
national-level legislation. Furthermore, the public expenditures undertaken by sub-national
governments are very small, indicating a less devolved governance structure.
Regional Government
As previously stated, no form of formal regional representation exists in Portugal.
Regional administration and representation in Portugal is currently a mix of deconcentrated
central government field offices, regional development commissions, and municipal
coalitions that have been created to deliver specific public services. There is no consistent
application of regional organization throughout the nation. Most of what would be
considered regional organization is a voluntary process loosely enabled by central
government but driven by municipalities. Additionally, the borders of different regional
bodies often overlap one another and the responsibilities and goals of each jurisdiction are
not always clear.
Civil Governments (Governos Civis)
Portugal is divided into twenty-two administrative districts (distritos)-eighteen of which
are in continental Portugal-which define the borders of the country's civil governments as
well as national electoral districts (circulos eleitorais). Civil governments are field offices of
40 The autonomous regions of the Agores and Madeira are an exception; both have elected regional legislative
assemblies.
41 The fourteen ministries are: the Ministry of Foreign Business (Ministirio dos Negdcios Estrangeiros, MNE), the
Ministry of Finance and Public Administration (Ministirio das Finanfas e da Administrafdo Ptiblica, MFAP), the
Ministry of National Defense (Ministirio da Defesa Nacional, MDN), the Ministry of Internal Administration
(Ministirio da Administrafdo Interna, MAI), the Ministry of Justice (Minist/rio da Justifa, MJ), the Ministry of
Environment, Spatial Planning and Regional Development (Ministirio do Ambiente, do Ordenamento do Territdrio e do
Desenvolvimento Regional, MAOTDR), the Ministry of Economy and Innovation (Ministirio da Economia e da
Inovaf~o, MF), the Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries (Ministirio da Agricultura, do
Desenvolvimento Rural e das Pescas, MADRIP), the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communication
(Ministirio das Obras Pziblicas Transportes e Comunicapfes, MOPTC), the Ministry of Labor and Social Solidarity
(Ministi/io do Trabalho e da Solidariedade Social, MTSS), the Ministry of Health (Ministirio da Safide, MS), the
Ministry of Education (Ministirio da Educardo, ME), the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education
(Ministitio da Cidncia, Tecnologia e Ensino Superior, MCTES), and the Ministry of Culture (Minist/rio da Cultura, MC).
central government. A civil governor, appointed by central government, leads the civil
government. This deconcentration of central government authority gives civil governments
a very limited set of responsibilities, such as coordinating national elections, issuing
passports and providing for public safety in the event of a natural disaster (Governo Civil de
Beja, 2008).
Regional Development Commissions (Comiss6es de Coordenagio e Desenvolvimento
Regional)
In addition to civil governments, Portugal is divided into five regional development
commissions, known by their Portuguese acronym as CCDRs. These serve as
deconcentrated jurisdictions of central government that support economic development
within their respective regions largely through the application for and distribution of
European Union (EU) Structural Funds. Before 2007 the CCDRs were responsible for
approving municipal land use plans within their respective regions. However, this authority
has since been removed through legal reforms (J.C. Mourio, personal communication,
February 8, 2008).42
The five CCDRs represent the north, central, Algarve, and Alentejo regions as well as a
region composed of the Lisbon metropolitan area and the Rio Tejo valley. The boundaries
of each regional development commission are based upon the EU NUTS II (Nomenclature
of Territorial Units for Statistics) designations for Portugal, a statistical division applied to all
EU member states.
The leaders of each regional development commission are appointed by central
government in a process that gives municipalities a modicum of representation. The
municipalities within a given region collectively nominate three candidates to the presidency
of the CCDR, one of whom is selected and installed as president by central government
(J.M. Viegas, personal communication, July 13, 2007).
Mxnidipal Coalitions
In recognition of the "growing need to coordinate supra-municipal investments and
activities such as the provision of roads, sewerage, water supply, public transport and
environment protection," national legislation was passed in 1991 to create metropolitan
governments in the Lisbon and Porto metropolitan areas (C. N. Silva & Syrett, 2006, p.
107). 43 Municipalities in these metropolitan areas appointed representatives to the
metropolitan government to coordinate collective planning issues. This legislation was later
expanded in 2003 to allow any group of municipalities to form "municipal coalitions". A
specific municipality could therefore join with other neighboring municipalities to form one
of three types of coalitions: Large Metropolitan Areas, Urban Communities, and Inter-
Municipal Communities (Grandes Areas Metmpolitanas, GAM; Comunidades Urbanas, CU; and
Comunidades Inter-Munidcipais, CG; respectively). Eligibility for a specific type of coalition was
based upon the collective population and level of urbanization within the coalition.44
Two hundred and sixteen of Portugal's 308 municipalities have formed municipal
coalitions consisting of seven GAMs, ten CUs and two CIs (Direcgio-Geral das Autarquias
Locals, 2005). The degree of activity varies widely among coalitions, and in most cases there
42 Lei 60/2007 brought the reform of Decreto-Lei 380/99 which had originally given CCDRs authority over
what are called "detailed plans"-the loteamento and plano depormenor-which are created by municipalities.
43 Lei 44/91.
44 See Di'rio da Repdblica, N.' 110, S&ie-A, pp. 3050-3065 for more on specific criteria.
is little evidence that the coalitions fulfill the all-encompassing planning role envisioned in
the enabling legislation. This reflects the degree of difficulty municipalities have in granting
both authority and a stable financing structure to the coalitions. Most active municipal
coalitions in Portugal can be likened to "special governments" organized around specific
policy issues such as municipal waste services or riparian and coastal resource protection
(J.C. Mourdo, personal communication, February 8, 2008).
Other Regional Administrations
Another notable effort to create a regional governance structure has centered upon
Metropolitan Transportation Authorities (Autoridades Metropolitanas de Transportes, AMT).
These entities are intended to coordinate public transit service planning and provision in the
metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto, which are composed of multiple municipalities. As
currently formulated, unprecedented control over transportation services-administrative
and financial--would be devolved from central government to the AMTs (R. Macirio,
personal communication, August 2, 2007). Adoption of the AMT proposal would represent
a drastic change in the vertical structure of the Portuguese governance system.
The proposal for metropolitan transportation authorities has been circulating in
Portugal for quite some time. What remains unclear, however, is why implementation has
stalled. It is speculated that political ownership of the proposal is at the center of the
standstill. Because the proposal was the work of a political party that lost the national
leadership in the previous election cycle, the current national administration is avoiding the
AMT proposal as a face-saving strategy (R. Macirio, personal communication, August 2,
2007).
In addition to the AMTs, the recent reorganization of central government has created
another group of regional administrations devoted to mobility and transport known as
Regional Mobility and Transportation Directorates (Direcfpes Regionais de Mobilidade e
Transportes). The responsibilities and goals of these regional directorates, as well as their
potential interaction with the proposed AMTs of Lisbon and Porto, are undefined as of yet
(J.B. Silva, personal communication, July 26, 2007). It is clear, however, that the directorates
are conceived as deconcentrated arms of central government, as the national land
transportation regulator (see Section 5.2) will coordinate their activity.
Municipal Government
All land in continental Portugal is under the jurisdiction of a municipality. There are
currently 308 municipalities in the country, each operating via a bicameral legislative system
comprised of a municipal chamber (cdamara munid4pal) and a municipal assembly (assambleia
municpal) (Direcqgo-Geral das Autarquias Locais, 2005). Each municipality is subdivided
into parish councils (freguesias), the respective populations of which elect a parish assembly
(assembleia defreguesia) as well as a parish junta (/unta defreguesia).
The municipal chamber is made up of a president and several city council members.
The number of city council members allowed to serve on the chamber is proportional to the
electoral population of the municipality. The smallest municipalities (those with an
electorate of less than 10,000) are allowed four city council members whereas Lisbon, the
largest municipality, has a municipal chamber of seventeen members (including the
president) (Governo da Repiblica Portuguesa, 1999b). Members are elected to four-year
terms through local elections, which are based upon party-list proportional representation.
The membership of Lisbon's current municipal chamber, for example, represents four
different political parties and two separate sets of "independents" ("Eleiý6es em Lisboa: O
futuro da cimara e o fen6meno dos independentes [Elections in Lisbon: The future of the
chamber and the phenomenon of the independents]", 2007). In contrast to the municipal
chamber, the municipal assembly is not directly elected. It is made up of the presidents of
the various parish councils inside the municipality.
The number of parish councils, or freguesias, within a given municipality varies widely
throughout Portugal. Barcelos, a municipality in northern Portugal, has 89 parishes, more
than any other municipality. On the other hand, several municipalities have only one parish
within their borders and, in a special case, the municipality of Corvo has none (Direcýio-
Geral das Autarquias Locais, 2005, pp. 43-46). Residents within each parish council elect a
parish assembly, the size of which is based upon the jurisdiction's electoral population. The
candidate to receive the highest number of votes is elected to the presidency of the freguesia
and represents his or her respective parish council in the municipal assembly. Once a parish
assembly has been elected, its members internally elect the parish junta, an executive board.
The legal size of the junta ranges from two to six members based on the parish's electoral
population (Governo da Republica Portuguesa, 1999b).
4.3 Expenditure Assignments
Portugal has been gradually devolving government responsibilities to municipal
government, yet the assignment of government expenditures remains significantly
concentrated at the central level. Central government is responsible for expenditures such as
national defense, citizenship, immigration, postal services, telecommunication services,
transportation infrastructure, energy infrastructure, agriculture, as well as some education,
culture, and health care expenditures. Central government also assumes expenditure
responsibilities for some services provided at the municipal level. These include public
transportation and sub-national police services.
Portuguese municipalities are responsible for urban planning and revitalization, water
works, local road construction and maintenance, public transportation (with the exception of
the Lisbon and Porto metropolitan areas), fire services, municipal police,45 municipal waste
delivery, public housing, culture (libraries), parks and recreation, and tourism (Camara
Municipal de Coimbra, 2007a; Cimara Municipal de Lisboa, 2006). Some municipalities also
run municipal health systems and public education systems, which are joint expenditures of
municipal and central government.
Municipalities can deconcentrate certain responsibilities to the parish councils within
their boundaries. In Porto, for example, some parish councils are responsible for operating
small pre-schools and maintaining public restrooms (J.F. Branco, personal communication,
February 4, 2008).
45 Portuguese municipalities can fund municipal police forces, however, national law limits their jurisdiction to
municipal code enforcement for construction and commercial activity, public safety in recreational areas, and
traffic enforcement (Camara Municipal de Lisboa, 2008). Criminal investigations, for example, are the purview
of the Policia de Seguranfa Publica in metropolitan areas and the Guarda Nacional Republicana in other parts of the
country. Both of these organizations are arms of central government.
4.4 Revenue Arrangements
Tax Revenue and Tax Administration
The power to tax is reserved for central and municipal governments in Portugal; parish
councils are not able to levy taxes. Tax assignment generally follows the consensus view
outlined in Chapter 2. Highly mobile sources such as business, labor, and retail transactions
are taxed at the national level while municipalities are free to tax land and real estate
transactions as well as a small portion of corporate income. Central government levies a
special "stamp duty" on major purchases (land, real estate, automobiles) as well as financial
transactions, operating licenses and copyrights (Direcýio-Geral dos Impostos, 2008). Excise
taxes are entirely the purview of central government, which levies separate taxes on fuel,
automobiles, alcohol and alcoholic beverages, and tobacco products. Recurrent taxes
include a roads tax levied at the national level as well as a gambling tax levied at the
municipal level (Caimara Municipal de Lisboa, 2006; MFAP, 2008b). Table 7 provides an
overview of tax assignment in Portugal.
The Portuguese tax system has seen two major reforms over the past five years with the
intention of simplifying taxation. In 2003 and again in 2007, several taxes were abolished or
rolled into other taxes. The 2003 reform was the more extensive of the two. It eliminated
the national Inheritance and Gift Tax (Imposto sobre as Sucessies e Doarfes), exempting several
transactions (namely inheritance transfers to immediate family) impacted by the tax and
rolling the remaining taxable transactions into the existing Stamp Duty (Imposto do Selo). The
reform also impacted municipal taxes. Two separate municipal property taxes, the Autarchic
Contribution (Contribuifdo Autdrquica) and the Contribution for Historic and Urban Buildings
(Contribuifdo Predial RAstica e Urbana), were abolished. Also, the Municipal Transfer Tax
(Imposto Municipal de Sisa) was replaced by the Municipal Real Estate Transaction Tax (Imposto
Municipal sobre Transmissies Onerosas de Imdveis) (Palminha, 2007).
The 2007 reform simplified the road and vehicle tax regime. Prior to the reform an
individual might have had to pay four separate motor vehicle taxes. A new road tax, the
Single Circulation Tax (Imposto Unico de Circulafdo), replaced the old national road tax, known
as the Circulation and Haulage Tax (Imposto de Circulafdo e Camionagem) (actually two separate
taxes, but often referred to as one), as well as the Municipal Vehicle Tax (Imposto Municipal
sobre Veiculos). As of January 1, 2008, only two taxes impact motor vehicles: the new Single
Circulation Tax and the national Automobile Tax (Imposto sobre Veiculos) (MFAP, 2008a).
Table 7. Tax Assignment in Portugal
(italics indicate abolished taxes)
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Pessoas Singulares (IRS)
Corporate Income Tax Imposto sobre o Rendimento de Derrama
Pessoas Colectivas (IRC)
Employer/Employee Contribuit6es de Seguranqa Social
Contributions (SS)
Property Taxes Imposto Municipal sobre Im6veis
(IMI), Contribuiqdo Autdrquica (CA)t,
Contribuiqdo Predial ROstica e
Urbana (CPRU)t
Real Estate Transaction Taxes Imposto Municipal sobre
Transmiss6es Onerosas de Im6veis
(IMT), Imposto Municipal de Sisa
(IMS)t
Inheritance and Gift Tax Imposto sobre as Sucess6es e
Doaq6es (ISD)t
Recurrent Taxes
Automobiles Imposto Municipal sobre Vekculos
(IMV)*
Value Added Tax Imposto sobre o Valor
Acrescentado (IVA)
Stamp Duty Imposto do Selo (IS)
Excise Taxes
Fuel Imposto sobre os Produtos
Petroliferos (ISP)
Automobiles Imposto sobre Vefculos (ISV)
Alcohol and Alcoholic Imposto sobre o Alcol e as Bebidas
Beverages Alco6licas (IABA)
Tobacco Imposto sobre o Tabaco (IT)
Recurrent Taxes
Road Imposto Jnico de CirculaýAo (IUC),
Imposto de Circulaqdo e
Camionagem (ICI, ICA)*
Gambling Imposto de Jogo (IJ)
Sources: Cbmara Municipal de Coimbra (2007a), Camara Municipal de Lisboa (2006), Direcgo-Geral dos Impostos (2008), Governo
da Rep~blica Portuguesa (2007b), Ministerio das Financas e da AdministraCAo P6blica (2008a), Palminha (2007).
a Municipalities can choose to levy all or some of the taxes in this category.
tAbolished in 2003. Several abolished taxes appear in present-day municipal budgets, however, as back taxes continue to be
collected.
*Abolished in 2007.
Table 8. Tax Revenue in Portugal: Central Government
(in millions of euros, nominal values; Portu
gu
e se tax 
acron
yms i )
Individual Income Tax (IRS) 4,740 6,947 7,667 8,770 9,252
Corporate Income Tax (IRC) 1,888 4,448 3,888 5,430 5,511
Taxes on Income Subtotal 6,628 11,395 11,555 14,200 14,763
Employer/Employee Contributions (SS) 8,126 12,620 15,918 12,288 13,016
Taxes on Property
Inheritance and Gift Tax (ISDt) 57 103 27 0 0
Value Added Tax (IVA) 6,075 9,733 11,574 13,100 14,145
Stamp Duty (IS) 1,047 1,147 1,534 1,735 1,830
Excise Taxes
Fuel (ISP) 2,195 1,969 3,121 3,170 2,760c
Automobiles (ISV) 675 1,239 1,153 1,184 1,120
Alcohol and Alcoholic Beverages (IABA) 165 217 230 207 264
Tobacco (IT) 774 1,077 1,220 1,325 1,430
Excise Taxes Subtotal 3,809 4,502 5,724 5,886 5,574
Recurrent Taxes
Road (IUC, ICI*, ICA*) 34 43 74 88 111
Other 38 19 21 n.a. n.a.
Recurrent Taxes Subtotal 72 59 95 88 111
Customs and Import Duties 1 1 0 n.a. n.a.
Other Taxes on Production 0 41 6 n.a. n.a.
Indirect Taxes Subtotal 11,004 15,483 18,933 20,809 21,660
Other Taxes 82 214 144 283 274
Total Tax Revenue 25,897 39,815 46,577 4 7, 5 8 0 d 4 9 ,7 1 3 dSources: Direc~qo-Geral dos Impostos (2008), Ministerio das Financas e da Administraqho POblica (2007a, 2008b), Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development (2007), Palminha (2007).
a The 2008 Portuguese National Budget, from which the 2007 revenues are drawn, designates these as "estimated" figures.b The 2008 Portuguese National Budget designates these as "projected" figures.
'The decrease in revenue from the previous year is the result of new legislation-Lei 55/2007 Contribuq5o de Serviqo Rodovisrio-
which dedicates a fixed portion of the Fuel Tax to the national roads authority, Estradas de Portugal. Central government does
not count the Contribuqho as revenue, thus the decrease from 2007 to 2008.
d Note that totals for 2007 and 2008 are incomplete. Revenue figures for minor national taxes were unavailable.
tAbolished in 2003.
*Abolished in 2007.
"n.a." indicates not available.
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Table 9. Tax Revenues in Portugal: Municipal Government
(in millions of euros, nominal values; Portuquese tax acronyms in parentheses)
Lorporate income lax (verrama) I 26 Ju .32i i 35U
Property Taxes (IMI, CAt, CPRUt) 310 508 781 n.a. n.a.
Real Estate Transaction Taxes (IMT, IMSt) 288 674 586 n.a. n.a.
Taxes on Property Subtotal 598 1,182 1,367 n.a. n.a.
Recurrent Taxes
Automobiles (IMV*) 50 79 114 n.a. n.a.
Recurrent Taxes
Gambling (IU) 67 107 117 n.a. n.a.
Indirect Taxes Subtotal 67 107 117 215 219
Total Tax Revenue 844 1,655 1,978 2,414 2,545
Sources: Minist&rio das Finanqas e da Administragqo POblica (2007a, 2008a, 2008b), OECD (2007).
"Disaggregate revenues for individual taxes were not available with the exception of the Corporate Income Tax (Derrama).
tAbolished in 2003. Several abolished taxes appear in present-day municipal budgets, however, as back taxes continue to be
collected.
*Abolished in 2007.
"n.a." indicates not available.
Municipalities in Portugal are limited to a specific set of taxes as mandated by national
law (Governo da Repuiblica Portuguesa, 2007a). In comparison with other unitary
democracies,46 however, municipal governments in Portugal have a great deal of autonomy
in setting both the tax rates and tax base for the taxes they levy. According to an OECD
(1999) tax policy study of 1995 tax revenues, Portuguese municipalities had the authority to
set both the tax rate and base on taxes that accounted for 49 percent of municipal tax
revenue. Additionally, municipalities could set the rate, but not the base on taxes that raised
another 14 percent of municipal tax revenue while the remaining 37 percent of tax revenue
came from taxes for which central government set the rate and base. Still, to put municipal
taxes into perspective, municipal tax revenue accounted for just four percent of total
government tax revenues in 2004 (OECD, 2007).
Table 8 and Table 9 provide an overview of aggregate tax revenue in Portugal for
central and municipal government, respectively. Major taxes for central government include
the value added tax, income taxes, social security taxes, and excise taxes. Property taxes
stand out as the major tax revenue generators for municipalities. In 2004, almost seventy
percent of municipal own-source tax revenue came from property taxes. Not reflected in
either table is the revenue-sharing arrangement that central government has with municipal
governments regarding the personal income tax (Imposto sobre o Rendimento de Pessoas Singulares,
IRS). This will be discussed in more detail under Intergovernmental Transfers. Table 10
outlines the projected municipal tax revenues for the municipalities of Lisbon, Porto, and
46With the exception of New Zealand.
I · · · · · ·
Coimbra for the 2008 budget cycle and expresses tax revenue as a percentage of total
municipal revenue.
Table 10. Projected Municipal Tax Revenues, 2008: Lisbon, Porto, and Coimbra
(in euros)
Tax Revenues
As % of Total
Total Municipal
Municipality Direct* Indirect* Total* Per Capita Revenue Revenue*
Lisbon 295.6 1.1 296.7 0.560 54% 546.0
Porto 88.1 19.8 108.0 0.452 51% 212.6
Coimbra 40.7 2.7 43.4 0.305 34% 128.7
Sources: CAmara Municipal de Coimbra (2007a), CAmara Municipal de Lisboa (2007), CAmara Municipal do Porto (2007).
*Thousands.
Despite the devolution of tax assignment to sub-national jurisdictions in Portugal, all
tax administration is conducted by central government. Both central and municipal
government taxes are collected and administered by the national Tax Directorate-General
(Direcfdo-Geral dos Impostos, DGI). DGI transfers the appropriate municipal tax revenues
from central government coffers to the municipalities once a month, charging the
municipalities a transaction fee for their services. Under this system, municipal governments
cannot track tax remittances and are therefore unable to verify the accuracy of transfers from
central government, although, in principle, municipal tax revenues cannot be appropriated
by central government (J.F. Branco, personal communication, February 4, 2008). 47
Intergovernmental Transfers
Intergovernmental transfers are an important part of the Portuguese public finance
system. Central government and all levels of sub-national government receive transfers as a
revenue source. The following sections outline each type of transfer in detail.
Transfers to Central Government
Portugal continues to receive intergovernmental transfers from the European Union
(EU) under the supranational authority's Cohesion Policy, which is designed to minimize
horizontal imbalances among its member states. These transfers are known collectively as
EU Structural Funds, yet they draw from three separate sources: the European Fund for
Regional Development (EFRD), the European Social Fund (ESF), and Cohesion Funds.
Structural Funds are designed to meet three objectives under the EU's Cohesion Policy: the
Convergence Objective, which seeks economic convergence among member states; the
Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective, which works to strengthen regional
competitiveness, attractiveness and employment opportunities; and the European Territorial
Cooperation Objective, which strengthens cross-border cooperation through joint local and
regional initiatives (European Union, 2007a). Each objective draws from the
aforementioned funds as outlined in Table 11.
47 In the case of extreme economic crisis, central government can withhold all or some of the Municipal
Corporate Income Tax (Derrama).
Table 11. EU Cohesion Policy Objectives and Funds
Objective
Convergence
Regional Competitiveness
and Employment
European Territorial
Cooperation
Structural Funds Distribution
EFRD ESF Cohesion 81.54%
EFRD
EFRD
15.95%
2.51%
source: EU (2007a).
EU transfers are assessed and disbursed at the NUTS II level, the boundaries of which
are contiguous with the regional development commissions (CCDRs) on continental
Portugal as well as the autonomous regions of Madeira and the Aqores. NUTS II territories
must meet specific requirements in order to be eligible for Structural Funds.48 For example,
the area contiguous with the CCDR for the Lisbon metropolitan area and the Rio Tejo
Valley is ineligible for funds under the Convergence and European Territorial Cooperation
objectives. This is because the GDP per capita in the region is higher than convergence
thresholds (eligible regions must have a GDP per capita that is less than 75 percent of the
EU average) (EU, 2007b). It is the sole NUTS II territory in Portugal that is restricted from
EU Structural Funds.
Once eligibility is assessed for all NUTS II territories, the EU outlines its plan for
disbursing Structural Funds. This is conducted once every seven years as part of the EU's
Framework Programme (FP) budget cycle.49 Once the EU discloses aggregate national-level
disbursements, member states are required to develop a national plan for distributing the
funds to its eligible regions. Although eligibility is assessed at the sub-national level, all
transfers go directly to central government for administration and allocation to the
appropriate regions, municipalities, companies, or projects.
In 2006, Portugal unveiled the National Strategic Reference Framework (Quadro de
Referindia Estrate'gico Nacional, QREN) as the national plan for distributing EU Structural
Funds during the FP7. The Ministry of Finance and Public Administration (Ministerio das
Finanfas e Administrafdo Priblica, MFAP) manages the plan in coordination with other central
government ministries, the regional development commissions, and municipalities. During
FP7, Portugal is expected to receive 21.5 billion euros as outlined in the following table.
Table 12. Financial Allocations for Portugal, EU Cohesion Policy, 2007-2013
(in millions of euros)
Objective Amount
Convergence 20,473
Regional Competitiveness and Employment 938
European Territorial Cooperation 99
Total 21,510
Source: EU (2006).
The figures in Table 12 represent the full disbursement of funds. Table 13, however,
shows the EU funds received between the years of 2005-2007 and anticipated in the 2008
budget year. In addition to Structural Fund support, Portugal also receives
48See EU (2007b) for a detailed description of EU Cohesion Policy eligibility requirements.
49 The EU is currently in the Seventh Framework Programme which began in 2007 and ends in 2013.
intergovernmental transfers for the development of the national agriculture and fishing
industries (MFAP, 2008b). They are also included in Table 13.
Table 13. EU Transfers to Portugal, 2005-2008
(in millions of euros)
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)
European Social Fund (ESF)
Cohesion Funds
Structural Funds Subtotal
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
(EAGGF)
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)
Agricultural Funds Subtotal
Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG)
Fish Ecosystems Plan (FEP)
Fisheries Funds Subtotal
A
2005
1,603
696
270
2,569
1,144
1,144
18
18
2006
1,266
753
204
2,223
2007"
2,029
552
461
3,043
2008 b
2,176
847
706
3,729
1,172 1,132 1,054
- 207 415
1,172 1,338 1,469
43 22 16
- 9 16
43 31 32
Source: MFAP (2008b).
' Estimated
bProjected
"n.a." indicates not available.
Portugal is also able to avail itself of intergovernmental transfers from the EU Trans-
European Networks--Transport fund (TEN-T). Monies from the TEN-T program are
intended for transportation projects that promote access to and interconnection and
interoperability of national transportation networks throughout the EU. The program is
currently targeting "30 Priority Axes" in Europe for priority funding. Three of the
program's priority projects directly impact Portugal. These include the high-speed railway
axis of southwest Europe (Priority Axes 3 and 19), the multimodal axis of the Iberian
Peninsula with the rest of Europe (Priority Axis 8), and the freight railway axis from
Portuguese container ports to Madrid and Paris (Priority Axis 16) (European Commission,
2005).
Transfers to Regional Government
The regional development commissions (Comissjes de Coordenafdo e Desenvolvimento
Regional, CCDR) receive a large portion of their funding through intergovernmental transfers
from both central government funds and EU Structural Funds administered by central
government." Table 14 outlines intergovernmental transfers to the CCDRs for the past two
annual budget cycles.
50 Approximately 18% of CCDR revenue (14.4 million euros) comes from revenue the regional development
commissions collect themselves.
Miscellaneous Funds
Other 32 52 4 1
Total 3,763 3,489 4,416 5,232
As % of Total Central Government Tax Revenue n.a. n.a. 9.3% 10.5%
Table 14. Intergovernmental Transfers to Regional Development Commissions,
2007-2008
(in millions of euros)
Regional Development
Commission
North (CCDR Norte)
Central (CCDR Centro)
Lisbon and Rio Tejo Valley (CCDR LVT)
Alentejo (CCDR Alentejo)
Algarve (CCDR Algarve)
2007" 1 2008 I1
Source
Central
Gov't EU
11.2 6.9
9 4.1
12.1 4.5
7.5 3.6
4.9 2.8
Source
Central
Gov't EU
12.8 11.2
9.9 5.8
13.5 6
7.3 3.3
5.2 3.7
Total 44.7 21.9 66.6 48.7 30 78.7
Sources: MFAP (2007a, 2008b)
'Projected
Transfers to Municipal Government
Municipalities in Portugal can avail themselves of a series of intergovernmental grants
from central government. A municipality can opt into a revenue-sharing arrangement with
central government and it may be eligible for a series of equalization grants, capital grants, or
both. There is very little restriction on how a municipality spends intergovernmental
transfer revenues. Apart from capital grants, which are project specific, any other revenues
can be split between recurrent or capital municipal budgets with the restriction that the
revenue designated to the recurrent budget cannot exceed sixty-five percent of the amount
the municipality receives from the Financial Equalization Fund, a horizontal equalization
grant described below (Governo da Repuiblica Portuguesa, 2007a).
Revenue Sharing
In 2007, central government introduced a new revenue-sharing arrangement with
municipal governments intended to spur competition among municipalities (J.F. Branco,
personal communication, February 4, 2008). For the first time, municipalities were given the
authority to vary the rate of the personal income tax (Imposto sobre o Rendimento de Pessoas
Singulares, IRS), a central government tax, as applied to their citizens. In the revenue-sharing
arrangement, central government will forego five percent of the annual IRS revenue
generated by each municipality. Municipalities are subsequently faced with the decision of
either (a) taking that five percent as municipal revenue or (b) taking less than five percent
and refunding the remaining revenue to their constituents, thus lowering the effective
personal income tax rate. Thus, municipalities can compete with one another by offering
lower personal income tax rates to current and prospective citizens (i.e. "Tiebout" sorting).
Municipalities are permitted to vary the IRS tax rate on an annual basis, although the
arrangement must be decided prior to the budget cycle in which the rates take effect
(Governo da Repuiblica Portuguesa, 2007a). In the most recent round of decisions, forty-
two municipalities, the majority of which lie outside major metropolitan areas, opted to
refund a portion of the IRS to their constituents in 2009 based upon remittances in 2008
(Anibal, 2008). This represents an effort on behalf of those municipalities to compete with
other regions by offering lower overall tax rates.
Horizontal and Vertical EqualiZation Grants
The Financial Equalization Fund (Fundo de Equilibrio Financeiro, FEF) and the Municipal
Social Fund (Fundo SocialMunicipal, FSM) constitute the equalization mechanisms of the
Portuguese intergovernmental transfer system. A complicated set of criteria defines how
each municipality interacts with either fund, whether as a recipient of monies or a donor.
The principal goal of the FEF is horizontal equalization whereas the FSM is oriented toward
vertical equalization. Table 15 outlines the two funds.
The FEF is composed of two separate funds, the General Municipal Fund (Fundo Geral
Munitipal, FGM) and the Municipal Cohesion Fund (Fundo de Coesdo Municipal, FCM). The
FGM is designed to provide each municipality with the capacity for basic public service
provision. The FCM, on the other hand, is a convergence fund designed to equalize capacity
among municipalities. The Municipal Finance Law (Lei das Finanfas Locais) outlines the
methodology for calculating FEF funds. The total amount to be disbursed under the FEF is
25.3 percent of the average of the sum of revenues generated by the personal income tax
(IRS), the corporae income tax (IRC) and the value added tax (IVA) (Governo da Repuiblica
Portuguesa, 2007a)5 The amount is subsequently split equally between the FGM and the
FCM. In 2008, 1.9 billion euros were dedicated to the FEF (Governo da Repuiblica
Portuguesa, 2007c, p. 407).51
Five percent of the FGM is distributed equally among all municipalities. The remaining
ninety-five percent is disbursed based upon a weighted population criterion (65%) as well as
a criterion addressing municipal lands impacted by the national land conservation and
environmental protection program known as Rede Natura 2000 (30%). Presumably, this last
criterion is intended to reimburse municipalities for foregone revenue due to the inability to
develop the environmentally protected land.
In contrast, the criteria that define the FCM are more complicated than those of the
other equalization grants. Two components drive the fund: a national measurement of per
capita remittances of municipal taxes (capafitto midia nacional, CMN) and a national social
development index (indice nacional de desenvolvimento social, IDS). The CMN is calculated by
summing the own-source tax revenue from every municipality in the country and dividing
that sum by the national population. A similar figure is calculated for each municipality
(capafitdo midia do municpio, CMMi). If the municipal tax remittance per capita for a specific
municipality, the CMMi, is less than 0.75 times the CMN, that municipality will receive
cohesion funds from the FCM. If the municipal tax remittance per capita is more than 1.25
times the national figure, it will be required to contribute to the FCM.
Once the contributions and disbursements based on the CMN have been accounted
for, any remaining revenue is devoted to social development. The national per capita social
development index (IDS) is based upon three equally weighted criteria. They include
average lifespan, education level, and a health and comfort criterion that measures household
connections to electricity, water delivery, and sewerage. A municipal per capita social
development index (indice municipal de desigualdade de oportunidades, IDO) is also calculated and
51 It is unclear why this amount, 1.9 billion euros (from Lei n.0 67-A/2007), does not reflect 25.3% of the
average of revenues collected by the aforementioned taxes as outlined in the 2008 Portuguese National Budget.
Using those amounts, the FEF should total 2.4 billion euros (Governo da Repdiblica Portuguesa, 2007c, p. 407;
MFAP, 2008b, p. 121).
compared to the IDS. Any municipality with an IDO below the national-level IDS will
receive cohesion funds from the FCM.
Table 15. Horizontal and Vertical Equalization Grants of Portugal
Fixed
General Municipal
Fund (Fundo Geral
Municipal, FGM)
Municipal Cohesion
Fund (Fundo de
Coesdo Municipal,
5.0%
65.0%
30.0%
Divided equally among all municipalities
Weighted measure of municipal population
Amount of territory affected by the national land
conservation and environmental protection program,
Rede Natura 2000
Per capita remittances of municipal taxes; municipal
versus national average
Social development index; municipal versus national
8 25.3% of (IRS+IRC+IVA)/3.
b Fund amount determined by central government.
As the primary vertical equalization tool, the Municipal Social Fund (FSM) supports
expenditures that were formerly the responsibility of central government, but have since
been transferred to municipal control. These include public education, healthcare and
community services such as daycare, rest homes for the elderly, and drug abuse programs.
Unlike the FEF, funds for the FSM are not a function of tax revenue. Instead,, central
government sets the amount to distribute within each budget cycle. Municipalities receive
funds based upon the number of school children aged 15 or younger in the municipal
education system, the number of members in the municipal healthcare system and the
number of individuals who utilize the aforementioned community services. In 2008, 151
million euros were allocated to the FSM (Govemo da Republica Portuguesa, 2007c, p. 407).
In contrast, the FEF budget (1.9 billion euros) is over twelve times the size of the FSM
budget.
Table 16 outlines intergovernmental transfer revenues from central government to the
municipalities of Lisbon, Porto, and Coimbra for the 2008 budget cycle. The table also
expresses transfer revenues as a percentage of overall municipal revenue.
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Table 16. Projected Municipal Intergovernmental Transfer Revenues, 2008: Lisbon,
Porto, and Coimbra
(in thousands of euros)
Intergovernmental Transfers
Transfers as % of
Total Total
Municipality IRSa FEF FSM Total Revenue Revenue
Lisbon 60.7 1.8 0.1 62.6 546.0 11%
Porto 19.0 4.0 3.3 26.3 212.6 12%
Coimbra 10.3 6.0 1.5 17.7 128.7 14%
Source: Governo da Reptblica Portuguesa (2007c).
a All municipalities choose to take the full 5% of IRS revenue.
Capital Grants
In addition to the revenue sharing and equalization grants, central government also
issues grants to Portuguese municipalities for capital projects. The primary mechanism for
capital grants is the national investment program known as the Central Administration
Program for Development Investments and Expenses (Programa de Investimentos e Despesas de
Desenvolvimento daAdministrafao Central, PIDDAC). The PIDDAC combines national revenue
with EU Structural Funds to channel investment to forty separate government programs
intended to promote economic growth and sustainable development in Portugal. Unlike EU
Structural Funds, however, PIDDAC funds are disbursed to all municipalities regardless of
NUTS II eligibility. Table 17 highlights the five programs allocated the largest share of
PIDDAC revenue in 2008. PIDDAC funds are transferred directly to the administrator of
the capital project, whether it is a ministry within central government, a municipality, or a
state-owned enterprise.
Table 17. Program Priorities for Portuguese National Investment Program
(PIDDAC), 2008
(in millions of euros)
Revenue Source
Program (Program Budget Number) National EU Total %
Competitiveness for Rural Development and
Fisheries (P030) 144 356 500 13.9%
Transportation (PO024) 313 119 433 12.0%
Agriculture and Rural Development (PO022) 138 241 380 10.6%
Scientific and Technological Research and
Innovation (PO02) 253 99 352 9.8%
Continental Rural Development (PO44) 26 209 234 6.5%
All Other 903 789 1,692 47.1%
Total 1,778 1,813 3,591
Source: MFAP (2008b, p. 103).
In the municipal case, PIDDAC grants may provide the full budget for municipal
infrastructure projects or they may be central government's portion of a co-financing
agreement between central government and one or more municipalities. Under co-financing
municipalities are asked to provide a portion of the project budget with own-source revenue
before PIDDAC funds are released (J.C. MourAo, personal communication, February 8,
2008).
Transfers to Parish Councils
Parish councils receive intergovernmental transfers from both central and municipal
government. Central government has a formalized system, the Parish Council Financing
Fund (Fundo de Financiamento das Freguesias, FFF), which draws revenue from 2.5 percent of
the average of the sum of the IRS, IRC, and IVA taxes. Parish councils receive funds based
upon the predominant land use typology within their boundaries (urban, medium urban, and
rural), their population, and area. Five percent of the fund is disbursed equally among all
parish councils. In 2008, central government anticipated disbursing approximately 198
million euros from the FFF (Governo da Repdiblica Portuguesa, 2007c, p. 452).
Municipal governments also transfer funds to their parish councils. This size of the
municipal transfers depends on the deconcentration of municipal government activity to the
parish council. Apart from administrative funds, parish councils may receive additional
monies to cover expenditures associated with operating daycare centers or maintaining
public restrooms. Table 18 highlights the expected intergovernmental transfers for parish
councils in the municipalities of Lisbon, Porto, and Coimbra.
Table 18. Parish Council Intergovernmental Transfer Revenues, 2008: Lisbon,
Porto, and Coimbra
(in millions of euros)
Intergovernmental Transfers Average
Number of per
Municipality FFF Municipal Total Councils Council
Lisbon 5.8 22.5 28.3 53 0.5
Porto 2.6 4.6 7.2 15 0.5
Coimbra 1.7 4.4 6.1 31 0.2
Sources: Clmara Municipal de Coimbra (2007a, p. 307), Clmara Municipal de Lisboa (2007, pp. 44,
46), Cbmara Municipal do Porto (2007, Anexo III), Governo da Rep6blica Portuguesa (2007c, pp.
421,431,436).
User Fees
Sub-national governments-municipalities and parish councils-are allowed to create
and levy user fees on a variety of goods and services as well as activities that impact the
public (e.g. construction). Central government itself does not utilize user fees as a revenue
generating mechanism although state-owned enterprises do. At the municipal level, user fees
represent a small portion of the total revenue generated by each municipality. Table 19
shows the anticipated user fee revenues for the municipalities of Lisbon, Porto and Coimbra
in the 2008 budget cycle and expresses user fee revenue as a percentage of total municipal
revenue.
Table 19. Projected Municipal User Fee Revenues, 2008: Lisbon, Porto, and Coimbra
(in thousands of euros)
User Fee Revenue
User Fee Total as % of Total
Municipality Revenue* Revenue Revenue
Lisbon 64.1 546.0 12%
Porto 4.6 212.6 2%
Coimbra 4.3 128.7 3%
Sources: Cdmara Municipal de Coimbra (2007a), Chmara Municipal de Lisboa
(2007), Cdmara Municipal do Porto (2007).
*Does not include user fees from public transportation services.
The municipality of Lisbon features the most comprehensive set of user fees. Fees are
levied on construction, retail operating licenses, drivers' licenses, vehicle inspection, solid
waste removal, the use of municipal cultural and recreational facilities, the rental of
municipal property, and advertising in the public realm (Ca^mara Municipal de Lisboa,
2005a). Other municipalities levy user fees on municipal healthcare facilities where they
exist. Parish councils are able to levy user fees on services that municipal government has
deconcentrated to them.
Borrowing
Municipal governments are allowed to borrow money in order to support the regular
government functions, fund capital projects, or stabilize municipal finances. Municipalities
can borrow from any legal entity that is allowed to issue loans. Central government places
limits, however, on the cumulative amount of debt a municipality can have in any given
budget cycle.
Money borrowed to support regular government operations or fund capital projects is
governed by the following criteria. Short-term debt, defined as debt to be repaid in one year
or less, cannot exceed ten percent of all municipal revenue (taxes, FEF, IRS revenue sharing,
etc.) in a given budget cycle. Medium-term debt, to be repaid in two to ten years, and long-
term debt, to be repaid in ten years or more, cannot exceed total municipal revenue in a
given budget cycle. A special exception is made for debts used to finance projects that are
co-financed with EU Structural Funds from the European Regional Development Fund or
the Cohesion Fund. In such cases, municipal debt cannot exceed 75 percent of the budget
apportioned to the national public sector (central and municipal government). Municipalities
in violation of the aforementioned criteria must reduce their overall debt by ten percent each
budget cycle until they are in compliance. If the reductions are not put into effect,
municipalities risk sanctions by central government (Governo da Repiblica Portuguesa,
2007a).
Municipalities in financial imbalance may also borrow without limit to stabilize
finances.5 2 They are required, however, to submit either a financial health plan (plano de
saneamentofinanceiro) or a financial restructuring plan (plano de reestruturafdofinanceira) with
central government. The latter is reserved for governments in severe fiscal crisis. Both
plans must outline how the municipality will reach fiscal solvency. The Ministry of Finance
and Public Administration (MFAP) monitors this process and verifies that municipalities are
following their respective plans. Municipalities that violate their own financial health plans
through unsustainable practices are sanctioned by central government. Sanctions include a
52 Articles 40 and 41 of the Lei n.o 2/2007 place limits on loan terms, but do not mention specific borrowing
limits for loans intended to rebalance municipal finances.
reduction of intergovernmental support from central government and restrictions on future
borrowing.53
Parish councils are also authorized to borrow. Cumulative debt cannot exceed ten
percent of the parish council's grant from central government through the Parish Council
Financing Fund (Fundo de Financiamento das Freguesias, FFF). Debt financing cannot exceed
fifty percent of council revenue in the preceding year. Parish councils in violation of these
criteria must reduce their overall debt by ten percent each budget cycle until they are in
compliance.
4.5 Analysis of the Portuguese Public Finance System
The Portuguese public finance system is the product of over thirty years of democratic
governance combined with the influence of over twenty years of membership in the
European Union. The system has effectively devolved authority and fiscal autonomy to sub-
national government despite the lack of a true regional governance system and maintained a
hard budget constraint with municipalities. Challenges remain, however. Although the
system is still relatively young, policy makers must resolve problems associated with the
fiscal equivalence condition in public transportation and municipal police services, tax
administration, and significant central level public debt. This section uses the framework
created in Chapter 2 to provide an analysis of the Portuguese public finance system with
respect to political ideology, fiscal federalism, and revenue-generating mechanisms.
Political Ideology and the Public Services Portugal Provides
As Section 2.2 outlined, cultural values and beliefs combine to form a political ideology
toward government and its role in society. In Portugal, political ideology has seen rapid
change as the nation has gone from authoritarian rule to democracy and membership in the
EU in a very short period of time. Citizens have begun to move from the embeddedness
side of the Schwartz framework to a more autonomous cultural value dimension.5 4 This may
be partially attributed to the influence of capitalism and its focus on the individual
(Vasconcellos, 2001).
While chronicling the changes in political ideology that led to the Carnation Revolution
is beyond the scope of this thesis, after the revolution political ideology was still in great flux.
In the initial years after the Carnation Revolution, the government nationalized much of
what had been provided by the private sector under the authoritarian corporatist rule. Since
1995, it has been attempting to reverse nationalization, but with mixed results (Wiarda &
Mott, 2001).
The vestiges of authoritarian rule have created a great sense of contempt for central, if
not municipal, government. Yet despite this contempt there exists a pervasive belief that the
Portuguese government should provide a robust set of goods and services to its citizens.
Furthermore, increased integration with the EU has brought pressure on government for the
provision of more goods and services. Portuguese citizens are very attuned to the quality of
53 In late 2007, support from central government to the municipality of Gaia was reduced by 106,000 euros per
month as a result of excessive municipal borrowing (Marmelo, 2007).
54 Interestingly, the Portuguese language features the option to pronoun drop, which Licht, et al. (2007)
determined to be an indicator of embeddedness.
life in other countries in the EU and consequently demand the same goods and services
from their government that other countries provide their citizens.
Apart from citizen preferences, the EU itself has also had an effect on the provision of
goods and services, which, in turn, has altered political ideology. Large infrastructure
projects, for example, became much more practicable with access to EU Structural Funds.
Municipal governments, especially, have begun to pursue EU investments through the
Portuguese central government.
Still, in contrast to many of its European neighbors, the Portuguese public sector's
involvement with public service provision is rather significant. The State Enterprise Sector
(Sector Empresarial do Estado, SEE), for example, is made up of eighty-three state-owned
companies that provide goods and services ranging from transportation to healthcare to
public utilities. Political ideology in Portugal has, thus far, not required that government
divest itself from providing these services and turn to the private sector.
Fiscal Federalism: Funding and Delivering Public Services in Portugal
The Portuguese public finance system does an adequate job of expenditure assignment
at the national and sub-national levels. The country has worked to devolve the appropriate
authority and fiscal autonomy to sub-national governments in the tradition of fiscal
federalism, maintain a hard budget constraint with municipalities, and, with the exception of
transportation infrastructure and services and municipal police expenditures, respect the
fiscal equivalence condition for public goods. Still, the lack of regional government creates a
vertical structure of government that poses a challenge to service provision as well as
democracy.
Form of Government
As Inman (Inman, 2007) indicates, Portugal is a unitary democracy. Although
municipal governments are locally elected, they have no representation at the central level of
government. Regional-level electoral districts elect members of parliament, yet those
individuals represent no regional government. Despite several attempts, the governance
system has failed to establish adequate regional representation.
The lack of regional government means that the provision of regional public goods falls
to municipalities through the formation of municipal coalitions. Central government seems
to have overestimated municipal governments' interest in taking on more regional roles,
however. Despite legislation to enable the creation of municipal coalitions, very few have
been established apart from the few special governments previously mentioned.
The lack of regional government also impacts the national political system with respect
to democracy. Because members of parliament do not represent an autonomous jurisdiction
of government, they cannot be held accountable, at least in the fiscal federalist tradition, for
the provision of regional public goods and services. Furthermore, although most EU
Structural Funds are administered at the regional level, they are eventually distributed to
either central or municipal level governments, not regions.
There is a disconnect, therefore, between the members of parliament that an individual
elects and the representation that individual can expect to receive from the elected.
Members of parliament act more as agents of national-level political parties than as regional
representatives; they can change very little in terms of the benefits their electoral districts
receive from national or supranational sources. Democracy, as far as parliament is
concerned, is therefore abrogated.
Decentralization
Despite the difficulties surrounding regional governance, Portugal has been fairly
successful in devolving authority and fiscal autonomy to municipal government.
Municipalities have not always welcomed this, of course. The historical centralization of
goods and services provision has created a cycle of sub-national dependence on central level
support as described in Section 2.5.
As mentioned previously, Portugal has struggled over the past decade to maintain a
balanced national budget. Twice, in 2002 and again in 2005, the nation was required to enter
the "excessive deficit procedure" with the European Commission after the national fiscal
deficit exceeded the three percent ceiling mandated by the Maastricht Treaty (OECD, 2006).
Under the excessive deficit procedure, central government was required to adopt several
measures, outlined in a series of Stability and Growth Programs, which were intended to
lower the deficit. In addition to the commission-mandated measures, Portugal was
encouraged to cut government expenditures where possible.
In an effort to cut costs, central government announced that it would significantly
reduce funds to the PIDDAC investment program in the 2008 budget cycle (MFAP, 2007a).
In 2007, national contributions to the PIDDAC funds increased by almost fifteen percent
over contributions the previous year. In contrast, national contributions to the PIDDAC in
2008 were cut by over forty-three percent. Hardest hit were the nation's municipalities that,
overnight, saw their PIDDAC outlays reduced by as much as eighty-five percent (A.
Monteiro, 2007).
Not surprisingly, the announcement and the consequent budget cuts that followed were
not well received by most municipal governments in Portugal. Although the municipalities
knew cuts were forthcoming, there was no indication that central government would reduce
PIDDAC funds so dramatically when the 2008 National Budget was announced in the fall of
2007. Many municipalities and their parish councils were left with budget gaps they could
not close.
The situation at the end of 2007 highlighted the level of dependence sub-national
government had on central government in terms of intergovernmental fiscal relations.
Although central government could have pursued a more gradual approach, the overall
policy to reduce capital grants to municipal governments was sound. Implicit in the move
was the expectation that municipal governments would use own-source revenue to fund
capital projects, effectively reducing the flypaper effect and strengthening the fiscal
equivalence condition at the local level. Furthermore, central government's commitment to
a hard budget constraint with municipalities has sent the message to municipalities that
central government is serious. Despite the fact that many municipalities are still demanding
intergovernmental capital support from central government, most know that their ability to
extract significant support is limited.
Still, political ideology is not completely in central government's favor. Municipalities
continue to assert that central government has discriminated against their citizens (Camara
Municipal de Vila Vigosa, 2007). This assertion has important political implications.
Municipal government is able to cast itself as the protector of the good of the people while
maligning central government. In the citizens' eye, it is central government not municipal
government that is to blame for unfulfilled promises (D.A. Pires, 2008).
Fiscal Equivalence
Central government has done a fair job of establishing the fiscal equivalence condition
with respect to decentralization. Municipalities are increasingly responsible for those goods
and services that have localized benefits such as public schools, municipal waste delivery,
water systems, parks and recreation, health care, and fire services. The Portuguese public
finance system effectively links municipal benefits with revenue-generating mechanisms in
most cases. There are two significant exceptions, however, where government has not
observed the fiscal equivalence condition: public transportation services and police services.
In the former case, central government, not municipal government, funds public
transportation services in the metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto. Interestingly, the
fiscal equivalence condition is preserved with public transportation services outside of these
two metropolitan areas. This will be discussed in great detail in the following two chapters.
In the latter case, central government retains significant control over policing. Although
municipalities can fund their own police forces, their power is greatly limited (see Footnote
45).
Public Sector Revenue Generation in Portugal
The Portuguese public finance system utilizes a fairly traditional approach to public
sector revenue-generating mechanisms. User fees, taxes, and intergovernmental transfers are
the standard mechanisms used by the system. Tax assignment, for example, follows the
consensus view as outlined in Section 2.4. Municipalities are able to levy taxes on land, real
estate transactions, and, to a small degree, business activity. Central government is
responsible for taxing all other revenue sources. As previously stated, Portuguese
municipalities have a great deal of autonomy as compared to other unitary democracies in
setting tax rates and tax bases for the taxes they levy.
Tax Administration
The devolution of government expenditures has not been matched with an equal
committed to devolving tax administration, however. Nor has there been any effort to make
the tax administration process more transparent. As previously mentioned, all national and
sub-national tax remittances are administered by central government. The current
arrangement prevents municipalities from verifying the accuracy of the tax revenue transfers
they receive from central government each month. Monthly tax transfers offer no means of
(a) ascertaining the collection period that the revenue corresponds to or (b) cross-referencing
municipal tax remittances with the amount of the transfer. This lack of transparency
undermines central government's effort to decentralize. As municipal responsibility grows
and central government support dwindles, a system of checks and balances will be necessary
if central government continues to administer all taxes.
As central government reduces intergovernmental transfers to Portuguese
municipalities, it must also prepare for the eventual reduction of support from EU Structural
Funds. Portugal will be eligible for fewer funds as its economy grows and new EU Member
States lower economic indicators for EU convergence. The strain on public sector funds in
Portugal will only increase once EU funds decline.
Debt
This last point represents, perhaps, the single most important challenge for the
Portuguese public finance system. The country's prospects for growth are among the
weakest in the EU yet its commitment to stabilizing public finances has not always been
steadfast. For example, the 2005 Stability and Growth Programme for Portugal (required by
the European Commission when the nation's public deficit exceeded three percent of GDP)
sought to reduce the deficit to 2.6 percent of GDP by 2008 (OECD, 2006). Recent
forecasts, however, set the 2008 deficit at 9.2 percent of GDP, a far cry from the goal set
back in 2005 (IMF, 2007). Central government has yet to bring spending under control
despite pressure from the EU.
Despite problems with fiscal equivalence and tax administration, the Portuguese public
finance system has proven fairly stable. Institutions, power structures (including hard budget
constraints with municipalities), and the utilization of specific finance mechanisms have seen
relatively moderate change in the past few years. Stability does not equate with sustainability,
however. The large public sector debt continues to place significant strain on government
activity and puts in doubt the government's ability to delivery public goods and services in
the future.
Nowhere is this more true than in public sector transportation services. The majority
of transportation activity in Portugal is financed by the central government and state-owned
transportation enterprises rely on a soft budget constraint and continue to amass increasing
debt. Government's ability to maintain this fiscal relationship is questionable. In the
following chapter, this thesis will analyze the Portuguese surface transportation policy and
finance system as a component of the general public finance system.

5 Surface Transportation Policy and Finance in Portugal
The Portuguese transportation system has seen an unprecedented change over the past
decade as the nation has utilized EU Structural Funds in combination with national revenues
to rehabilitate and expand road, rail and public transit systems. Additional change is
forthcoming as the nation continues to pursue the expansion of the national highway
network, increased freight capacity on the conventional rail network, and the country's first
high-speed rail connection to Western Europe. This chapter will provide an in-depth
overview of the Portuguese surface transportation system. Subsections will describe the
principal government organizations involved in planning and financing transportation
investments, outline the characteristics of the Portuguese road, rail and public transit
systems, and discuss national and sub-national approaches to transportation finance.
5.1 Transportation Administration
Three ministries within central government coordinate the majority of transportation
planning and financing activity taking place in Portugal: the Ministry of Finance and Public
Administration (Ministerio das Finanfas e daAdministrapdo Publica, MFAP), the Ministry of
Public Works, Transportation and Communications (Ministerio de Obras Piblicas, Transportes e
Comunicayfes, MOPTC), and the Ministry of Environment, Spatial Planning and Regional
Development (Ministitio do Ambiente, do Ordenamento do Territdrio e do Desenvolvimento Regional,
MAOTDR). Coordinating transportation planning activity was traditionally a laborious
process. In an effort to streamline and overhaul some central government operations,
several ministries, including those just mentioned, are involved in the Program for
Restructuring Central State Administration (Programa de Reestructurafdo de Administrafdo Central
do Estado, PRACE).
At the sub-national level, individual municipalities have departments dedicated to
transportation planning. This mainly impacts the local road networks for which
municipalities are responsible and may include activities related to road construction,
signalization, sidewalks and the adoption of specific road safety measures.
Central Government Ministries
The Portuguese Ministry of Finance and Public Administration (MFAP) has both an
advisory and an administrative role in authorizing and subsequently disbursing recurrent or
capital funds for transportation activity. One of MFAP's key responsibilities is control of the
State Enterprise Sector (Sector Empresarial do Estado, SEE), a consolidated budget and
management effort directed at the eighty-three companies, known as "state-owned
enterprises," that are owned and operated by central government. The eventual goal of the
SEE is to privatize or sell the state-owned enterprises. This process has been successful in
some sectors, namely healthcare, but significantly less progress has been made with the ten
surface transportation companies operating under control of the SEE (MFAP, 2007e).ss
MFAP coordinates directly with the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and
Communication (MOPTC), which is primarily responsible for planning and regulating
transportation activities in Portugal. Two secretaries of state operate within the MOPTC,
ss A notable exception was the SEE's liquidation of SILOPOR, a state-owned enterprise that managed port
storage facilities, in 2006 (MFAP, 2007e)
each responsible for a specific set of transportation modes. The Secretary of State for Public
Works and Communication (Secretdrio de Estado Adjunto das Obras Pgblicas e das Comunicafoes,
SEAOPC) is responsible for road and air transportation while the Secretary of State for
Transportation (Secretria de Estado dos Transportes, SET) oversees rail and public
transportation planning and operations as well as ports and maritime planning. The two
entities operate independently from one another. The minister of MOPTC and his or her
staff must coordinate any joint activity between the two secretaries of state (E.B. Pires,
personal communication, August 2, 2007).
The Ministry for Environment, Spatial Planning and Regional Development
(MAOTDR) is responsible for coordinating land use planning and environmental protection
at all levels of government. Municipalities, for example, must submit comprehensive land
use plans that follow the guidelines and goals of MAOTDR. The ministry is also responsible
for the regional development commissions (CCDRs) and incorporates the intergovernmental
transfers to the CCDRs as part of its annual budget.
Restructuring Central Government
In 2005, the Portuguese government passed legislation intended to eliminate overlap
between existing organizations within central government as well as create new organizations
to facilitate government activity (Governo da Repdblica Portuguesa, 2005). Known as the
Program for Restructuring Central State Administration (Programa de Reestructurafdo de
Administrafdo Central do Estado, PRACE), the program was phased over a series of two years.
Although the PRACE was officially implemented by the end of 2007 there are still many
loose ends to be dealt with.
Of the ministries conducting transportation planning and financing, the MOPTC was
affected the most by the PRACE. The most sweeping reform involved merging the nation's
rail regulator with the surface transportation and ferries regulator and the office of licensing
and traffic safety. In the summer of 2007, the National Institute of Rail Transportation
(Instituto Nacional do Transporte Fermvidrio, INTF), the Directorate General of Land and Water
Transportation (Direcfo-Geral dos Transportes Terrestres e Fluviais, DGTTF) and the Directorate
General of Traffic (Direcfdo-Geral do Viafdo, DGV/) were combined to become the Institute of
Mobility and Land Transportation (Instituto da Mobilidade e dos Transportes Terestres, IMTI).
This large entity is responsible for regulating private and public surface transportation
companies in all municipalities (subway, bus, light rail, and freight and passenger rail) and for
national road safety, vehicle registration, and drivers' licenses.56
Although the aforementioned organizations have been combined on paper, they
continue to maintain separate identifies and have yet to integrate their staffs. While the
PRACE is meant to eliminate institutional overlap, it is unclear whether the program will
also eliminate the employees that produce this overlap. This represents one of the more
politically challenging aspects of streamlining government activity.
In addition to the new surface transportation regulator, a new regulator for roadway
concessions, the Institute of Roadway Infrastructure (Instittto de Infra-Estructuras Rodovidrias,
INIR) was also created as a result of the PRACE. All future roadway concessions will fall
under the purview of INIR, while current contracts being administered and regulated by the
56 Ferry regulation was not passed on to IMTT, but to the Institute of Ports and Maritime Transportation
(Insfituto Portudrio e dos Transportes Martimos, IPTM).
national highway authority, Estradas de Portugal (EP), will be transferred to INIR at some
unknown date in the future.
5.2 Surface Transportation in Portugal
The following sections outline the primary characteristics of the road, rail, and public
transportation systems in Portugal. The country has leveraged the private sector to
undertake a large expansion and modernization of the national road network. It also plans
to use private sector investment to construct and operate the nation's new high-speed rail
system, which is currently in the planning stages. Despite policies that have promoted
comprehensive road planning since the mid 20d Century, government decision makers have
seen no need to conduct comprehensive rail (conventional plus high speed) rail or public
transportation planning.
The majority of surface transportation investments are coordinated by central
government through the ten surface transportation companies that are operated through the
State Enterprise Sector (Sector Empresarial do Estado, SEE) as state-owned enterprises.
Municipal-level transportation investment is limited to locally managed road systems and
municipally owned public transportation systems where they exist.
The Portuguese Road System
Portugal has a road network of approximately 16,000 kilometers of freeway and
regional highways which is complemented by an additional 90,000 kilometers of municipal
roadway (EP, 2007c). Portuguese roadways are classified into six distinct categories:
Principal Routes (Itinerdrtios Ptinndais, IP), Complementary Routes (Itinerdrios Complementares,
IC), National Roadways (Estradas Nadonais, EN), Regional Roadways (Estradas Regionais, ER),
municipal routes, and declassified routes. The final category represents roadways that are in
the process of being turned over from central government to municipal control.s7
The IPs "connect...major cities, the ports between them, and the most important
borderlands... [they] are complemented by a secondary network of links to the interior and
to medium and small cities: ICs and ENs" (Fernandes & Viegas, 1999, p. 23). IPs and ICs
make up the most important segments of the Portuguese road network and represent what
would most likely be characterized as freeways and major highways. ENs and ERs are much
less important links in the system.
As in other countries, roadways in Portugal are assigned particular numbers for
identification purposes. In addition to being designated an IP or IC, a Portuguese freeway is
also assigned an "A" designation (the "A" standing for "Auto-Estrada"). A particular freeway
can therefore be made up of various segments of IPs and ICs or vice versa. The IP1, for
example, forms part of the Al, A2, A3 and A22 freeways.
Operation and Maintenance
As indicated in Table 20, the majority of the Portuguese road network is operated and
maintained by either municipal governments (85%) or the national road authority, Estradas
57 Before agreeing to take control of any declassified routes, some municipalities request that Estradas de
Portugal (EP) make improvements to the declassified roadways and fund future maintenance. In most cases,
EP is not in a position to comply, leaving the majority of declassified routes in a political limbo (R.N. Dinis,
personal communication, August 1, 2007).
de Portugal (EP), a state-owned SEE company (13%). Twelve private concessionaires under
contract with EP manage the remaining two percent of the road network, which accounts
for almost three-quarters of the principal road network in Portugal (IPs and ICs) (EP,
2007a). A common tolling system, Via Verde, is used on all directly tolled facilities (roads
and bridges) in the country. The Via Verde system can also be used to pay parking fees and
purchase gasoline from affiliated garages and gas stations. Figure 3 offers a map of the
Portuguese road network, highlighting the principal network of IPs and ICs.
Table 20. Portuguese Road Network, 2007
Managing % of TotalDesignation Kilometers otalEntity Network
National Network
IP EP 497
Concessionaires 1,664
IP Subtotal 2,161 2%
IC EP 520
Concessionaires 865
IC Subtotal 1,385 1%
EN EP 4,910
ER EP 4,500
Declassified EP 3,233
EP Subtotal 13,660 13%
Concessioned Subtotal 2,529 2%
National Subtotal 16,189 15%
Municipal Municipalities 90,000 85%
Total Network 106,189
Source: Adapted from EP (2007c).
Since the first road concession was tendered in 1997, Portugal has seen its share of
successes and failures in public private partnerships for roadways. Road infrastructure
concessioned under the "real toll" revenue generation model-where drivers are directly
charged a user fee to use the road--has been widely regarded as a successful approach to
fast and efficient road infrastructure development (Monteiro, 2005). However, roads
operated under "shadow toll" concessions have failed to provide their intended benefit. Use
of the model, which requires the government, not individual drivers, to pay the
concessionaire for road use, has placed a significant and unexpected financial burden upon
central government.
Figure 3. Portuguese Road Network, 2007
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Shadow Tolls
Seven of the twelve private road concessions (approximately 3 5% or 910 km of the
concessioned network) are operated under shadow toll concessions, which were tendered as
early as 1999 (MOPTC, 2006a).). Travel demand on the shadow tolled roads (known by
their Portuguese acronym as SCUTs, sem custopara o utiliZador or "without cost for the user")
was much higher than projected, consequently forcing the government to pay
concessionaires much larger sums than forecasted (J. Portela, personal communication, July
31, 2007). Between 2008 and 2015, central government is expected to pay over 6 billion
euros to SCUT concessionaires. In contrast, payments to real toll concessionaires will total
just over 550 million euros for the same period. Shadow toll costs will therefore be over ten
times real toll costs (MFAP, 2008b, p. 170).
By 2004, central government realized the severity of the shadow toll situation and
created a new finance model to lessen the SCUT burden on central government (R.N. Dinis,
personal communication, August 1, 2007). This, too, proved unsustainable, and in 2005
central government initiated the complex and costly process of converting four of the seven
existing SCUTs to real toll facilities (Anonymous,58 personal communication, February 7,
2008). No roadways have been converted to date, therefore it remains to be seen whether
the SCUT facilities will garner sufficient revenue through real tolls to make them sustainable
endeavors. In the meantime, rather than rule out future applications of the shadow toll
model, MOPTC developed a more rigorous methodology for identifying appropriate
economic situations for future SCUTs in Portugal (MOPTC, 2006a).
In addition to underestimating the true cost of shadow toll concessions, there is
evidence that central government authorized SCUTs detrimental to other road
concessionaries, thus undermining the overall benefit of public private partnerships. In at
least two cases, SCUTs have been constructed as alternatives to real toll facilities, which, in
turn, has had the effect of diverting revenue from the real toll facility to the shadow toll
facility."59 The A17 freeway, for example, is a SCUT that parallels approximately 140 km of
the Al freeway, a real toll facility. The A28 also offers drivers a free alternative to the real
tolls of the A3 freeway (R.N. Dinis, personal communication, August 1, 2007; J. Portela,
personal communication, July 31, 2007). Government officials defend the practice, arguing
that non-toll options must be offered to travelers along those specific stretches. Private
concessionaires disagree, however, and have entered into litigation with EP in order to
recoup the revenue lost as a result of the SCUT competition.
Regulation
Estradas de Portugal (EP), the national highway administrator, currently regulates
roadway concessions. All future concessions, however, will be the purview of the new
regulatory body, the Institute of Roadway Infrastructure (Insfituto das Infra-Estructuras
Rodovibrias, INIR), which was created in mid-2007 by the PRACE. As previously mentioned,
there is an interest within central government to consolidate all existing concessions under
INIR as well. This would be a very difficult undertaking, however. It is anticipated that
many current concessionaires would call for renegotiated contracts or simply block the
transfer of any concessions to the new regulatory body (R.N. Dinis, personal
58 Some transportation officials and public administrators would only agree to speak on condition of
anonymity.
59 Drivers see very little difference between levels of service on real toll facilities and SCUT facilities. More
often they opt to drive for free on the SCUT rather than pay a toll.
communication, August 1, 2007). The plausible future, therefore, foresees EP and INIR
regulating independent subsets of national roadway concessions until the former's share of
concessions expires.
In addition to the organizational changes related to the PRACE, central government
recently authorized EP to become a quasi-private organization (Governo da Repiblica
Portuguesa, 2007d). This enables the national road administrator to bid for and be awarded
roadway concessions. The proposal envisions central government "tendering" a large long-
term concession to EP to operate approximately seventy to eighty percent of the current
road network (with the exception of existing concessions and municipal roads). EP would
have the option of managing the network itself or subcontracting specific roadways out to
other concessionaires (R.N. Dinis, personal communication, August 1, 2007).
The proposal is largely viewed as a tactic to privatize public debt and therefore lessen
the burden road construction places on the national deficit. The privatization of EP also
raises two key conflicts of interest. First, private concessionaries could conceivably become
major shareholders and control part of EP. If the government cannot transfer existing
roadway concessions to INIR, however, EP would remain the regulator of those
concessions, plausibly freeing the majority shareholders to regulate their own concessions.
Second, with EP as a quasi-private concessionaire, there would be little recourse for central
government if it were to contend or revoke the large long-term concession with EP.
Because EP would not be entirely private, if central government were to sanction the
authority it would be essentially sanctioning itself (J. Portela, personal communication, July
31, 2007; J.M. Viegas, personal communication, July 13, 2007).
Planning
The National Roadway Plan (Plano Rodovirio Nadonal, PRN) guides all new road
infrastructure planning in Portugal. The current iteration of the plan, the PRN 2000, follows
two previous national roadway plans, the PRN 1945 and the PRN 1985. Development of
the plan lies principally with MOPTC, which coordinates with EP. Each year the two work
together to review the plan and prioritize projects for the following budget cycle. As of
2007, approximately sixty percent of the projects identified in the PRN 2000 had been
completed (R.N. Dinis, personal communication, August 1, 2007).
While MOPTC prioritizes the planning and construction of new road infrastructure, EP
is solely responsible for existing infrastructure. The authority is currently developing a mid-
range plan, which identifies roadway safety, rehabilitation, and maintenance projects to be
completed over the next five years. EP plans to release the plan in mid-2008 (Anonymous,
personal communication, February 7, 2008).
The Portuguese Rail System
The Portuguese rail network serves over 650 station stops and extends approximately
2,800 kilometers, 1,400 of which are electrified (INE, 2006). While the conventional
Portuguese network shares a common gauge with Spain (a distance between the rails of
1,668 mm, known as Iberian gauge), locomotives and rolling stock from Spain and Portugal
are not interchangeable with the rest of Europe, which operates standard gauge rail networks
(1,435 mm).
Demand for passenger rail service in Portugal has been steadily declining since at least
1990. Nationwide, passenger kilometers decreased by 36.6 percent between 1990 and 2003
although ridership growth was seen in some rail markets between 2004 and 2005. Freight
rail operations in Portugal are extremely limited. Between 1995 and 2003 freight rail
accounted for no more than 2 percent of total freight transportation in the country. Despite
the low mode share for freight, growth in ton kilometers increased 11 percent between 2000
and 2005 (MOPTC, 2006b). The potential future growth for freight rail has spurred both
the EU and Portugal to increase rail freight capacity by constructing new rail lines to
Portugal's largest container port, the Port of Sines, and several intermodal freight facilities
near the Spanish border (European Commission, 2005; RAVE, 2007). No private rail
operators have entered the Portuguese rail freight market to date.
Rail transportation in Portugal has undergone major regulatory changes over the past
several years as the country has taken steps to liberalize the sector in response to European
Commission legislation.6' Regulation of the Portuguese rail sector is the responsibility of the
newly created Institute of Mobility and Land Transportation (Instituto da Mobilidade e dos
Transportes Termstres, IMTI) while National Rail Network (Rede Ferrovitria National, REFER)
owns, maintains and schedules use of the nation's rail infrastructure. The primary freight
and passenger rail operator is Comboios de Portugal (CP). Originally a private company dating
from the late 1800s, CP was nationalized in 1975 as a state-owned enterprise and the sole
operator of rail service in the country. Portugal continued with this model until 1997 when
EU rail liberalization efforts required that CP shed its ownership and control of rail
infrastructure to the newly created REFER (Steer Davies Gleave, 2003). Portugal has seen
little private interest in launching rail service in the country with the exception of the
Fertagus commuter rail line that operates in metropolitan Lisbon. Figure 4 provides an
overview of the Portuguese rail sector's institutional architecture.
Figure 4. Institutional Architecture of the Portuguese Rail Sector
60 Rail liberalization under EU regulations requires the separation of rail infrastructure-track, signals, station
facilities, and so forth-from rail operations. In the case of nationalized rail systems, the national rail operator
must divest itself of all rail infrastructure and turn the assets over to a new infrastructure management
company. Once rail infrastructure has been divested, entry into the national rail market is opened up to private
operators as well as the incumbent national operator. Any operator wishing to use the rail infrastructure,
namely tracks, must request an operating slot from the infrastructure manager, pay the associated access fees,
and use its own equipment-locomotives and rolling stock-to transport goods or passengers. All of this
activity is coordinated by a national rail regulator, an independent body which certifies operators for safety, sets
access fees, and ensures competitive and fair access to the rail market.
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As previously mentioned, CP handles the majority of rail activity in Portugal. On the
passenger rail side, CP segments its operation into several divisions as indicated in Figure 4.
The rail company operates commuter rail service in the Lisbon and Porto metropolitan areas
(CP Lisboa, CP Porto) as well as nationwide regional and long distance intercity service (CP
Regional, CP Longo Curso). The two remaining divisions within the company, CP Carga and
CP Alta Velocidade, operate the railroad's freight service and coordinate high speed rail
planning with Rede Ferroviairia de Alta Velocidade (RAVE), respectively.
Apart from CP, only one other operator, Fertagus, provides passenger rail service in
Portugal as of 2008. In 1999, the private company was awarded a 30-year concession to
operate the Eixo Norte Sul commuter rail line, which links the municipalities on the southern
bank of the Rio Tejo with Lisbon via the 25 de Abril Bridge. In light of unrealized demand
projections, Fertagus and DGTTF (the former surface transportation regulator that has since
been replaced by IMTT) entered contract renegotiations in 2005. As a result of
renegotiation, the concession was shortened to nine years, and Fertagus was allowed to sell
its rolling stock to central government and subsequently lease it back (G. Freitas, personal
communication, August 3, 2007).
High Speed Rail
The most noteworthy development in Portuguese rail transportation is the nation's
high-speed rail initiative. RAVE is responsible for planning and tendering the construction
and operation of this new rail network. The project features over 550 kilometers of high
speed rail lines divided into three priority links: Lisbon Madrid (Lisbon to the border with
Spain) and Porto Vigo, scheduled to open in 2013; and Lisbon Porto, scheduled to open in
2015. Budgeted at 7.1 billion euros, the entire project is considered one of the EU's priority
transportation axes and is therefore eligible for EU funding through the TEN-T program
(European Commission, 2005). RAVE anticipates splitting the project into five construction
concessions, a signaling and telecommunications concession, and an operating concession
(RAVE, 2007)."6
Portugal will continue to maintain its conventional rail network (see Figure 5) once the
high-speed rail system opens. Future capital investments will channel additional freight
traffic to the conventional system as both the nation and the EU look to reduce the adverse
impacts of ever-increasing truck traffic. Passenger service will also continue to operate in
those areas that will not be served by the new system.
Portuguese Public Transportation Systems
MFAP, MOPTC, and IMTT each play a role in public transportation service provision
in Portugal. MFAP coordinates financial assistance, MOPTC coordinates planning, and
IMTT regulates all public transportation providers, whether they are state-owned enterprises
or private companies. IMTT sets fares for each mode, certifies companies for operation in
Portugal, and grants each company the right to operate in a service area defined by the
regulator.
61 RAVE plans to build the Porto-Vigo line in Iberian gauge and operate it as a conventional system until
demand warrants high speed service. Once that happens, the line will be shut down, converted to standard
gauge operation and reopened as an integrated link in the Portuguese high speed rail network. This cost is not
incorporated into the 7.1 billion euro project budget (G. Freitas, personal communication, August 3, 2007).
The provision and financing of local-level public transportation services in Portugal
varies widely throughout the nation. State-owned enterprises under the SEE, which receive
exclusive funding from central government, provide public transit service to the country's
largest metropolitan areas. Other municipalities outside these metropolitan areas must
finance their own transit systems either through a municipally owned company or service, or
an operating contract with a private company. The following subsections will highlight
public transportation in the nation's metropolitan areas as well as a few smaller cities of note.
Lisbon Metropolitan Area
The Lisbon metropolitan area features an extensive public transit network of bus,
subway, tram and light rail services, the majority of which are operated by state-owned SEE
enterprises. The SEE companies have an exclusive monopoly within their service areas.
Outside of those service areas, however, a burgeoning number of private operators provide
supplementary bus services. Most operations focus on facilitating trips in and out of the
Lisbon central business district, although housing and employment trends have spurred the
growth of public transit systems in areas such as the south bank of the Rio Tejo. Figure 6
provides a map of the Lisbon metropolitan area.
lities of the Lisbon
As of early 2008, there were 408 different ticket combinations sold by public
transportation companies in the Lisbon metropolitan area (C.S. Bentes, personal
communication, February 8, 2008). The process of integrating fares among the individual
public transit companies has been difficult. The principal bus company and subway operator
offer an integrated monthly pass, the Lisboa Viva card, but this does not extend to single
trips. The subway operator also sells a joint pass with the main ferry company. Still, each
public transit operator continues to develop exclusive fare media and fare collection plans.
Apart from the role that IMTT plays in defining service areas, very little regular and
coordinated planning is conducted among Lisbon's public transit operators. Planning is
therefore coordinated on an "as needed" basis. The most notable recent effort is an
extensive, multi-year service change, known as Rede 7, which MOPTC has coordinated with
Lisbon's principal bus operator. The project is intended to integrate bus service with the
existing subway system.
Bus Operations
The largest public transit company in Lisbon is the Companhia Cards de Ferros de Lisboa,
referred to as Cards. Originally founded in 1872 as a private company, Carris is now a state-
owned SEE enterprise. In 1973, the company was granted a fifty-year "right to operate" in
the municipality of Lisbon (C.S. Bentes, personal communication, February 8, 2008). That
right is currently administered by IMTT.
Carris operates a 660-kilometer bus network as well as a 48-kilometer tram network.
Most of the company's operations are concentrated within the municipality of Lisbon,
although the company does operate some peripheral services to neighboring municipalities
that are part of the metropolitan area. With over 750 buses dispatched out of three bus
barns and an additional tram barn dispatching 58 vintage and modern trams, Carris provides
the lion's share of public transportation for the citizens of Lisbon. A single fare on either
network is 1.35 euros (Carris, 2008).
In 2006, the company launched the first phase of the Rede 7 service change, altering
forty percent of its routes (Boaventura, 2006). The second phase was launched in January
2008. Carris also began a full modernization of its fleet in 2006. The modernization project
is scheduled to continue for several years and will eventually lower the average fleet age to
between five and six years (C.S. Bentes, personal communication, February 8, 2008).
Subway Operations
Metropolitano de Lisboa (ML) operates the Lisbon subway system, which serves the
municipalities of Lisbon, Odivelas, and Amadora. Like Carris, ML is a state-owned SEE
enterprise. The system has 46 stations along a 38-kilometer network and uses 338 heavy rail
vehicles (ML, 2008a). A single fare begins at 0.75 euros (ML, 2008b).
Commuter Rail Operations
CP Lisboa operates commuter rail service in the greater Lisbon area. Service originates
from Lisbon's four main train stations-Cais do Sodre, Estagio Oriente, Rossio, and Santa
Apal6nia-to the suburbs of Cascais, Sintra, Azambuja and Sado.
Ferry Operations
Transportes Tejo and Soflusa, known collectively as Transtejo, operate five ferry routes
across the Rio Tejo, linking the municipalities of Almada, Seixal and Barreiro with Lisbon.
Transtejo is also a state-owned company operated through the SEE. The company operates
thirty-eight passenger and car ferries from nine separate terminals, offering single fares that
range from 0.77 to 2.25 euros depending upon the route (Transtejo, 2007, 2008).
Light Rail Operations
The Metro Sul do Tejo (MST) is the most recent addition to the Lisbon metropolitan area.
The company initiated service on April 30, 2007. Envisioned as a 28-kilometer, 37-station
light rail system that connects the municipalities of Almada, Seixal and Barreiro on the south
bank of the Rio Tejo, it has been plagued by political infighting since construction began in
2005. Prior to December 2007, only four kilometers of the system were operable due to
construction delays caused by the municipality of Almada. The municipality held up the
project in an effort to secure amenities-park and ride facilities, pre-emptive traffic signals,
and public parks-that were not a part of the original proposal.
The MST is not a state-owned enterprise. In 2002, a private consortium was awarded a
thirty-year concession to design, build and operate the MST project (D. Neves, personal
communication, February 12, 2008). Demand on the MST system has thus far been
extremely low. Local media outlets and public officials question whether the system will
garner the ridership projected in the initial proposal. In September 2007, Diarino de Noticias,
one of Lisbon's principal periodicals, reported that the MST was carrying an average load of
four passengers per vehicle trip at a cost to the government of fifteen thousand euros a day
(C. R. Monteiro, 2007). It is unclear, however, exactly how the concession is structured in
terms of revenue shortfalls. In January 2008, the consortium was no longer providing
ridership numbers to the public (Gouveia, 2008). A single fare on the MST is 0.85 euros
(Metro Transportes do Sul, 2008).
Private Operators
At least fourteen private bus operators offer service in the Lisbon metropolitan area.
These companies are regulated by IMTT, receiving authorization from the agency to operate
in specific areas of the municipalities that make up the metropolitan area. Private operators
primarily supplement service provided by Carris; they are not allowed to directly compete
against the state-owned enterprise. As recently as 2005, private operators were subjected to
fare freezes ordered by central government via IMTT. A special subsidy from MFAP
compensates private operators for cost increases in light of fare regulation (R. Macirio,
personal communication, August 2, 2007).
Porto Metropolitan Area
Although smaller than the capital of Portugal, Porto still offers a large array of bus and
light rail public transportation services. Porto is similar to Lisbon in that the majority of its
transportation services are operated by state-owned SEE enterprises, however, is has been
more successful than Lisbon in integrating fares among its different operators. In 2003,
transportation operators in the metropolitan area joined with one another to form
Intermodal Transportation of Porto (Transportes Intermodais do Porto, T7P) with the intention
of designing and launching an integrated fare card. Two years later TIP unveiled the Andante
integrated fare card, a contactless card that is accepted by the main bus and metro operators
in Porto, the commuter rail service operated by CP and five additional private bus operators
(TIP, 2008). Figure 7 provides a map of the Porto metropolitan area.
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Bus Operations
The Sociedade de Transportes Colectivos do Porto (STCP), a SEE enterprise, uses 500 buses to
operate 81 routes over a network of nearly 500 kilometers. In addition to bus service STCP
operates a five-line tram network with eight trams (STCP, 2007). A single fare on the system
(sold in roundtrip increments only) is 1.65 euros (STCP, 2008b).
Light Rail Operations
Construction on the Metro do Porto (MP) system began in 2003 with the last phase of the
fifty-eight kilometer light rail network being completed in the spring of 2006. The system
serves 69 stations in the municipalities of Porto, Vila Nova de Gaia, Matosinhos and Maia
(MP, 2008b). A single, one-zone fare on the system is 0.90 euros (MP, 2008c). The Metro do
Porto is a state-owned SEE enterprise.
Commuter Rail Operations
CP Porto operates commuter rail service in the greater Porto area. Service originates in
Porto's two main train stations--So Bento and Campanhi--and extends to the
surrounding municipalities of Aveiro, Braga, Marco and Guimardes.
Private Operators
Over thirty private bus operators provide service in the Porto metropolitan area. Just as
service providers in Lisbon, the Porto bus operators must be certified through IMTT and
are subsequently authorized to operate in specific service areas. They are not allowed to
compete directly with STCP, the principal bus provider in Porto and a state-owned SEE
enterprise.
Coimbra
A municipally operated bus service makes up the bulk of the public transit services in
the municipality of Coimbra (population 142,400). Regional rail service offered by CP
provides additional links between outlying municipalities and the Coimbra central business
district. A proposal to build a new regional tram-train operation with a terminus in Coimbra
may see the central government focus investment funds for public transportation into the
area for the first time.
Bus Operations
Servifos MunicpaliZados de Transportes Urbanos de Coimbra (SMTUC) is a municipally
operated public transportation service (servifo munidpai) that operates a fleet of 120 buses
over a network of 495 kilometers. SMTUC is not a state-owned enterprise and receives all
funding from the municipality of Coimbra.
Tram-Train Operations
The Metro Mondego (MM) in Coimbra is the only new urban rail project proposed outside
of the Lisbon and Porto metropolitan areas in recent years. Although it is still under
development, the project proposes the conversion and extension of an existing CP
commuter rail service into a 40-kilometer tram-train operation that connects the municipality
of Coimbra with several surrounding municipalities. The project was proposed in 2003, but
political infighting prevented it from moving forward at that time. The proposal was revived
in 2006 when Metro Mondego was officially made a state-owned enterprise and
responsibility for the project was transferred from the Secretary of State for Transportation
to REFER and CP (A. Seco, personal communication, February 1, 2008).
The Metro Mondego project is currently being planned in two phases. The first phase
will rehabilitate CP's existing 27-kilometer right-of-way, which currently links all of the
municipalities to be served by the new system. The second more intensive phase will
construct thirteen kilometers of new right-of-way in downtown Coimbra. Phase One is to
be completed in 2010; Phase Two is still in the planning stages.
Traditional funding sources (central government and EU Structural Funds) will be used
to finance the project, although budget outlays have yet to be defined. The first five to six
years of operation will be the responsibility of CP. After this initial period, the plan is for an
operating concession to be tendered to the private sector (A. Seco, personal communication,
February 1, 2008).
Other Municipalities
With the exception of the Metro Mondego project in Coimbra, central government has
no formal mechanism to support public transportation services outside of the metropolitan
areas of Lisbon and Porto. Other municipalities must therefore finance public
transportation services themselves. Most municipalities opt for bus services by either
entering into operating agreements with private bus companies or opting to create and fund
a municipally owned system.
The municipalities of Faro and Lagos, for example, are mid-sized coastal
communities (population 58,000 and 27,000, respectively) in southern Portugal that have
contracted with a private company, Eva Transportes, to provide urban fixed-route bus
service (five and six routes, respectively). The company is a long-distance intercity bus
operator, which has a division devoted to urban routes (Eva Transportes, 2007). In contrast,
the municipality of Braga, a large community in northern Portugal with a population of over
170,000, has operated its own public transit system, Transportes Urbanos de Braga, for twenty-
six years. The system comprises 78 routes and 113 buses operated over a network of 230
kilometers (Transportes Urbanos de Braga (TUB), 2007).
In summary, the majority of transportation activity in Portugal is conducted through the
State Enterprise Sector (Sector Empresarial do Estado, SEE) and the ten surface transportation
companies it manages: Estradas de Portugal; REFER; CP; RAVE; Carris, Metropolitano de
Lisboa, and Transtejo in Lisbon; STCP and Metro do Porto in Porto; and Metro Mondego
in Coimbra (MFAP, 2007e). Municipal activity is limited to road infrastructure investments
and investments in and operation of municipal bus services.
5.3 Transportation Finance
Revenues used to finance transportation expenditures in Portugal primarily originate
with central government. Central government uses an extremely limited stream of dedicated
revenue for transportation-related investments, funding the majority of transportation
expenditures through general revenue. Municipalities do not utilize any form of dedicated
revenue for government expenditures, transportation-related or otherwise.
Since 2005, the Portuguese national budget has authorized a stream of dedicated tax
revenue62 for the national highway authority, Estradas de Portugal (EP). Beyond this, no
additional dedicated revenue sources exist. All other government expenditures, including
transportation investments outside of road planning and construction, draw funding from
general tax revenue. The national budgeting cycle therefore features an extensive process of
expenditure authorizations, as the various ministries of central government compete with
one another for funds (Anonymous, personal communication, February 12, 2008).
Municipal governments do not utilize dedicated revenues to fund government activities,
which includes transportation investments.
On the expenditures side, the largest share of public sector transportation funding
comes from central government. Funding is offered in the form of (a) operating subsidies
(indemniZaFies compensatorias) disbursed directly to state-owned SEE enterprises, and (b) capital
project grants transferred to SEE enterprises and municipal governments, and (c) EU
Structural Funds earmarked for specific projects but administered by central government.
Municipal governments provide operating and capital funds for municipal transportation
departments and in-house public transit systems where they exist.
Revenue
Beginning in 2005, EP received a dedicated portion of the revenue generated by the
Circulation and Haulage Tax (Imposto de Circulafdo e Camoinagem, ICI, ICA). This arrangement
continued until the tax was abolished in 2007. A new dedicated revenue source was
62 "Dedicated revenues" are revenue sources tied to specific revenue generating mechanisms (taxes, user fees,
etc.) and reserved for specific government expenditures.
subsequently authorized as part of the 2008 tax reform. This reauthorization dedicated a
portion of the national Fuel Tax (Imposto sobre os Produtos Petroeferos, ISP) revenue to EP,
underlining that the funds could not be channeled to any other recipient sector (Governo da
Repdiblica Portuguesa, 2007b). Table 21 outlines the overall ISP tax rate as well as the rates
apportioned to both central government and EP. Tax rates did not increase as a result of
the tax reform.
The new arrangement provides EP a substantial increase in dedicated revenue. ICI
and ICA tax revenues disbursed to EP in 2007 totaled 55.2 million euros (EP, 2007b). In
contrast, the ISP tax revenue to be dedicated to EP in 2008 is estimated at 600 million euros
(MFAP, 2008b). This revenue can be diverted to either operating or capital costs; however,
according to the Portuguese 2008 National Budget, the increase in revenue will be offset by
an equal decrease of capital funds traditionally directed to EP.
Table 21. Portuguese Tax Rates on Fuel (ISP)
(in euros)
Tax Rate to Central Gov't to EP
Fuel Type (per liter) Rate % Rate %
Petroleum 0.580 0.516 89% 0.064 11%
Diesel 0.360 0.274 76% 0.086 24%
Sources: Governo da Replblica Portuguesa (2007b), OECD & European Environment
Agency (2008).
As previously stated, most Portuguese municipalities do not provide dedicated
revenue sources for any government transportation expenditures. Although municipalities
generate revenue by levying taxes and user fees on a variety of transportation activities
(automobile sales, drivers' licenses, vehicle registration), there is no equal link on the
expenditure side. All expenditures are funded through the general pool of own-source
revenue and intergovernmental transfers.
As an exception, however, there are limited cases where municipal governments link
fare and parking fee revenues with public transportation expenditures. This only occurs in
municipalities where the city funds its own public transportation systems and, in the case of
parking fee revenues, not always. Aveiro, Coimbra, and Evora, for example, have created
this dedicated revenue stream for public transportation.
Expenditures
Transportation-related expenditures in Portugal take the form of operating subsidies
and capital grants. Capital grant funds are project-based revenues distributed through the
national capital investments program. This program combines national revenues with
intergovernmental transfers from EU Structural Funds and disburses the revenue as outlined
in the QREN, the National Strategic Reference Framework (Quadro de Referincia Estrategico
Nacional). Subsidies are exclusively distributed to state-owned enterprises while capital grants
may be distributed to municipalities as well as state-owned enterprises.
Operations
All transportation-related operations expenditures disbursed by central government
are subsidies directed to the state-owned transportation companies managed by the State
Enterprise Sector (Sector Empresarial do Estado, SEE) under MFAP. In 2006, the last year for
which data are available, the central government disbursed over 210 million euros to eight of
the ten transportation companies as outlined in Table 22. This represents almost a four
percent increase over subsidies in the previous year. Municipally owned transportation
services and companies are not eligible for central government subsidies.
Table 22. Operating Subsidies to SEE Surface Transportation Companies, 2005-
2006
(in thousands of euros)
Variation
-0.9 -1.4%
1.9 4.6%
1.6 6.3%
1.9 6.9%
1.3 6.4%
1.1 6.9%
0.4 5.1%
0.2 7.0%
Total 203.4 210.9 7.5 3.7%
Sources: MFAP (2007b, 2007e).
"RAVE and Metro Mondego (MM) did not receive operating subsidies in 2005 and
2006.
b According to EP's EsforfoFinanceiroPbl/ico, the authority did not receive
operating subsidies in 2005 and 2006. This contradicts the SEE's own Relat6rio
2007, however, which describes the above figures as operating subsidies to EP.
Project Finance
Over the past several years, the transportation program (Programa Orfamental P024) has
received the largest share of PIDDAC funds. This changed, however, in 2008 when, among
other reductions, the PIDDAC funds apportioned to EP were reduced as a result of the new
dedicated revenue arrangement from the ISP tax. As Table 17 in the previous discussion of
PIDDAC funds illustrates, the transportation program has only slipped to second place
among the top five priorities for capital investment. The program is budgeted to receive
twelve percent or 433 million euros of PIDDAC funds in 2008 (MFAP, 2008b). In contrast,
the budget for the preceding year was over 2.5 billion euros, which represented more than
half of all PIDDAC funds disbursed in that year (MFAP, 2007a). This drastic reduction is
the result of both central government's policy to reduce government expenditures and its
reduction of support to EP as a part of the reauthorized dedicated revenue stream. Both
municipalities and SEE companies are eligible to receive PIDDAC funds.63
5.4 Analysis of the Portuguese Surface Transportation Policy and
Finance System
Portugal has not established an explicit surface transportation policy and finance
system. No overarching policy coordinates transportation activity and, apart from the
63 Disbursements to private companies are not common. However, the private commuter rail operator,
Fertagus, received an undisclosed amount of PIDDAC support in 1999 (Ministtrio do Planeamento, 2001, p.
70).
Company 2005 2006
Estradas de Portugal (EP)b 62.6 61.7
Carris 41.5 45.4
Comboios de Portugal (CP) 25.5 27.1
REFER 27.1 29.0
Metropolitano de Lisboa (ML) 20.3 21.6
STCP 15.4 16.4
Transtejo 8.7 9.1
Metro do Porto (MP) 2.2 2.4
revenue dedicated to road infrastructure, there is no explicitly defined transportation finance
system. Regardless, government investments in transportation infrastructure and operations
have led to the emergence of an implicit system.
This implicit system funds transportation investment with general government revenues
in a political process that does requires little in the way of project evaluation, cannot ensure
the stability of future transportation investments, and promotes wide-ranging public sector
participation in transportation. The following section provides an analysis of the implicit
Portuguese public transportation policy and finance system with respect to the criteria
introduced at the end of Chapter 3-fiscal equivalence, externalities, and equity-as well as a
stability criterion. On the whole, the system struggles in each area. It violates the fiscal
equivalence condition in public transportation infrastructure and services, largely ignores
transportation externalities, and disregards equity issues associated with accessibility.
Fiscal Equivalence
The fiscal equivalence condition is applied unevenly by the Portuguese surface
transportation policy and finance system. It is somewhat adhered to in the road and rail
sectors. It is often violated, however, in the public transportation sector with respect to
both operations and project finance.
Portugal only partially matches national and sub-national benefits with national and
sub-national expenditures in the road and rail sectors. Both the national road and rail
networks, for example, provide national benefits in terms of interconnectivity, economic
development, and network effects. Improvements in these sectors therefore appropriately
draw from central government revenues. Yet, the system fails to recognize the localized
benefits that such improvements bring and does not require municipal governments to pay
for the benefits they receive. Therefore all of the localized benefits go "unpaid."
The opposite is true for municipal road network improvements. While municipal roads
primarily provide more localized benefits, network effects also bring benefit to the national
road network. Yet, central government rarely offers support for improvements of municipal
road infrastructure. Furthermore, municipal governments see none of the revenue dedicated
to road development through the Fuel Tax. The exclusive beneficiary of the dedicated
revenue is EP, the national road operator, who has no plans to share the revenues with
municipal governments.
There is one large exception in the road sector with respect to fiscal equivalence: the
private concessionaires. Private involvement in the roads sector does provide an example of
strict adherence to the fiscal equivalence condition. Direct tolls ensure that users pay for the
benefits they receive, namely access to road infrastructure.
In contrast, fiscal equivalence is pursued in an uneven manner by the Portuguese public
transportation sector. On the operations side, state-owned companies that provide local
public transportation services do not abide by it, while municipal companies are forced to.
On the project finance side, municipal support for public transportation infrastructure
projects is minimal, creating a mismatch between benefits and expenditures.
Despite the fact that public transportation services provide more localized benefits,
central government, not municipal government, provides municipal level public
transportation services in the metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto. The main public
transportation service providers in these metropolitan areas-Carris, Metropolitano de
Lisboa, Transtejo, STCP, and Metro do Porto-are state-owned enterprises that draw all
operational (and capital) funds from central government revenues. Although the
municipalities themselves receive the direct benefit of these transportation services,
municipal government provides no financial support. Central government taxes are used to
support a sub-national good (with local and regional benefits), thus creating a mismatch
between benefits and expenditures.
A different standard applies, however, when municipalities outside of the Lisbon and
Porto metropolitan areas opt to provide their own public transportation services. Unlike the
state-owned public transportation companies, municipally funded public transportation
operations are ineligible for central government support. They must be funded with own-
source revenue, a requirement that preserves the fiscal equivalence condition.
This uneven approach is not limited to public transportation operations. Public
transportation project finance can also violate the fiscal equivalence condition. While EU
Structural Funds are often leveraged for co-financing, the Portuguese central government is
the only governmental body that funds capital costs for public transportation projects.
Municipalities rarely fund any portion of capital costs for projects from which they will
directly benefit (nor are they required to fund any future operating costs). This is also true
for projects that do not involve state-owned enterprises.
The lack of fiscal equivalence in public transportation operations and infrastructure in
Portugal creates an inefficient provision of public transportation services. Many citizens are
paying for transportation improvements that bring them no benefits and, on the other hand,
other citizens are not paying the true costs of the transportation benefits they receive. The
problems of public transportation operations and project finance will be discussed further in
the following chapter.
Transportation Externalities
The Portuguese transportation finance system inadequately treats the existence of
transportation externalities. Apart from a single tax mechanism targeting motor vehicle
emissions, no other finance mechanisms are used to internalize either positive or negative
externalities generated by transportation activity.
The Single Circulation Tax (IUC) acts as a proxy for a pollution tax on motor vehicles.
It is a recurrent tax levied on motor vehicles. The IUC tax rate increases as vehicle age, the
vehicle's polluting capability, and the power of the engine increase.
There is no indication that road tolls are being used to internalize transportation
externalities. Private road concessionaires set tolls within the limits outlined by central
government, but prices are based upon their revenue-generating capabilities with respect to
demand. Although concessionaires are responsible for safety measures on the road
segments they own and manage, there is no evidence that other marginal costs are being
incorporated into tolls. Furthermore, government does not collect a portion of toll revenue
to redirect toward the mitigation of transportation related externalities.
Equity
Project planning and finance in Portugal is biased toward road infrastructure, which
creates equity concerns with respect to other transportation modes. Road planning is guided
by a national road plan and road finance benefits from a dedicated revenue stream. Rail and
public transportation planning and finance, however, do not have equal plans or dedicated
revenues. Equity concerns are further exacerbated by the lack of project evaluation
requirements for public transportation projects, which makes the process vulnerable to
political influence at the expense of user benefits. Furthermore, citizen access to efficient
public transportation services is hindered by the administrative and financial relationship
between central government and the state-owned public transportation companies. This
relationship promotes a soft budget constraint and allows companies to provide service with
little consideration for the user.
The Portuguese surface transportation policy and finance system is promoting mobility
over accessibility. Government policies toward road infrastructure planning and finance
have created a much more stable environment for auto-oriented projects, while policy
toward public transportation investments promotes spending over efficiency and user
benefits. An efficient road network is not accessible by all citizens.
Road Infrastructure Privilege
Portuguese transportation policy dictates that road infrastructure planning and
implementation be conducted in a comprehensive, rational manner, guided by a national
road plan and a dedicated revenue stream. Policy does not dictate the same, however, for
rail and public transportation sectors. This discrepancy creates a bias in the Portuguese
surface transportation system that privileges road infrastructure over other transportation
investments.
Road infrastructure planning in Portugal is guided by the Plan Rodovidrio National (PRN),
which has been in existence since the mid 1940s. The PRN provides the basis from which
EP and MOPTC identify and prioritize future infrastructure investments, lending stability to
the road planning process. No similar national plan exists for rail or public transportation
investments despite significant central government participation in both sectors. While the
rail sector is currently guided by a "strategic orientations" plan developed by the Secretary of
State for Transportation in 2006, the plan is not comprehensive. It devotes significant
attention to the conventional rail network, while relegating the national high speed rail plan
to a handful of pages (MOPTC, 2006b). Similarly, the public transportation sector has never
had a comprehensive national plan.
Obviously, the mere existence of a plan does not guarantee government action or
adherence. However, the potential power of a national plan is evidenced by the PRN. The
plan has been legitimized as an appropriate planning tool and the roads sector has certainly
benefited from its existence. It streamlines the political process for project prioritization and
approval while simultaneously ensuring stability in road infrastructure planning and
implementation by creating the existence of "future plans." The lack of such plans for the
rail and public transportation sectors sets the stage for ad hoc, uncoordinated planning.
The road sector also benefits from a dedicated revenue stream from the Fuel Tax (ISP).
Although the revenue is not sufficient to cover all expenditures related to road infrastructure
planning, construction and operations, its existence lends a degree of stability to the
Portuguese roads sector. No similar source of dedicated revenue exists for other
transportation expenditures, however. The rail and public transportation sectors must seek
funds from general government revenue alongside funding requests from the public
education, defense, and healthcare sectors, for example.
This discrepancy represents a bias toward the roads sector, which benefits from a
depoliticized store of hundreds of millions of euros each budget cycle. Dedicated revenue
streams are generally considered beneficial for transportation investments, yet a more
balanced, intermodal approach would be appropriate in the Portuguese case. Despite the
failings of the state-owned enterprises, injecting some stability in all transportation sectors
would be a legitimate government interest.
Public Transportation Infrastructure Projects
Public transportation infrastructure projects are not required to undergo project
evaluation as a stipulation for central government funding. Cost benefit analyses or
alternatives analyses are therefore very uncommon for public transportation projects.
However, this lack of project evaluation likely makes the process even more vulnerable to
political influence. Projects need not display any technical or social merit to be approved.
The absence of project evaluation represents an equity issue with respect to public
transportation investments. Recent public transportation projects have implemented
technologically advanced systems in areas that have little demand for such systems. The
Metro Sul do Tejo project and the 2004 extensions of the Metropolitano de Lisboa stand out
as two examples. Both extended light rail and heavy rail systems, respectively, to
communities in the metropolitan Lisbon area that did not warrant such capital intensive
systems. Overall costs for these projects were high, yet ridership has failed to materialize.
Both projects were valued for their political merit rather than any social benefit.
Central government must establish criteria for evaluating public transportation
infrastructure projects as elements of the larger transportation system. It must also begin to
consider the relationship between costs and benefits in an effort to better match investments
with demand. Without these measures, the equity issues with public transportation
infrastructure projects will remain. Government will continue to spend large sums of money
on political projects as opposed to bringing efficient public transportation infrastructure to
the people of Portugal.
State-Owned Public Transportation Enterprises
State-owned public transportation enterprises receive operating and capital support
from central government regardless of performance criteria with respect to users. The
administrative and fiscal relationship between central government and the state-owned
companies prizes service provision over everything else. Whether that service offers a benefit
to the municipalities where it is operated appears to be of peripheral consideration.
Thus, policies toward public transportation service provision orient state-owned
companies toward mobility (merely providing service) instead of accessibility (providing
service for the benefit of users). This represents yet another equity impact on users who are
already adversely impacted by a policy bias toward road infrastructure planning and a highly
politicized public transportation infrastructure implementation process. The equity impact is
further exacerbated, however, by the existence of a soft budget constraint between central
government and the state-owned public transportation enterprises. As previously
mentioned, these companies carry significant debt. Regardless of their actions, however,
these companies will continue to receive central government support.
New incentives must be adopted to orient public transportation services to users and
encourage state-owned companies to reduce debt. This represents one of the most
significant challenges to the Portuguese transportation policy and finance system. It will be
discussed in detail in the following chapter.
Stability
Although implicitly acknowledged as a criterion for good general public finance,
stability plays an important role in transportation policy and finance as well. The Portuguese
transportation and policy finance system suffers from a lack of stability, most notably in
budgeting processes. The lack of earmarking, an inability to guarantee multi-year financing
commitments, and a short time horizon adversely impact long-term transportation planning.
Under the central government budgeting process, each ministry is required to submit a
budget request as an aggregate sum. Ministries are not asked to provide any detail behind
their budget requests and little debate occurs over the projects or programs that the
aggregate budgets would support (J.P. Henriques, personal communication, February 12,
2008). Instead, debate is centered upon each ministry receiving its "fair share," which is
nothing more than a political construct. Earmarking does not exist; therefore ministries wait
to commit to projects or programs until they know how much their lump sum from central
government will be.
The budgeting process promises no certainties. Multi-year commitments for funding
are therefore uncommon. Furthermore, the final budget is most often approved one day
before the new budget cycle is to begin, providing little incentive for preliminary planning.
The situation makes it difficult for transportation projects, which often represent large, long-
term investments, to compete fairly against other government expenditures under such an
unstable system. This is especially true for transportation expenditures in the rail and public
transportation sectors, which do not benefit from a dedicated revenue source. Long-term
transportation planning will only be possible through significant reform of central
government budgeting processes.
The Portuguese transportation policy and finance system leverages the public sector to
provide a significant amount of transportation services. The private sector is leveraged for
road infrastructure construction and maintenance, but its involvement in rail and public
transportation has been largely limited. The existence of state-owned transportation
enterprises has created serious problems with respect to fiscal equivalence, equity, and soft
budget constraints. Furthermore, government policies have created a more stable
environment for road infrastructure planning, further exacerbating equity issues.
The following chapter will discuss three sets of case studies that represent significant
challenges to the provision of transportation services in Portugal. The first set considers the
problems surrounding state-owned transportation companies. The second set concerns
government provision of public transportation services while the third looks at project
finance.
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6 Case Studies in Transportation Policy and Finance in
Portugal
The structure of the Portuguese public finance and transportation finance systems
combined with the overarching government policy toward transportation has created a
complex landscape with respect to transportation activity and investments. Building from
the theoretical frameworks for both general public finance and transportation policy and
finance, this chapter examines three case studies as elements within the Portuguese surface
transportation policy and finance system: state-owned surface transportation companies,
public transportation provision, and transportation project finance. This chapter will analyze
each case study with a focus on how they impact fiscal equivalence, externalities, and equity.
It will conclude with an overarching analysis of policy with respect to both operations and
project finance.
6.1 State-Owned Surface Transportation Enterprises
The Portuguese government's major involvement in transportation infrastructure and
services provision means that little transportation planning can be conducted without the
influence of a state-owned transportation company. There is obviously a legitimate
government interest in providing accessibility to its citizens. Yet, the fiscal and
administrative relationship between central government and its transportation companies
limits central government's ability to influence public goods provision through the state-
owned companies. This has an adverse impact on government transportation policy and
finance, most notably in the rail and public transportation sectors.
Background
As previously mentioned, ten state-owned enterprises provide the bulk of road, rail and
public transportation services in Portugal. Each company is an autonomous entity governed
by its own board of directors, however, all have an administrative and fiscal relationship with
the State Enterprise Sector (Sector Empresanral do Estado, SEE) under the Ministry of Finance
and Public Administration (MFAP) as well as the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation
and Communications (MOPTC). Table 23 outlines the ten SEE companies and their
respective sectors.
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Table 23. State-Owned Surface Transportation Enterprises in Portugal
Public Transportation Rail Road
Carris de Portugal Estradas de Portugal (EP)(CP)
Rede Ferrovibria de AltaMetro do Porto (MP) Velocidade (RAVE)Velocidade (RAVE)
Rede Ferrovibria Nacional
Metro Mondego (MM) (REFER)
Metropolitano de Lisboa
(ML)
Sociedade de Transportes
Colectivos do Porto (STCP)
Transtejoa
Source: MFAP (2007e).
aProvides ferry service, but included under public transportation.
These ten companies were incorporated into the SEE under very different
circumstances. Some companies have long histories in providing transportation services.
Carris, for example, began as a private company in 1872 and was eventually nationalized by
the Portuguese communist party after the Carnation Revolution in 1974. CP also has
antecedents as a private company, Companhia dos Caminhos de Ferro Portugueses, which begin rail
operations in Portugal in 1856. It, too, was nationalized after the revolution. Still, other
SEE companies are quite young. The four youngest transportation companies were created
between 1997 and 2001 (MFAP, 2002).64
Certainly new SEE companies are created for specific development initiatives. Parque
Expo '98, for example, was created to redevelop an unused industrial site to host the Expo
'98 World's Fair. Once their tasks are complete, however, these companies are dissolved.
The same cannot be said for transportation operations that have the potential to continue
indefinitely.
One of the major goals of the SEE is to bring state-owned enterprises to a state of
operation such that they can be privatized or liquidated. The agency has been moderately
successful in the privatization of hospital services, for example. However, with the
exception of the high-speed rail authority, RAVE,"s the recent incorporation of these new
transportation companies seem to run counter to these goals; it further burdens the state
with the provision of transportation services.
Analysis
A public goods perspective of transportation activity focuses on accessibility.
Government has a legitimate interest in dedicating policy and financial resources toward the
provision of accessibility. The question surrounding the state-owned surface transportation
companies is whether they provide accessibility and, if not, whether they can be encouraged
to do so.
The previous chapter indicated that state-owned public transportation companies were
oriented toward providing service as opposed to accessibility. The same could be said for
64 REFER in 1997, Metro do Porto in 1999, RAVE in 2000, and Metro Mondego in 2001.65s Which will presumably be dissolved once the high-speed rail system is constructed and operating.
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the rail sector. Companies exist simply to provide service. Little relationship seems to exist
between ridership levels on the rail and public transportation systems and support from
central government. Clearly, at least some portion of Portuguese society benefits from rail
and public transportation services. Still, that benefit appears secondary to the state-owned
surface transportation companies' activities.
Political ideology may deem central government to be the right provider for
transportation services, but the current administrative and financial environment limits the
government's ability to influence the provision of accessibility. A soft budget constraint and
protection from competition mean that state-owned companies receive support regardless of
whether they provide accessibility.
Herein lies the main problem with regards to equity in transportation services.
Taxpayers are financing a system in which the performance outcome (i.e., accessibility) does
not seem to be the highest priority. This is most egregious when considering those
individuals who cannot or do not access the only viable alternative-the road system. The
following sections highlight the degree to which the soft budget constraint and protectionist
policies influence the state-owned transportation companies' ability to provide accessibility.
Soft Budget Constraint
The ten SEE transportation companies place a significant burden on central
government finances. The current fiscal relationship between central government and the
SEE companies can be characterized as a soft budget constraint. Central government not
only provides each company with increasing yearly operating subsidies, it also guarantees
each company's debt without imposing restrictions on borrowing.
As a result of this relationship, the ten surface transportation companies carry
significant net operating losses and shoulder a large amount of debt. In 2006, for example,
the companies posted a cumulative net operating loss of over 760 million euros, an almost
twelve percent increase over the previous year. Over half of the operating loss can be
attributed to REFER and CP alone. In the public transportation sector, Metropolitano de
Lisboa and Metro do Porto posted the largest losses, representing 19 percent and 16 percent
of the total loss for all transportation companies. Table 24 summarizes key figures for the
state-owned surface transportation sector.
Apart from the operating losses, another significant problem is debt. Almost all SEE
companies are guilty of profligate borrowing. When a company needs money, it borrows it,
and, because the loans are guaranteed by central government, the banks are happy to lend it
(C.S. Bentes, personal communication, February 8, 2008). The companies require no
authorization from central government to seek loans. Furthermore, central government
bailouts are common should debt become an issue for the company. As one transportation
professional put it, "Public companies [in Portugal] don't go bankrupt; things like that don't
usually happen in Portugal" (Anonymous, personal communication, February 4, 2008).
Although debt information is not available for most SEE companies, of particular
note is the 2006 debt-to-income ratio for both Carris and STCP of 298% and 346%,
respectively. These figures continue to grow each year as the agencies borrow money to pay
off debt. It is a cycle that cannot continue indefinitely. They, and their other SEE
transportation counterparts, will eventually default and central government will be forced to
devote a significant amount of money to bail the companies out.
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Table 24. State-Owned Surface Transportation Enterprises in Portugal: Key Figures,
2005-2006
(subsidy and net operating loss in millions of euros)
Company Carris CP EP MP
Year 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006
Operating Subsidy 41.5 43.4 25.5 27.1 0.0 0.0 2.2 2.4
Subsidy as % of Revenue 34% 32% 8% 8% 0% 0% 5% 5%
Net Operating Lossa -54.5 -52.2 -196.8 -192.9 -4.3 -1.3 -71.3 -122.2
Debt-to-Income Ratio 270% 298% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Employees 2,787 2,681 4,459 n.a. 1,703 1,737 137 123
Company ML REFER STCP Transtejo
Year 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006
Operating Subsidy 20.3 21.6 27.1 29.0 15.4 16.4 8.7 9.1
Subsidy as % of Revenue 23% 25% 14% 12% 20% 22% 32% 33%
Net Operating Lossa -162.0 -147.6 -160.4 -201.7 -17.1 -25.6 -16.3 -17.3
Debt-to-Income Ratio n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 295% 346% n.a. n.a.
Employees 2,841 2,884 4,024 n.a. 1,751 1,673 578 569
Sources: Carris (2007b), CP (2006), MFAP (2007b), MP (2008b), ML (2007), REFER (2006), STCP (2007), Transtejo (2007).
' Includes subsidy.
"n.a." indicates not available.
Protectionism
In addition to providing the SEE transportation companies a fairly unconstrained
supply of funds, central government is also very protective of its companies, limiting their
exposure to competition from the private sector. Of course, in some cases the nature of the
transportation service promotes a natural monopoly. Such is the case of the national rail
infrastructure manager, Rede Ferrovidria Nadional (REFER) and the national road authority,
Estradas de Portugal (EP).6 6 Still, in most sectors the government has created artificial
monopolies, which bar the private sector from direct competition with SEE companies.
The monopolies are the responsibility of IMTI, the surface transportation regulator.
As previously mentioned, the agency authorizes private providers of public transportation
service to operate in specific areas. It also prevents those same companies from providing
service where a SEE company is present. Companies such as Carris, Transtejo, and STCP,
for example, are protected from competition with the private sector. In the rail market, as
well, IMTT has been criticized for creating administrative barriers to market entry for the
private sector (IBM Global Business Services, 2007).
This protectionism has not prevented SEE companies from competing with one
another, however. This is especially true in the Lisbon and Porto metropolitan areas where
SEE bus services (Carris, STCP) have been forced to compete with SEE heavy and light rail
services (Metropolitano de Lisboa, Metro do Porto). Rather than competing collectively
with private transportation modes to maintain or even gain market share, the companies
have dug in their heels in an effort to steal mode share from one another.
66 Although EP has successfully introduced competition for the market through private sector road
concessions.
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Policy Implications
The Portuguese public sector has a legitimate interest in providing accessibility to its
citizens through participation in transportation infrastructure and services. The soft budget
constraint and protectionist policies with respect to the state-owned surface transportation
companies, however, present policy implications for equity in transportation. Guaranteed
money (through subsidy and unlimited borrowing) and protection (through government
policy) the companies are more concerned with mobility (the efficient movement of
vehicles) and only peripherally concerned with providing accessibility (increasing users'
access to opportunities).
It is difficult to determine exactly who benefits from such an arrangement. Those who
rely exclusively on the SEE companies for accessibility are lucky if the system serves them
well. Central government benefits politically from the perception that it is providing
accessibility, yet its ability to truly provide it through the state-owned transportation
companies is limited. The state-owned transportation companies benefit from unconditional
public sector support, but are operating on borrowed time. Central government's coffers are
not bottomless.
The state-owned surface transportation companies alone represent one of the biggest
transportation challenges facing central government in the next decade. Reform must orient
their activity to the user, encourage companies to reduce debt to within reasonable levels,67
eliminate the soft budget constraint, and expose the companies to a more competitive
environment. The end result will be a more efficient and equitable transportation system.
6.2 Public Transportation Services
Municipal governments in Portugal are free to provide public transportation services to
their citizens, yet there is no official government policy on public transportation. A de facto
policy has emerged, however, though the direct involvement of the state in public
transportation service provision. This policy simultaneously privileges and disadvantages the
Lisbon and Porto metropolitan areas with respect to public transportation.
Background
Portuguese law allows great flexibility for municipal provision of public transportation
services. Municipalities have the option of either providing public transportation as a
municipal service (servio munizal)) or creating a municipal company (empresa municipal), which,
unlike a sernfo muniapal, is legally recognized as an autonomous entity that is free to create its
own labor practices and borrow from the market (Governo da Repdiblica Portuguesa, 2006).
Of course, as a third option, municipal governments may choose to contract with the private
sector for specific public transportation services.68 In all cases, public transportation services
remain under the regulatory control of IMTT.
A handful of Portuguese municipalities have chosen to provide public transportation
services to their citizens. Barreiro, Braganga, Coimbra and Portalegre, for example, offer
fixed route bus service to their communities through servinos municpais. The municipalities of
Aveiro, Braga and Evora, on the other hand, have created empresas munidciais to carry out
67 On par, perhaps, with similar public companies in the EU.
68 In some cases, the preexistence of private transportation services obviates the need for municipal
intervention.
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public transportation services. All of the municipal public transportation entities in Portugal
are outlined in Table 25.
Table 25. Municipally Operated Public Transportation Systems in Portugal
Services
Fixed Water Bike Parking
Municipality Company Type Bus Taxi Sharing Facilities
Aveiro MoveAveiro Empresa VMunicipal
Servi:os Municipalizados de
Barreiro Transportes Colectivos do Municipal
Barreiro (TCB)
Braga Transportes Urbanos de Braga Empresa(TUB) Municipal
Servigo de Transportes Servigo
Urbanos de Braganga (STUB) Municipal
Servikos Municipalizados de
Coimbra Transportes Urbanos de Servioipal
Coimbra (SMTUC)
Sistema Integrado
EIvora Transportes e Estacionamento Empresa
de EIvora (SITEE)
Serviqos Municipalizados de
Portalegre Aguas e Transportes Municipal
Portalegre (SMAT)
Sources: CAmara Municipal de Portalegre, (2007), C&mara Municipal do Barreiro (2008), MoveAveiro (2007), SITEE (2008),
SMTUC (2007), STUB (2008), TUB (2007).
Several municipalities-Faro, Lagos, Guimaries, Setibal, for example-leverage private
bus companies to provide basic services for their communities. These arrangements are
contracts only; municipalities do not have the authority to tender and regulate concessions
with private companies. IMTT must grant each private company the right to operate in
specific service areas, but it is unclear how the regulator, the municipality, and the private
operator manage this process under municipally contracted service.
Regardless of the form, a municipality that opts to provide public transportation
services takes on the full fiscal and administrative responsibility for doing so. Central
government activity with respect to municipally provided service is limited to minimal capital
support through PIDDAC funds, mainly to assist in the purchase of new buses.69 Other
sources of funding include one-time EU grants, which are disbursed directly to
transportation companies. In 2007, for example, SMTUC in Coimbra applied for capital
funds for a driving simulator under the EU CIVITAS program (Anonymous, personal
communication, January 31, 2008).
Notably absent from the discussion are the metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, the bulk of public transportation services in these areas is
69 New bus purchases, in this case, are often limited to one or two vehicles a year.
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provided by state-owned enterprises under the State Enterprise Sector (Sector Empresarial do
Estado, SEE). The municipal governments themselves do not directly shoulder any of the
operating or capital costs associated with the services provided by these SEE companies.
The funds to support bus, subway, and ferry services in Lisbon, as well as bus and light rail
services in Porto come entirely from central government.7 0 Table 26 outlines the seventeen
municipalities that receive some form of public transportation service from a state-owned
SEE company. The fiscal structure of public transportation provision in the Lisbon and
Porto metropolitan areas represents an obvious windfall of avoided costs for these
municipalities. Admittedly, each receives varying degrees of state-provided service, yet none
directly finances the service they receive.
Table 26. Portuguese Municipalities Served by State-Owned Public Transportation
Companies
Public Transportation Services
Fixed Light
Municipality Bus Subway Ferr Raila
Almada v*
Amadora V /
Barreiro V
Lisbon / V/ /
Loures /
Montijo V
Odivelas / /
Oeiras / /
Seixal
Gondomar $
Maia
Matosinhos / /
Porto "
P6voa de Varzim "
Valongo
Vila do Conde
Vila Nova de Gaia V
Sources: Carris (2007a), Governo da Repiblica Portuguesa (1999a), ML (2008a), MP
(2008a), STCP (2008a).
" Includes tram services.
* State does not provide service; however, it assumes all risk of underperformance.
Analysis
The Portuguese central government provides local (regional) public goods in the Lisbon
and Porto metropolitan areas. This not only violates the fiscal equivalence condition, it also
presents equity issues with respect to "metropolitan" municipalities that reap the benefit of
state participation. An uneven application of budget constraints to public transportation
70 Capital co-financing with the EU is possible, especially when large infrastructure projects are undertaken.
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service providers further exacerbates equity issues. Municipal companies are required to
follow a hard budget constraint while the state-owned transportation companies, as
previously mentioned, are not.
While the Lisbon and Porto metropolitan areas reap the fiscal benefits of state
participation, they are simultaneously disadvantaged because they have little administrative
control over the services they receive. This is a manifestation of the equity problems
mentioned in the previous section's analysis of general transportation state-owned
enterprises. The companies are oriented toward mobility as opposed to accessibility.
Violation of Fiscal Equivalence
Because each state-owned enterprise draws it funding from general revenues collected
by central government, all taxpayers in Portugal finance the provision of public
transportation service in the Lisbon and Porto metropolitan areas. The majority of the
benefits of public transportation services accrue locally, however." This mismatch of costs
and benefits, with respect to the metropolitan areas, violates the fiscal equivalence condition.
Municipally provided services, on the other hand, maintain the fiscal equivalence
condition. Own-source revenue-taxes and user fees-is utilized for financing
expenditures. Thus, localized benefits are paired with local revenue-generating mechanisms
(ignoring the appropriateness of those specific mechanisms for financing the services). 72 Put
simply, a citizen of Coimbra pays national taxes, a portion of which is used to support bus,
subway, light rail and ferry services in Lisbon and Porto, in addition to municipal taxes that
support the SMTUC bus service in Coimbra. Meanwhile, a citizen of Lisbon dies not pay
the true costs for the benefits received by the SEE companies and, furthermore, pays
nothing to support municipally operated systems in other parts of the country. The
Coimbra citizen pays more than their share while the Lisbon citizens pays too little.
Budget Constraints and Efficiengy
As previously mentioned, all SEE companies operate under a soft budget constraint.
They borrow money from the private market without limit, knowing that central
government will bail them out when the debt becomes a problem. Municipal transportation
companies and services, on the other hand, are subject to hard budget constraints by law.
Their debt is included as municipal debt and therefore falls under the restrictions of the
Municipal Finance Law.
The state-owned enterprise soft budget constraint further aggravates the fiscal
equivalence condition with respect to bailouts. When a public transportation SEE company
becomes so insolvent that central government must step in with a large infusion of cash-in
addition to the regular operating subsidy-the fiscal equivalence condition is further
violated. The entire country is required to pay for the bailout.
A comparison of municipal transportation services and companies with their SEE
counterparts reveals the impacts of budget constraints. Table 27 provides some key figures
71 And, arguably, regionally. The point here is that primary beneficiary of public transportation is not the
nation.72 Certainly intergovernmental transfers from the FEF or FSM could be put toward municipal public
transportation expenses, but even in this case, the fiscal equivalence condition is not necessarily violated. The
intent of the horizontal and vertical equalization grants is to give municipalities the discretion to spend the
grants as they see fit. There is no direct link between transfer eligibility (as a function of municipal tax
remittances, population, land area, social development, etc.) and the provision of public transportation.
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for comparing Carris and STCP, state-owned bus companies, with select municipal
companies. Although figures are not available for all municipally provided transportation
services, in the case of SMTUC, the hard budget constraint means less debt than the SEE
counterparts. Of particular note is the debt-to-income ratio of the two SEE companies as
compared to SMTUC's debt-to-income ratio.
Table 27. Public Sector Urban Bus Services in Portugal: Key Figures, 2005-2006
(subsidy and net operating loss in millions of euros)
Companya Carris' STCP" SMTUCt TUB* MoveAveiro*
(City) (Lisbon) (Porto) (Coimbra) (Braga) (Aveiro)
Year 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006
Operating Subsidy 41.5 43.4 15.4 16.4 3.6 4.1 2.9 3.6 0.9 1.2
Subsidy as% of Revenue 34% 32% 20% 22% 27% 30% 31% 37% 45% 44%
Net Operating Lossb -54.5 -52.2 -17.1 -25.6 -0.8 -0.3 -1.0 -0.5 -1.1 -1.3
Debt-to-Income Ratio 270% 298% 295% 346% 56% 59% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Employees 2,787 2,681 1,751 1,673 481 480 332 322 129 119
Sources: Carris (2007b), MFAP (2007c, 2007d), MoveAveiro (2006, 2007), SMTUC (2007), STCP (2006, 2007), TUB (2007).
' Reports from SITEE, SMAT, STUB, and TCB unavailable.
b Includes subsidy.
* State-owned enterprise, SEE (SectorEmpresarial do Estado).
t Municipal service (serviqomunicipal).
* Municipal company (empresa municipal).
"n.a." indicates not available.
Preferences Mismatch
The third and final public finance concern deals with public preference and the ability
of national government to provide local public goods. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is widely
acknowledged that local and not national government should provide local public goods.
This does not happen with state-owned SEE companies that provide public transportation
services.
Exacerbating the problem is the fact that the SEE companies are not accountable to the
customers and the municipalities they serve. Each company is an autonomous entity that
can tailor its service to specific demographics; however, under the current system there is
little incentive to do so. Two points illustrate this fact. First, recourse through the
traditional company-client relationship is muted by the soft budget constraint. A customer
that is dissatisfied with a SEE company such as Carris can either complain or refuse to ride
the system, essentially taking their business elsewhere. The number of complaints and the
loss of ridership, however, have little impact on the SEE companies in terms of their overall
budget.73 The soft budget constraint means they can continue to borrow without actually
accounting for the dissatisfaction or loss of business, which are legitimate manifestations of
public preference.
Second, recourse through democratic means is very difficult. Public preferences for
local public goods logically manifest themselves at the municipal level in Portugal. A
Portuguese citizen unhappy with their municipal government's provision of public services,
for example, can vote a new administration into power. Yet, a citizen in Lisbon seeking to
change public transportation provision through a newly elected administration will be sorely
73MFAP does not disclose an official methodology for calculating subsidies for state-owned transportation
companies. Customer satisfaction, travel time, and other indicators of accessibility are not reported to MFAP
on a regular basis, however. It is assumed, therefore, that MFAP calculates subsidies using other criteria.
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disappointed by the municipality's inability to create change. State-owned companies are not
beholden to the municipalities they serve; they answer only to central government.
Municipally elected governments therefore hold little sway, with little practical ability to
influence the actions of SEE companies.
If municipal government is inadequate, a second-best approach might consider the
members of parliament elected by the public. This raises the question of whether these
elected officials can be held accountable for the actions of SEE companies. The answer is a
qualified no. Members of parliament have little say as to how a specific ministry spends its
budget once all ministries have been allotted their lump sum (J.P. Henriques, personal
communication, February 12, 2008). Furthermore, because the SEE enterprises are
autonomous companies, a board of trustees guides each. Members of parliament have little
control over leadership and day-to-day operations.
Policy Implications
Although central government has no official policy toward the provision of local public
transportation, the current situation in Portugal has created a de facto policy that
simultaneously privileges and disadvantages the metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto.
The privilege is that the municipalities and citizens in these areas do not pay the full costs of
the benefits they receive. The disadvantage is that the services they do receive are provided
by insolvent agencies, and there is no recourse when services do not reflect public
preferences.
The de facto national public transportation policy has recently grabbed the attention of
the municipal companies and services. In 2006, the municipality of Coimbra launched a
public awareness campaign drawing attention to the subsidies that Carris and STCP have
received from central government and the fact that SMTUC has received nothing (Camara
Municipal de Coimbra, 2007b). By 2007 dissatisfaction had spread to all of the nation's
empresas and servifos municipais who demanded an audience with the national Secretary of
Transportation to discuss the subsidy question ("Coimbra quer ser tratada como Lisboa e
Porto [Coimbra wants to be treated like Lisbon and Porto]", 2007). Their core argument is
that they, too, deserve central government subsidy just like the state-owned enterprises. 74
The municipal desire to receive intergovernmental support for municipal transportation
services is misguided. Were they to receive the subsidies they demand, the fiscal equivalence
condition would still be violated in areas that the subsidies do not reach. Citizens in rural
Portugal, for example, would be paying taxes to support public transportation services in not
only Lisbon and Porto, but also in other urban areas such as Aveiro, Braga, Braganga, and so
on. Also, the employment of subsidies would further entrench national government in the
provision of local public goods, a role it should not assume. Despite the political necessity
of confronting central government and demanding what they "rightfully deserve,"
contemporary Portuguese municipalities in this case must understand that the lack of central
government operating support is as it should be, in a strictly theoretical sense.
Short of completely divesting itself of the state-owned public transportation companies,
the challenge for central government is to create a more equitable and uniform policy toward
public transportation finance. Reform would give the metropolitan areas of Lisbon and
Porto more fiscal and administrative responsibility over the public transportation services
74 There is no evidence that their demands were met in the 2008 budget cycle, yet pressure continues to mount
on central government.
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provided in their respective jurisdictions. This would mirror the manner in which public
transportation service is provided in other municipalities such as Coimbra and Braga.
The proposed Metropolitan Transportation Authorities (Autoridades Municipais de
Transportes, AMT) provide the framework for such a reform, yet their political feasibility
remains to be seen. The metropolitan areas are not clamoring for the AMTs to be
implemented. Maintaining the status quo means they can avoid financing public
transportation despite the equity problems associated with administrative authority.
6.3 Transportation Project Finance
While the two previous sections have dealt with transportation operations in Portugal,
this section addresses transportation project finance. Two current transportation
infrastructure projects-the Metro Sul do Tejo and the Metro Mondego-demonstrate that
transportation project finance in Portugal is, foremost, an exercise in politics. Projects are
selected based on political merit rather than any technical or social benefit. This exacts a
high price, however, from central government in terms of finance and, ultimately, creates
equity issues that impact the Portuguese public at large.
Background
Metro Sul do Tejo
The Metro Sul do Tejo had its origins as a proposal by municipal government to
promote mobility on the southern bank of the Rio Tejo in the Lisbon metropolitan area. As
of mid-2008, six years after the concession contract to build the project was signed, the
system remains only partially complete. The project is 70 million euros over budget and
even the private concessionaire has begun to admit that the promised ridership is not likely
to materialize.
Protests
In 1966 the 25 de Abril Bridge (then known as the Salazar Bridge, but renamed after the
Carnation Revolution in 1974) was constructed across the Rio Tejo to link the growing
communities on the south bank of the river with the municipality of Lisbon. The road link
was seen as a vital component of regional connectivity and became increasingly important as
the motorization rate in Portugal rose. A toll was charged on northbound trips (heading into
Lisbon) and motor vehicle traffic on the bridge grew steadily.
In 1991, as Lisbon prepared for the Expo '98 World's Fair, the decision was made to
construct a second bridge across the Rio Tejo. A public private partnership was proposed
for the project. The bridge, known as the Ponte Vasco da Gama, would be designed,
financed, constructed, operated and maintained by a private company awarded that right
through a competitive bid process. Lusoponte, a consortium of Portuguese, French and
British companies, was awarded the bid in 1994 and construction began in 1995. The new
bridge opened to traffic on March 29, 1998 (Lusoponte, 2008).
The Vasco da Gama Bridge concession also included an operating concession for the
25 de Abril Bridge, granting Lusoponte full control over the two major metropolitan bridges.
In an effort to harmonize the toll structures of both bridges (and thus remove the price
advantage the 25 de Abril Bridge had over the newer, more expensive Vasco da Gama
Bridge), Lusoponte proposed a fifty percent toll increase for the older bridge. The proposal
ignited a public backlash, however, especially among the communities on the south bank of
the Rio Tejo who felt they were being unfairly targeted. The discontent culminated in the
largest public protest in the nation's history on June 24, 1994, which shut down traffic over
the bridge. The government responded by freezing tolls and compensating the
concessionaire for the cumulative revenue that the toll increase would have raised on the 25
de Abril Bridge (Alem~o, 1999; Neves, 2005). While political ideology supported the use of
tolls on the two bridges, it did not support what was perceived as unnecessary government
interference with an individual's right to accessibility.
The Proposal
The 1994 protest brought mobility to the forefront of discussions among the
communities of the south bank. Most had seen significant growth in the late 1980s and early
1990s and were feeling the pressure that such growth brought to bear on the transportation
system. By the end of the year, the municipalities of Almada, Seixal, Barreiro and Moita had
formed a coalition to investigate mobility solutions. The Instituto Superior Tecnico (IST) in
Lisbon and the Ecole Polytechnique FHd6rale de Luasanne (EPFL) in Switzerland were
contracted to conduct studies on the viability of a light rail system in the area. Based on
these studies, the municipal coalition created an initial proposal for over 100 kilometers of
light rail to link the four communities. The proposal sought to connect the communities
with the new Eixo Norte Sul commuter rail line which would enter the south bank via a
retrofitted 25 de Abril Bridge.
The initial proposal was taken to central government and by 1995 an agreement was
signed between central government and the municipalities: the project would move forward
with central government assuming eighty percent of the capital costs and the municipalities
the remaining twenty percent (Cnimara Municipal de Almada, 2008). For the next several
years, however, the project languished as central government attempted to scale it back.
In 1999, four years after the original proposal was made, central government approved
a 28-kilometer system-much smaller than the coalition's original proposal-divided into
three project phases that, once complete, would connect the four municipalities (Governo da
Repdiblica Portuguesa, 1999a). Also, sometime during this year, central government entered
a new agreement with the municipalities that replaced the 1995 agreement and absolved the
municipalities of their twenty percent share of capital costs (CaLmara Municipal de Almada,
2008). Thus, central government would assume the full costs of the project.
Implementation of the first phase was to begin immediately while the other two were
postponed indefinitely. Phase One featured a network of 13.5 kilometers of light rail in the
municipalities of Almada and Seixal. Radiating outward from a central junction, three lines
would extend (a) four kilometers southward to Seixal, (b) four kilometers to the School of
Science and Technology at the Universidade Nova de Lisboa in western Almada, and (c) 5.5
kilometers northeast to downtown Almada. Figure 8 displays the alignment for the Metro
Sul do Tejo system.
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Figure 8. Map of the Metro Sul do Tejo System
In April of the same year, central government resolved that the project, to be called the
Metro Sul do Tejo, would be a public private partnership. A 30-year concession was
tendered under the DBOT model (design, build, operate, transfer), which also included a
small finance component for the private partner (Governo da Repuiblica Portuguesa, 1999a).
Under the arrangement, central government would seek co-financing with EU Structural
Funds for all capital costs except rolling stock and ticketing systems. The private partner
would finance the rolling stock and ticketing equipment, as well as construct, operate and
maintain the system.
Similar to most DBOT concessions, the Metro Sul do Tejo concession guaranteed the
private partner a minimum amount of fare revenue regardless of ridership. Thus, if ridership
failed to reach projected levels, central government would be required to pay the
concessionaire the difference between actual revenue and the guaranteed minimum. The
risk of underperformance was therefore shouldered by central government. If ridership, and
consequently revenue, exceeded the minimum, the concessionaire would be required to
share a portion of the revenue gain with central government.
In 2002, the concession was awarded to a consortium comprised of Siemens, three large
Portuguese construction companies (Teixeira Duarte, Mota-Engil, and Sopol), and a private
Portuguese bus and rail operator (Grupo Barraqueiro). The project was scheduled for
completion in December 2005 with a capital budget of 323 million euros, 55 million of
which represented the concessionaire's investment in rolling stock and ticketing systems. Of
the remaining 268 million, roughly seventy percent was to come from central government,
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thirty percent from the EU. The government created an administrative board, the Gabinete
Metro Sul do Tejo, to coordinate the project (Governo da Repiblica Portuguesa, 2002a,
2002b).
Munidpal Demands
Immediately after the concession contract was awarded, the mayor of Almada stepped
forth with a series of objections to the project. She demanded that several elements be
added to the project that were not part of the original proposal. This included signal pre-
emption on rights-of-way shared by automobiles and light rail vehicles, nine new park and
ride lots, and new mitigation measures that would ensure the construction of public parks
and gardens in Almada (D. Neves, personal communication, February 12, 2008).
Central government balked. The Almada demands would significantly increase the cost
of the project and, furthermore, the contract had already been signed with the
concessionaire. In response, the municipality refused to grant the right-of-way necessary to
construct the project through the municipality's downtown and at the key junction which
joined the system's three radial spurs (D. Neves, personal communication, February 12,
2008).v5
As a consequence, the project came to an abrupt halt. Central government scrambled
to rearrange the project's construction schedule and avoid excessive delays. Eventually, the
project was divided into three segments, the first of which would avoid the contested right-
of-way and allow time for negotiations with the municipality. Segment One was comprised
of the first two lines to the university and Seixal, Segment Two would connect the two at the
junction (presumably after resolution with Almada), and Segment Three would build the
third and final line into downtown Almada.
Construction on Segment One commenced immediately and by May 2007 the system
opened to the public. Although construction was complete on both the university and Seixal
lines, they were not connected to one another. Operations were therefore restricted to the
four-kilometer Seixal line.
It is unclear what transpired between Almada and central government leading up to the
opening of Segment One, but the municipality eventually allowed construction to commence
on Segments Two and Three in 2007. The municipality's primary demands were never met,
although central government did make some small changes to the original proposal to suit
the municipality (D. Neves, personal communication, May 2, 2008). By December 2007 the
first two lines were connected to one another and operations extended to the university.
The line to downtown Almada is scheduled for completion at the end of 2008.
Project Indicators
Table 28 outlines the final Metro Sul do Tejo project budget, which ballooned to over
393 million euros. Cost overruns reached approximately 70 million euros, a twenty-six
percent increase of the public sector portion of the total budget, all of which was assumed
by central government. Authorities attributed the entire overage to the three-year delay
caused by Almada.
75 Portuguese law states that municipalities have full and legal ownership of the land they govern. Municipal
land is, therefore, ceded to third parties (central government or otherwise) at will.
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Table 28. Metro Sul do Tejo Capital Budget
(in millions of euros)
% of Public
Source Amount Sector % of Total
Central Government 248 73.4% 63.1%
EU 75 22.2% 19.1%
Municipalities 15 4.4% 3.8%
Public Sector Subtotal 338 86.0%
Concessionaire 55 - 14.0%
Total Capital Budget 393
Sources: Gouveia (2007), Lino (2007).
Ridership on Phase One of the Metro Sul do Tejo was projected to be 28 million
passengers per year, an average of almost 77 thousand passengers per day (Lino, 2007).76
However, neither the concessionaire nor central government has released official ridership
figures since operations began in May 2007 (Gouveia, 2008). The press and the public are
left to conjecture over actual numbers, but, from all accounts, ridership on the system has
been extremely low.
Project directors attribute the low ridership to the fact that Phase One is not complete.
Critics assert that ridership projections were always overly optimistic and that the high
numbers will never be realized. In an interesting twist, the concessionaire itself has begun to
suggest that ridership will be less than anticipated. It attributes the low ridership to stagnant
population growth in the two municipalities (Gouveia, 2007).
Also unknown is the total amount central government is paying the concessionaire for
operations in light of the unrealized travel demand. As mentioned in the previous chapter,
the reputed Portuguese daily Diirio de Noticias reported that as of September 2007 (when
only Segment One was in operation) the government was paying the concessionaire fifteen
thousand euros a day (C. R. Monteiro, 2007).
Metro Mondego
Just as the Metro Sul do Tejo project, the Metro Mondego began as a proposal by a
municipal coalition. The project has been on the drawing board since 2001 and has
weathered political infighting and one attempt to start construction that was eventually
terminated. As of 2008, Metro Mondego remains in the planning stages, but has begun to
resemble the Metro Sul do Tejo project in several ways.
The Proposal
Since the early 20' Century, rail service has linked the municipalities of Coimbra,
Miranda do Corvo, and LousA. The 37-kilometer Lousa line, as it is known, has a physical
connection with the national rail network in Coimbra, however, the current service operated
by Comboios de Portugal (CP) stops approximately one kilometer short of that connection
(J. R. Silva & Ribeiro, 2007). CP carries approximately two to three thousand passengers a
day on eighteen daily roundtrips between Coimbra and Serpins, a town in the municipality of
Lousa (A. Seco, personal communication, February 1, 2008).
76 It is unclear if these numbers came from the IST and EPFL studies.
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In the mid 1990s, the three municipalities served by the Lousa line created a proposal
for a modern tram-train operation, which has since developed into the current Metro
Mondego project. As conceived, the Metro Mondego would replace and shorten the
existing CP service and include approximately thirteen kilometers of new rail infrastructure
built on the streets of Coimbra. The project also includes plans for large park and ride
facilities in the outlying municipalities of Miranda do Corvo and Lousi.
First Attempt
After the initial proposal in the mid-90s, the project languished for several years. A
state-owned SEE company, Metro Mondego, was created in 2001, but another two years
would pass before the project gained momentum. Finally, in 2003, central government, then
under the Social Democratic Party (Partido SocialDemocrata, PSD), offered to push the plan
forward. Central government stipulated that all three municipalities must be in agreement
with the proposal before a concession contract would be tendered.
Concerned about low ridership figures on the LousA line's extremity, planners
shortened the Metro Mondego project by seven kilometers, cutting the municipality of
Lousa out of the project as a consequence. In response, the municipality attempted to stop
the concession process, but because the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista, PS) governed the
municipality, the PSD government turned a blind eye, forgetting its stipulation that all the
municipalities must agree. The tendering process moved forward.
Before the concession could be awarded, however, the PS took power over central
government in 2005. Lousa suddenly had the sympathetic ear it needed and central
government invoked the forgotten stipulation for municipal agreement. The municipality
refused to accept the project, which was enough for central government to terminate the
tendering process (A. Seco, personal communication, February 1, 2008).
Second Attempt
A year after the first concession process ended, a new Metro Mondego proposal
surfaced. Not surprisingly, the proposal restored service to the municipality of Lousi. In an
attempt to speed up implementation, the project was placed under the control of REFER
and CP," but progress remains slow. In mid-2008 only the first phase of the project (the
rehabilitation of the existing CP right-of-way) had been designed. The remainder of the
project, the 13 kilometers of shared right-of-way in downtown Coimbra, has yet to be
planned (Lopes, 2008). Figure 9 shows the project as it is currently envisioned.
77 The Metro Mondego SEE retains administrative authority.
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Figure 9. Map of the Metro Mondego System
Project planners anticipate the total cost of the Metro Mondego to be 300 million euros.
Financing has not yet been finalized, although it is assumed that some EU Structural Funds
will supplement a much larger portion from central government. The original 2003
concession followed the DBOT model similar to the Metro Sul do Tejo project. The
current proposal, however, leverages the private sector for construction only. REFER will
own the infrastructure while CP will operate the Metro Mondego for a five to six year
preliminary period. After the preliminary period project planners say an operating contract
will be tendered to the private sector (A. Seco, personal communication, February 1, 2008).
Analysis
Both the Metro Sul do Tejo and Metro Mondego projects raise several questions with
respect to equity and fiscal equivalence. As mentioned in the analysis at the end of Chapter
5, recent public transportation infrastructure projects seem to value politics over social
equity concerns. Instead of providing transportation services to improve accessibility in a
community that warranted investment, the projects implemented capital-intensive services in
areas where demand did not warrant them. Furthermore, the municipalities in which the
projects were constructed were never asked to provide any capital support for the projects.
The project finance process makes no effort to match benefits (no matter how insignificant)
with expenditures.
On its surface, the Metro Sul do Tejo appears to have been a political victory for both
the municipalities and central government, but also appears to be an inefficient use of public
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sector money, which lacked both technical and social merit. Although the Metro Mondego
project is only in the preliminary planning phases, it has begun to exhibit characteristics
similar to the Metro Sul do Tejo project. Even more troublesome, however, is the project's
potential to damage existing public transportation services through uncoordinated
competition with Coimbra's municipal bus service, SMTUC.
Project Evaluation
Although the collective memory of Portuguese transportation professionals claims that
"studies were done" for the Metro Sul do Tejo project, there is no evidence to suggest that a
proper alternatives analysis was conducted to determine (a) the need for transportation
improvements on the south bank of the Rio Tejo and (b) the superiority of light rail over
other forms of public transportation, such as bus networks. They may be referring to the
studies conducted by IST and EPFL, but, by all appearances, those studies were feasibility
studies and not alternatives analyses (Camara Municipal de Almada, 2008; Governo da
Repdiblica Portuguesa, 2000).
The same criticism can be levied against the Metro Mondego project. There is no
evidence that an adequate alternatives analysis was done to establish the tram-train operation
as the preferred alternative. Neither the municipalities nor central government have
considered options that may improve the existing service or even discontinue and replace it
with other public transportation alternatives, such as bus service.
The fact is that central government never required an alternatives analysis to justify the
sizeable investments for these projects. In the Metro Sul do Tejo case, debate did not center
on the technical or social merits of the proposal, but rather around financing and timing
(Governo da Rep6iblica Portuguesa, 1996, 2000). Included in the debate was political
rhetoric which affirmed how much the communities of the south bank of the Rio Tejo
"deserved" the investment. The same air of deserving surrounds the Metro Mondego
project.
A final issue rests with the public record. Very little documentation regarding either
project is available to the public. This includes the original proposals as well as approved
projects, ridership figures, methodologies, and assumptions.
Fiscal Equivalence
The final budget for the Metro Sul do Tejo project indicates that the municipalities of
Almada and Seixal contributed approximately 15 million euros for mitigation costs
associated with the project. This amount represents 4.4 percent of the public sector portion
of the project budget (5.6 percent without cost overruns), a significantly smaller level of
participation than the twenty percent agreed to in 1995. It is unclear why the municipalities
were absolved of this responsibility.
The fiscal equivalence condition, a tenet of efficient public goods provision discussed in
Chapter 2, indicates that the beneficiaries of public expenditures should be the ones to fund
the expenditures. This is not the case in the either the Metro Sul do Tejo or Metro
Mondego projects. The direct beneficiaries of the light rail and tram-train systems are the
citizens and the economies of the municipalities of Almada, Seixal, Coimbra, Miranda do
Corvo, and Lousi. Arguably, central government sees some aggregate economic and social
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benefit, yet, the benefits of such systems-congestion relief, travel time savings, emissions
reductions, higher mobility or accessibility-are largely felt at the local level.78
As it now stands, the municipalities of Almada and Seixal have provided 4.4 percent of
the capital costs of the Metro Sul do Tejo project and provide nothing for operating
expenses, yet they reap nearly all of the benefit (however small that may be). Although
financing arrangements have yet to be finalized, it appears that the municipalities of the
Metro Mondego project will not contribute anything toward the project itself. Instead,
central government and the EU will foot the bill. Project backers hint that the three
municipalities may have to share a "small portion" of the project cost, yet such an
arrangement is doubtful considering the current battle Coimbra has with central government
over subsidies for its bus service.
This raises the question: if a higher level of municipal participation-in terms of both
capital and operating expenses-were required, would either project have moved forward in
its present form? Presumably, the municipalities would have been much more deliberate
and, perhaps, conservative in their proposal if they knew that, should the project move
forward, they would be responsible for a larger portion of capital costs and also exposed to
some of the operating risk. While this is not to say that the municipalities should have been
entirely responsible for financing the respective projects, the low level of municipal
participation has undoubtedly influenced their willingness to pursue specific infrastructure
projects.
In the current finance framework, success or failure of the project means very little in
terms of municipal finances. Furthermore, it enables the "blame culture" described by
Weingast (2006, p. 23). Should either the Metro Sul do Tejo or Metro Mondego projects be
ultimately deemed a failure, the municipalities can throw their arms up in desperation and
blame central government for its incompetence, using their lack of financial participation as
"proof" that they were not responsible.
Policy Implications
The absence of a requisite alternatives analysis and a project evaluation period for
transportation improvements enables a costly and highly politicized power play over
transportation investments. Current transportation policy in Portugal appears to value
transportation improvements for their political value first; their merits second. Thus, the
average citizen (and, arguably, the average EU citizen whose tax contributions reach Portugal
through Structural Funds) is forced to finance projects that (a) are not vetted through any
comprehensive analysis and (b) do not always bring them any benefit.
A culture of sub-national dependence and a level of deep distrust between national and
sub-national governments reduce policy making to a series of exchanges, which take on the
characteristics of a public performance for power (.M. Viegas, personal communication,
July 13, 2007). The Metro Sul do Tejo exchanges unfolded in the following manner:
Municipalities band together and make an outrageous demand of central
government, unsure of what they'll get in the end, but sure that they will get
something. The 100-kilometer light railproposal
78 There are likely some spillover effects for neighboring communities, however, the systems were built to serve
the citizens of the municipalities they serve. The citizens from other municipalities were a secondary
consideration.
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* Central government cannot afford the political backlash were it to refuse the
municipal proposal outright (especially if both levels of government are of
the same political affiliation), yet it likely cannot afford the financial outlay
the project requires. Instead, it scales back the municipal proposal. The 28-
kilometerproposal that is eventually broken into threephases, effectively redudng it to 13.5
kilometers.
* Municipalities emerge victorious, having won something from central
government. Yet they continue to characterize central government as a
source of mistrust. The Almada demands.
* Central government, on the other hand, emerges victorious because (a)
political fallout was mitigated and (b) it did not give the municipalities
everything. Almada's demands are refused and Phases Two and Three are indefinitely
postponed.
In the end, however, the Portuguese public is saddled with an expense that is of more
political value than social or economic value. In the case of the Metro Sul do Tejo, that
equates with a cumulative expense of 248 million euros for a project that, by all accounts, is
a boondoggle. As one transportation professional close to the project concluded,
"Altogether, I think everybody lost: the [central] government, the CMA [Municipality of
Almada], the passengers..." (D. Neves, personal communication, May 2, 2008).
While the Metro Mondego project is still unfolding, the political power play has created
a conflict of interest for Coimbra. As the municipality scrambles to have the tram-train
system built, it has not considered the effects the project may have on its own municipal
public transportation service, SMTUC. Officials from SMTUC anticipate that the new tram-
train operation will siphon riders from its most profitable routes, yet as of January 2008,
there had been no dialogue between the municipality, SMTUC and Metro Mondego
regarding integrating service. Without a regional transportation plan that takes the Metro
Mondego into account, the municipally operated bus service will face stiff competition from
CP.
If central government plans to continue its support of public transportation
infrastructure projects, it must tackle the equity and fiscal equivalence problems that current
practices create. Policy makers must establish (a) a uniform methodology by which projects
and appropriate alternatives are evaluated, (b) policies that direct support to projects with
social and technical merit, and (c) requirements that make municipalities partially finance
transportation infrastructure projects in their respective jurisdictions. While politics will
always play a role in project finance, depoliticizing the process as much as possible will create
a more stable and equitable system.
6.4 Transportation Operations Finance versus Transportation Project
Finance
The preceding three sections provided two sets of case studies dealing with
transportation operations finance and a final set addressing transportation project finance.
Returning to the framework of analysis for transportation policy and finance systems,
Portugal's practices for operations and project finance are similar with respect to equity and
stability. They are different, however, with respect to the fiscal equivalence condition.
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Similarities: Equity and Stability
Portuguese finance practices for transportation operations and infrastructure projects
are similar on equity and stability. Both promote mobility over accessibility, offer support
with apparently little regard for operational or project criteria, and promote an unstable
finance environment for transportation activity.
As previously mentioned, the administrative and fiscal relationship between central
government and the state-owned transportation companies promotes the provision of
service over the provision of accessibility. The same holds true for project finance.
Transportation operations and projects are considered successful merely because they exist.
The benefits they provide to society appear to be of secondary practical concern. Carris is
championed for the Rede7 service change, its first in thirty years, while the Metro Sul do Tejo
is celebrated for bringing light rail to the south bank of the Rio Tejo (Lino, 2007; Vitorino,
2006). Yet, what does this mean for users? Investigating beyond the press releases reveals
that Carris' primary motivation for the service change was not the potential for increased
user benefits, but, rather, the fact that MOPTC was forcing the change. As far as the south
bank of the Rio Tejo is concerned, is it enough to just bring light rail to Almada and Seixal?
Why not prudent transportation investments that target travel demand where it exists?
Operations and project finance are also similar in that support is offered to
transportation companies and infrastructure projects regardless of any overarching criteria.
State-owned transportation companies receive subsidies and the guarantee of loans from
central government without any sort of benchmarking or performance measurement.
Similarly, the lack of a project evaluation requirement means that transportation projects
need not meet any basic criteria for social benefit or cost effectiveness.
Finally, practices regarding operation and project finance create an unstable
environment for transportation services and infrastructure. Central government may be
unexpectedly called upon to bail out a state-owned transportation company, an unplanned
designation of funds that has the potential to destabilize the entire transportation policy and
finance system. Likewise, project finance is done on an ad hoc basis. There is no formal
process for evaluating transportation projects and subsequently awarding central government
support for multiple budget cycles.
Differences: Fiscal Equivalence
Transportation operations and project finance differ under the fiscal equivalence
condition. While both largely violate the condition, the policies that guide funding
municipally provided transportation services (a subset of public transportation activity in
Portugal) actually preserve fiscal equivalence. Public transportation infrastructure projects,
which bring localized benefits, do not adhere to fiscal equivalence, however.
The laws that govern municipal public transportation companies and services prevent
them from receiving operating subsidies from central government. Instead, own-source
revenue must be utilized in the event that municipally operated systems require subsidy. The
general public finance system also works to reinforce fiscal equivalence. Hard budget
constraints prevent municipalities from pressuring central government for larger
intergovernmental transfers to support municipal activity (including municipal transportation
services).
No similar policies establish fiscal equivalence for transportation project finance,
however. As evidenced by the Metro Sul do Tejo and Metro Mondego projects,
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municipalities reap the benefits (regardless of how small) of infrastructure projects without
providing any capital support.
6.5 The Path Forward
The Portuguese transportation policy and finance system places a significant burden on
the general public finance system, unfairly privileges the Lisbon and Porto metropolitan
areas, and enables a costly and highly politicized tug-of-war between central government and
sub-national governments with respect to public transportation investments. If Portugal is
to create a more equitable and efficient transportation policy and finance system, it must
focus its efforts on reforming two principal areas: public transportation operations and
project finance. The central government must move toward divesting itself of municipal-
level public transportation services operation and it must establish a formal process for
transportation infrastructure project finance. Such reform would move toward resolution of
the fiscal equivalence and equity issues identified in this chapter.
Municipal-level public transportation services should be operated and supported by
municipalities. As a first measure, the State Enterprise Sector must stop accepting new state-
owned public transportation enterprises. This is a "low hanging fruit" that would prevent
the commitment of even more resources in the forthcoming destatization of public
transportation services. The second, and more difficult, measure requires central
government to divest itself of the existing state-owned public transportation companies:
Carris, Metropolitano de Lisboa, Transtejo, STCP, Metro do Porto and Metro Mondego.
Logic suggests that control of the companies and their services be devolved to the
municipalities they currently serve.
Fiscal federalism requires authority and revenue, however. Therefore, the devolution of
public transportation services must be accompanied by efforts to create explicit municipal
transportation finance systems. This should be applied evenly to all municipalities regardless
of whether public transportation service is drawn from state-owned companies or from
municipal companies. All municipalities must have the power to create and levy new taxes,
user fees, or other appropriate instruments for the purposes of financing transportation
expenditures.
The second area of reform concerns project finance. Central government must create a
more equitable and efficient approach to financing transportation infrastructure by
establishing a formal project finance process. The process requires dedicated revenue
sources for infrastructure provision as well as an established set of criteria for evaluating
project proposals. A formal process would allow central government to solicit project
proposals for each budget cycle, evaluate the proposals in a uniform manner, and eventually
award funds to projects that meet the criteria. Dedicated revenues lend stability to project
finance, while criteria can be geared toward projects that display social and technical merit.
A secondary concern of project finance reform deals with fiscal equivalence. The
current project finance process allows municipalities to demand infrastructure without
committing any support. Co-financing requirements for municipalities and central
government have the potential to encourage municipalities to more carefully consider those
demands. While it is unlikely that municipalities would bear the full cost of public
transportation infrastructure investments in their jurisdictions, central government has a
legitimate interest in requiring some level of capital participation from the municipalities that
benefit from specific transportation infrastructure projects.
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Reform of the Portuguese transportation policy and finance system is not a question of
if, but rather when. Slow growth is predicted for the Portuguese economy over the next few
years. Government must therefore work to minimize inefficiencies in public finance where
they exist. The transportation sector will undoubtedly be targeted as the nation works to
minimize public debt with respect to GDP as part of the Maastricht Treaty. Portugal must
seize the opportunity to not only reduce inefficiency in the transportation policy and finance
system, but also to imbue it with a more equitable orientation.
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7 Conclusions
The Portuguese transportation policy and finance system exhibits problems with respect
to fiscal equivalence, equity, and transportation externalities. These problems are not unique
to Portugal, however. The transportation policy and finance systems of many nations face
similar problems and inconsistencies. In light of this, what lessons can be drawn from the
Portuguese approach?
7.1 Lessons from Portugal
The Portuguese case raises two important points. First, transportation infrastructure
and service planning is difficult without an explicit transportation finance system. Second,
governments that choose to become involved in the transportation sector through state-
owned enterprises must be aware of the challenges such enterprises present. These points
stand out as particularly salient lessons for other nations.
The Need For An Explicit Transportation Finance System
As previously stated, because they are large and often require resources from multiple
budget cycles, transportation investments benefit from a stable policy and finance
environment. Despite the many political and administrative challenges behind creating an
explicit transportation finance system, the Portuguese case shows that, without one, long-
term transportation planning is difficult. Furthermore, it demonstrates the bias that can be
created when specific transportation activity is privileged over other activity. This is the case
with road infrastructure planning and construction in Portugal.
The challenge is therefore to (a) create an explicit transportation finance system-
aiming to fulfill the requirements implied by fiscal equivalence, externalities, and equity-and
(b) apply that system equally to all forms of transportation. An explicit system implies
dedicated revenues that capture externalities and an institutionalized method for applying
those revenues to transportation expenditures. This may be through a formal project
finance program that solicits project proposals, evaluates them with a uniform set of criteria,
and eventually awards funds to projects. An even application of such a system requires
similar project finance programs for road, rail, public transportation and non-motorized
transportation sectors.
The Challenges of Managing State-Owned Transportation Enterprises
Government has a legitimate interest in becoming involved in the transportation sector
and, as this thesis has demonstrated, involvement can occur to vary degrees. Should
government decide to create state-owned enterprises to actually provide transportation
services, it must be aware of the challenges it will face in (a) maintaining budget constraints
and (b) enacting policy through the state-owned enterprises.
The Portuguese case demonstrates that, once established, state-owned transportation
companies are difficult to control. Soft budget constraints sap central government of
revenue and the existence of unconditional subsidies means central government has little
opportunity to effect change in the companies. Furthermore, reform is much more difficult
than simply imposing a hard budget constraint and making subsidies contingent upon
specific performance measures. The state-owned enterprises have become ensconced
elements within the Portuguese governance system.
It may seem that the time of the state-owned transportation enterprise has long past in
other parts of the world. This is untrue, however. Amtrak is the state-owned rail passenger
provider in the United States; China utilizes state-owned shipping, rail and aviation
companies to deliver transportation services; and New Zealand is in the process of creating a
new state-owned rail enterprise after attempts to privatize rail service failed. Portugal, too,
has opted to create new state-owned transportation enterprises. It is likely that other
developed and developing nations will also seek to establish similar stakes in transportation
activity within their respective economies.
On the surface, the existence of state-owned transportation enterprises does not equate
with bad transportation policy and finance. It is important, however, that governments
consider the challenges they will face once these enterprises become established. These
challenges often influence government's ability to place good transportation policy and
finance practices into practice.
7.2 The Future of Transportation Finance Mechanisms
In an ideal world, transportation finance mechanisms would effectively capture all of
the benefits associated with transportation activity. Such a scenario would generate
sufficient funds to improve transportation systems and mitigate transportation's negative
externalities. As the Portuguese case and others show, however, reality is far from the ideal.
Many of the current transportation finance mechanisms-excise fees, recurrent taxes,
and user fees--only partially capture the true cost of transportation activity. As
governments find it more difficult to secure the revenue necessary to fund transportation
improvements, however, they will move toward other mechanisms that are better at
capturing more of that cost. Thus, land value capture, congestion pricing, and emissions
taxes will emerge alongside existing fuel taxes and tolls as principal mechanisms for financing
transportation investments. A government's ability to employ these emergent mechanisms
will be a function of political plausibility, administrative capacity, and transaction costs.
In addition to employing finance mechanisms that more closely capture the true cost of
transportation activity, it is also likely that government will continue to leverage the private
sector to provide transportation infrastructure and services. Well-formulated public private
partnerships allow the government to reduce public sector expenditures through the
efficiencies of the private sector. Still, the Portuguese case demonstrates that, while public
private partnerships can bring significant benefits, they can also go wrong. Government
must develop the capacity to identify appropriate private sector partners and establish and
administer effective public private partnerships.
Transportation finance systems all across the globe find themselves running out of
options in their efforts to secure transportation revenue. It is only a matter of time before
the political and administrative barriers to reform are surmounted.
7.3 Directions for Further Research
The analysis of the Portuguese case has established criteria for evaluating transportation
finance systems, developed an understanding of the relationship between transportation
finance and the larger public finance system, and provided some lessons for developing
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sound transportation finance systems. Still, avenues for future research remain with regards
to both the Portuguese case, specifically, and transportation finance more generally.
As mentioned in the introduction, there is a need for additional policy-oriented
transportation in Portugal. With respect to transportation finance, specifically, additional
research is necessary in quantifying some of the problems addressed in this thesis. What is
the actual economic effect of the fiscal equivalence problem in public transportation service
provision, for example? Furthermore, research must develop specific solutions for the
Portuguese case. What would a politically and administratively feasible short-term solution
to the fiscal equivalence problem look like? What are best practices for transferring state-
owned enterprises to the private sector or to municipal government? This research is vital
for defining a direction forward for Portugal in terms of transportation.
Additional research regarding transportation finance is also needed. Public finance
systems are often analyzed and compared to one another, but specific mentioned of
transportation finance is limited. A comparison of several national transportation policy and
finance systems would shed insight into the myriad ways governments can become involved
in the transportation sector. How are most systems alike, how do they differ and what
policy and finance innovations are being pursued?
Transportation infrastructure and services are vital elements of economic and social
activity regardless of a nation's particular governance system or political ideology. A
government's involvement in the transportation sector will depend upon its recognition of
transportation externalities and its use of transportation infrastructure and services to
accomplish specific goals. However, as the Portuguese case has shown, establishing a sound
transportation policy and finance system is difficult. It is a challenge to develop systems that
strive to establish fiscal equivalence, internalize transportation-related externalities, and
promote transportation equity. Yet the challenge must be met. Economic and social
stability on both the national and global scales depend upon human beings and their need to
move.
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Lists of Acronyms
Tax Acronyms
CA Contribuiý5o Autbrquica
Autarchic Contribution
CPRU ContribuikAo Predial Rtistica e Urbana
Contribution for Historic and Urban Buildings
IABA Imposto sobre o Alcol e as Bebidas Alco6licas
Alcohol and Alcoholic Beverages Tax
ICA Imposto de Camoinagem
Haulage Tax
ICI Imposto de Ciruclago
Circulation Tax
IJ Imposto de Jogo
Gambling Tax
IMI Imposto Municipal sobre Im6veis
Property Tax
IMS Imposto Municipal de Sisa
Municipal Transfer Tax
IMT Imposto Municipal sobre Transmiss6es Onerosas de Im6veis
Real Estate Transaction Tax
IMV Imposto Municipal de Vefculos
Municipal Vehicle Tax
IRC Imposto sobre o Rendimento de Pessoas Colectivas
Corporate Income Tax
IRS Imposto sobre o Rendimento de Pessoas Singlares
Individual Income Tax
IS Imposto do Selo
Stamp Duty
ISD Imposto sobre as Sucess6es e Doa•6es
Inheritance and Gift Tax
ISP Imposto sobre os Produtos Petroliferos
Fuel Tax
ISV Imposto sobre Veiculos
Automobile Tax
IT Imposto sobre o Tabaco
Tobacco Tax
IUC Imposto Onico de CirculaqAo
Single Ciruclation Tax
IVA Imposto sobre o Valor Acrescentado
Value Added Tax
SS Contribuiq% o Seguranga Social
Social Security
Intergovernmental 
Transfer 
Acronyms
CMMi Capacittio M4dia do Municipio
CMN
EAFRD
EAGGF
EFRD
ESF
FCM
Average Municipal Capacity
Capaqitbo M6dia Nacional
Average National Capacity
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
European Fund for Regional Development
European Social Fund
Fundo de Coeso Municipal
Municipal Cohesion Fund
FEF Fundo de Equilibrio Financeiro
Financial Equalization Fund
FEP Fish Ecosystems Plan
FFF Fundo de Financiamento das Freguesias
Parish Council Financing Fund
FGM Fundo Geral Municipal
General Municipal Fund
FIFG Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance
FSM Fundo Social Municipal
Municipal Social Fund
IDO (ndice Municipal de Desigualdade de Oportunidades
Municipal Index of Opportunity Inequality
IDS Indice Nacional de Desenvolvimento Social
National Social Development Index
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All Other Acronyms
AMT Autoridade Metropolitana de Transportes
Metropolitan Transportation Authority
CCDR Comissio de Coordenaqgo e Desenvolvimento Regional
Coordination and Regional Development Commission
CI Comunidades Intermunicipais
Intermunicipal Communities
CP Comboios de Portugal
Portuguese Trains
CU Comunidades Urbanas
Urban Communities
DBOT Design, Build, Operate, Transfer
DGI DirecqAo-Geral dos Impostos
Tax Directorate-General
DGTTF Direcqo-Geral dos Transportes Terrestres e Fluviais
Director General of Land and Water Transportation
DGV Direcqo-Geral do ViaýAo
Director General of Traffic
EN Estradas Nacionais
National Routes
EP Estradas de Portugal
Highways of Portugal
EPFL Ecole Polytechnique FHddrale de Luasanne
Federal Polytechnic School of Luasanne
ER Estradas Regionais
Regional Routes
EU European Union
GAM Grandes Areas Metropolitanas
Large Metropolitan Areas
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IC Itinerbrios Complementares
Complementary Routes
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMTT Instituto da Mobilidade e dos Transportes Terrestres
Institute of Mobility and Land Transportation
INE Instituto Nacional de Estatistica
National Statistics Institute
INIR Instituto das Infra-Estructuras Rodovidrias
Institute of Roadway Infrastructure
INTF Instituto Nacional do Transporte Ferrovibrio
National Institute of Rail Transportation
IP Itinerdrios Principais
Principle Routes
IST Instituto Superior Tkcnico
Superior Technical Institute
MAOTDR Ministdrio do Ambiente, do Ordenamento do Territ6rio e do Desenvolvimento Regional
Ministry for Environment, Spatial Planning and Regional Development
MFAP Ministdrio das Finanqas e da Administra(qo Piblica
Ministry of Finance and Public Administration
ML Metropolitano de Lisboa
Lisbon Metro
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MM Metro Mondego
Mondego Metro
MOPTC Ministdrio de Obras Piblicas, Transportes e Comunicaý6es
Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communication
MP Metropolitano do Porto
Porto Metro
MST Metro Sul do Tejo
South Tejo Metro
NUTS Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
PIDDAC Programa de Investimentos e Despesas de Desenvolvimento da Administraso Central
Program for Investments and Development Expenses of Central Administration
PRACE Programa de Reestructuraqgo de Administracqo Central do Estado
Restructuring Program for the State's Central Administration
PRN Piano Rodovibrio Nacional
National Roadway Plan
PS Partido Socialista
Socialist Party
PSD Partido Social Democrata
Social Democrat Party
QREN Quadro de Refer~ncia Estrategico Nacional
National Strategic Reference Framework
RAVE Rede Ferrovibria de Alta Velocidade
High Speed Rail Network
REFER Rede FerroviAria Nacional
National Rail Network
SCUT Sem Custo para o Utilizador (Portagem Virtual)
Without Cost for the User (Virtual or Shadow Toll)
SEAOPC Secrethrio do Estado Adjunto das Obras Piblicas e das Comunicaq6es
Secretary of State for Public Works and Communication
SEE Sector Empresarial do Estado
State Enterprise Sector
SET Secretbria de Estados do Transportes
Secretary of State for Transportation
SITEE Sistema Integrado Transportes e Estacionamento de Nvora
Integrated Transportation and Parking System of Avora
SMAT Serviqos Municipalizados de Aguas e Transportes Portalegre
Municpalized Water and Transportation Services Portalegre
SMTUC Serviqos Municipalizados de Transportes Urbanos de Coimbra
Municipalized Urban Transportation Services of Coimbra
STCP Sociedade de Transportes Colectivos do Porto
Society for Collective Transport of Porto
STUB Servigo de Transportes Urbanos de Braganpa
Urban Transportation Services of Braganga
TCB Serviqos Municipalizados de Transportes Colectivos do Barreiro
Municipalized Collective Transportation Services of Barreiro
TEN-T Trans-European Networks -Transport
TIP Transportes Intermodais do Porto
Intermodal Transportation of Porto
TTT Equipa de Missio da Terceira Travessia do Tejo
Team for the Third Rio Tejo River Crossing
TUB Transportes Urbanas de Braga
Braga Urban Transport
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Appendix
Table A. Interview List
Interviewee Title Agency Date
Anonymous - January 30, 2008
Anonymous - - January 31, 2008
Anonymous - January 31,2008
Anonymous - February 7, 2008
Anonymous - February 12, 2008
Anonymous - February 12, 2008
Anonymous - February 12, 2008
Carlos Sousa Bentes Director of Finance Carris February 8, 2008
Director, MunicipalJos Branco Director, Municipal Cmara Municipal do Porto February 2, 2008Directorate of Finance
Rui Nelson Dinis Secretary General Estradas de Portugal (EP) August 1, 2007
Gonqalo Freitas Director of Finance RAVE August 3, 2007
Director, Cabinet of Ministry of Public Works,
Jose Pinheiro Henriques Planning, Strategy, and Transportation and February 12, 2008
International Relations Communications (MOPTC)
Rosdrio Machrio Assistant Professor Instituto Superior Tdcnico August 3, 2007
Jorge Carvalho Mouro Geographer, Urban Strategic Cmara Municipal de Lisboa February 8, 2008
Planning
Ministry of Public Works,
Pedro Nascimento Aid Transportation and August 2, 2007
Communications (MOPTC)
Daniel Neves Director Mobilidade February 7, 2008
Ministry of Public Works,
Eduardo Borges Pires Assessor Transportation and August 2, 2007
Communications (MOPTC)
Director, Department ofJoio Portela Director, Department of Brisa July 31, 2007New Concessions
Paulo Sd Chief Financial Officer Sociedade de Transportes February 2, 2008Colectivos do Porto
Alvaro Seco President Metro Mondego February 1, 2008
Instituto da Mobilidade e dos
Jorge Silva Board Member Transportes Terrestres July 25, 2007
(IMTT)
Jose M. Viegas Professor Instituto Superior Thcnico July 13, 2007
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